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 Developmental psychologist John Flavell (1979, 1981) used the term 
metacognition to encompass any form of thinking about one’s thinking. Flavell did not 
consider this second-level capacity to be a regular part of the thinking and learning of 
preschool children. However, research using developmentally-appropriate tasks, 
especially early literacy tasks, has suggested otherwise. Therefore, through this 
qualitative and exploratory study, I investigated whether and how seven 4-year-olds 
attending full-day preschool were metacognitive as they read narrative picture books with 
me in their classroom. Over the course of their pre-kindergarten school year, during free 
choice morning centers, I engaged the participants in repeated joint readings of 
commercially available, narrative picture books. Throughout the informal dialogue of 
each joint reading session, I posed questions meant to encourage metacognitive 
processing. I transcribed the dialogue from these sessions and coded each researcher and 
 
 
participant speech turn. I utilized a constant-comparative process to analyze 
transcriptions throughout the data collection process while referring to Flavell’s (1979, 
1981) conceptualization of metacognition and prior studies of metacognition with 
preschool participants. This process resulted in the articulation of seven categories of 
metacognition relevant to preschoolers’ joint reading processes: Feeling of Knowing 
Story Content, Judgment of Difficulty, Reflecting on Reading, Verbal Self-Revising, 
Expanding Storytelling, Task Planning, and Justifying Verbalizations. Participants 
engaged in a total of 219 instances of these forms of metacognition. Approximately 60% 
of these instances were prompted—occurring in response to a question that I posed 
within the joint reading dialogue. However, approximately 40% of recorded instances of 
metacognition occurred spontaneously. All seven participants were metacognitive in at 
least five of the seven categories, across all four books, and through both prompted and 
spontaneous verbalizations. Consistent with Flavell’s (1979) conceptualization, 
metacognition functioned as a transactionally-relevant resource for each joint reading 
participant, manifesting in ways that reflected varying efforts to participate in the task 
and construct meaning from the story. My results challenge the notion that metacognition 
has limited relevance before proficient or conventional print reading (Baker, 2005; 
Hacker, 1998; Pressley & Gaskins, 2006; Veenman, et al., 2006) and provide further 
support for Whitebread et al.’s (2009) conclusion that underappreciation of the 
metacognitive capabilities of preschoolers is becoming an “increasingly untenable” 
position (p. 64). Given my findings, I discuss implications for metacognitive theory and 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Metacognition refers to a secondary level of cognition through which someone can 
revisit, reflect on, and react productively to their cognitive efforts and experiences (Brown, 1978; 
Flavell, 1976, 1979, 1981). Metacognition has been recognized as a critical factor in successful 
reading from the initial decoding of words (Clay, 1991) through the comprehension of connected 
text (Baker & Brown, 1984) and the ability to learn from reading at all academic levels 
(Boulware-Gooden, Carreker, Thornhill, & Joshi, 2007; Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 2000; 
Hacker, 1998; National Institute of Health & Child Development, 2000; Pressley & Gaskins, 
2006; Veenman, 2014; Veenman, Van Hout, & Afflerbach, 2006; Wang, Haertel, & Walberg, 
1990). It is widely recognized that metacognition is important to literacy development and 
proficiency, and it is widely recognized that children have meaningful literacy experiences 
before they begin to read print in the conventional sense (Clay, 1991; Dooley & Matthews, 
2009). However, metacognition is not commonly considered to be a fundamental component of 
emergent literacy. This assumption may be attributable to developmental psychologist John 
Flavell’s (1976, 1979) original explication of the concept, which excluded preschool children 
from metacognitive agency, as well as the results of research in which preschool children failed 
to accurately rate their knowledge, select helpful tools for a task, object to egregious illogic, or 
generally think or talk about their thinking (Flavell, 1979; Flavell, Friedrichs, & Hoyt, 1970; 
Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995; Vygotsky, 1978). A 1998 joint statement on emergent literacy 
by the International Literacy Association and the National Association for the Education of 
Young Children may have reflected this assumption by not explicitly mentioning metacognition 
in conjunction with preschoolers. 
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However, Revelle, Wellman, and Karabenick (1985) and, more recently, Whitebread et 
al. (2009), have argued that reliance on unfamiliar, decontextualized, and irrelevant tasks has 
resulted in under-recognition of young children’s metacognitive abilities in research and theory. 
Preschoolers have been more likely to be found to be metacognitive when research settings, 
tasks, and materials were relatable and when the criteria for being metacognitive could be met 
through behaviors and forms of communication typical for their age (Marulis, 2014). For 
example, Whitebread et al. (2009) and Neuman and Roskos (1997) documented multiple forms 
of metacognition in preschoolers’ intentional, goal-directed, and sometimes planned behaviors 
while working at learning centers in their classroom. Rowe (1989) noted preschoolers’ self-
reflective revisions and expansions as they composed and revised original texts through self-
selected emergent writing activities. Fang and Cox (1999) documented similar behaviors when 
preschoolers dictated original stories to a scribe. Holdaway characterized preschoolers’ first 
experiences with picture storybooks as having a pervasive element of metacognition, manifested 
through self-regulatory behaviors during their “re-enactments” (1979, p. 7). Brenna (1995) 
observed that precocious preschool readers employed metacognitive meaning-making strategies 
that referenced and sometimes coordinated self, task, and text knowledge. Skarakis-Doyle and 
Dempsey (2008) found that preschoolers with a range of developmental profiles objected to the 
insertion of an error in the second read aloud of a simple, short story. In her seminal study of 
pretend storybook reading, Sulzby acknowledged that a pre-reading participant made an 
introspective and self-referential “meta-statement” (1985, p. 465). However, meta-processing did 
not become part of her emergent literacy schemata. This collection of evidence using 
developmentally appropriate tasks depicts a preschooler who can revisit, reflect on, and react 
productively to her or his own cognition across multiple early literacy and learning scenarios. 
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Were these manifestations of metacognition exceptions—or do conceptualizations of both 
metacognition and emergent literacy need to be updated to accommodate them?  
A related question concerns whether metacognition plays a role in joint picture book 
reading. Joint picture book reading is a foundational emergent literacy experience, yet it is 
underutilized as a methodological approach for studying early metacognition. The National Early 
Literacy Panel (NELP; 2008) recommended joint (i.e., shared) picture book reading as a 
developmentally appropriate, supportive, and naturalistic emergent literacy experience for 
preschoolers. In various forms, jointly reading a picture book with an adult caregiver is a typical 
practice in children’s homes and in the preschool setting. Approximately 50% of U.S. children 
under five experience joint reading at home on a regular basis (U.S. Department of Education 
[USDOE], 1999; Scholastic, 2018). Additionally, almost nine out of ten young children have 
heard a story read aloud within the prior week (USDOE, 2018). In the preschool classroom 
where this study took place, interacting with picture books was a valued and familiar activity. 
One-to-one joint readings were considered to be best practice and occurred occasionally, based 
on the availability of a teacher or adult volunteer. Class members also experienced picture books 
on a daily basis through listening to whole class read alouds and engaging in pretend reading at 
the class library, during centers, or at nap time.  
Within this setting, I engaged seven 4-year-old class members in repeated joint readings 
of commercially available, narrative picture books intended for a preschool audience. My goal 
was to investigate 4-year-olds’ metacognitive behaviors and verbalizations during the joint 
reading of picture books that they might encounter when not under study. Joint picture book 
reading is one of many foundational emergent literacy experiences thought to contribute to 
reading and thinking skills (NELP, 2008; Pellegrini & Galda, 2003; Schickedanz & McGee, 
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2010; Snow, Burns, & Griffin, 1998). Since metacognition has been shown to be germane to the 
various emergent literacy activities referenced above (e.g., independent pretend reading and 
writing, detecting errors during read alouds, and participating in learning centers), I sought to 
investigate the relevance of metacognition to joint picture book reading. I also sought to explain 
how early metacognition in this context is consistent with Flavell’s conceptualization and is 
therefore worthy of continued study through the same theoretical foundation used to study 
metacognition during conventional literacy. 
Preschool children (3- to 5-years-old in the U.S.) are considered to be in a phase of 
emergent literacy—a period of development involving the acquisition of fundamental skills and 
beliefs that will enculturate them into a print-based society (NELP, 2008). Preschoolers achieve 
emergent literacy milestones as they notice environmental print, play with rhyming sounds, turn 
book pages from front to back, pretend to read, say the letters in their name, and listen to books 
that adults read aloud (Clay, 1991; Dooley, 2010; Sulzby, 1985). During this period before 
conventional print reading, jointly “reading” and discussing narrative picture books with an adult 
offers opportunities to consider story structure, react to evocative scenarios, make inferences 
about the motivations of characters, and hear new words that label tangible and intangible things 
in the world (Dooley, 2010; Lynch, van den Broek, Kremer, Kendeou, White, & Lorch, 2008; 
NELP, 2008; Stahl, 2014; Sulzby & Teale, 1991). For conventional readers, these scenarios can 
be rich spaces for metacognition (Annevirta, Laakkonen, Kinnunen, & Vauras, 2007; Baker & 
Brown, 1984; Boulware-Gooden et al., 2007; Bransford et al., 2000; Palincsar & Brown, 1984; 
Veenman, 2014). Through the present study, I sought to understand whether and how jointly 
reading narrative picture book stories could enable spaces for 4-year-old pre-readers to manifest 
early, reading-relevant metacognition.  
5 
 
Preschoolers’ actions and reactions while participating in joint reading are not only 
constructive ways of knowing, but also may be precursors to the comprehension processes of 
conventional readers (Dooley, 2010; Lynch et al., 2008). Thus, I chose a joint (or shared) reading 
dynamic to both encourage and document participants’ meaning-making processes as they 
jointly “read” the book and discussed settings, characters, events, and the range of novel and 
familiar ideas and information represented (NELP, 2008). I intended for this methodology to 
create multiple opportunities for participants to wonder, infer, learn, remember, reflect, connect, 
and update their understanding—spontaneously or in response to my questions (Baker & Brown, 
1984; Paris & Paris, 2003; Schickedanz & McGee, 2010; Stahl, 2014).  
Motivation and Rationale 
 As a teacher, I have always been interested in how literacy cultivates thinking and 
learning. Moved by awareness of disparate achievement and underachievement, I became 
interested in the relationship between metacognition and literacy. In 2015, I began my study of 
metacognition as an active and higher order capacity important for constructivist learning—that 
is, when a learner actively constructs meaning from a framework of prior knowledge, prior 
experiences, and personal motivations (Flavell, 1993; Markman, 1981; Morrison, 2008). I 
decided to investigate metacognition during the joint reading of narrative picture books as an 
alternative to focusing on discrete early literacy skills such as vocabulary, letter recognition, or 
book-handling (Blamey, Beauchat, & Sweetman, 2012; Britto, Fuligni, & Brooks-Gunn, 2006). 
Acquisition of code-based skills has received extensive attention; additional research is needed to 
understand the less discrete skills that contribute to comprehension and self-aware literary 
agency (Paris, 2011; Schickedanz & McGee, 2010). 
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How young children think and think about their thinking while interacting with picture 
books is an important yet understudied phenomenon. A relative lack of research on such an 
“unconstrained” skill (Paris, 2005, p.187) may be attributable to the arduous nature of collecting 
and interpreting children’s thoughts as well as pessimistic presumptions suggested by Flavell’s 
description of a much older metacognitive agent, Piaget’s hierarchical stage view of cognitive 
development, and historical research approaches (Marulis, 2014). However, if comprehending 
and learning from texts are the penultimate goals of reading, then concern for mindfulness must 
start when literacy starts, which is before the onset of conventional print reading (Baker, 2005; 
Clay, 1991; Markman, 1977; Schickedanz & McGee, 2010). Thus, I designed this study to 
investigate the cognitive and metacognitive knowledge, skills, and experiences that preschoolers 
can rely on to make sense of narrative picture books. I intended for my results to advocate for 
increased inclusion of preschoolers in metacognition research as well as increased attention to 
evidence of early metacognition in discussions of emergent literacy. In the next sections, I 
present additional information that further supports my rationale for investigating the 
metacognitive capacities of preschoolers during joint reading. 
Metacognition is not just a function of age. Preschool children are developmentally 
capable of basic metacognition as they make reflective sense of everyday social experiences and 
learn basic ideas through interaction with others and the environment (Baker, 2005; Kuhn, 2000; 
Trawick-Smith, 2006). Though Flavell referenced older readers and students to exemplify his 
ideas, he conceded that “some aspects of metacognition, just like some aspects of general 
cognition, are probably present almost from the beginning” (1987, p. 25). An extensive body of 
psychological research and a growing body of literacy research have established that 4-year-olds 
can be metacognitive, especially when the task seems relevant or familiar and when the criteria 
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for being metacognitive can be met through typical communication and behavior (Stein, 1986; 
Whitebread et al., 2009). Granted, younger children are not as cognitively and metacognitively 
capable as older ones (Annevirta & Vauras, 2001; Flavell et al., 1995), and pre-conventional 
readers cannot yet read. However, readers of any age can have limited metacognitive knowledge 
about reading as a mental activity (Jacobs & Paris, 1987) and limited ability to discuss reading in 
a self-reflective manner (Martin & Kragler, 2011; Mokhtari & Reichard, 2002). Developmental 
limitations may impose parameters on reading processes and performances (van den Broek, 
Kendeou, Lousberg, & Visser, 2011), but they do not lessen the importance of investigating 
metacognition during those processes and performances (Annevirta et al., 2007; Baker, 2005).   
Emergent comprehension and metacognition have been understudied in the 
preschool population. The National Research Council’s Preventing Reading Difficulties in 
Young Children (Snow et al., 1998) addressed the need for high quality preschool experiences 
for all children—especially those at risk for disparate achievement. Snow et al. (1998) 
recommended that preschoolers experience frequent, open-ended, adult-child conversation about 
books and literacy experiences. They recommended that conventional readers benefit from 
metacognitive pedagogies, such as Reciprocal Teaching (Palincsar & Brown, 1984). In other 
words, Snow et al. (1998) explicitly mentioned metacognitive pedagogy for conventional readers 
but not for preschoolers. A decade later, the National Early Literacy Panel, which was purposed 
with extending the scientifically-based findings of the National Reading Panel to children birth 
through age five, concluded that “code-focused instruction” was the necessary pathway forward 
(2008, p. 120). Though the NELP also recommended shared or joint reading for its educative 
adult-child interactions, it consistently referred to comprehension as an aspect of “conventional” 
versus “emergent” literacy (2008, p. 3). In sum, both NELP (2008) and Snow et al. (1998) 
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recommended that preschoolers experience the rich conversation of dialogic reading, yet neither 
explicitly assigned importance to metacognitive skills for preschoolers.  
Many scholars, including Dooley and Matthews (2009) and Paris (2011), have suggested 
that the emergent literacy community pay increased attention to the processes and skills that are 
less constrained than code-based skills. For example, Tompkins, Guo, and Justice (2013) 
proposed that inferencing should be considered an important aspect of emergent literacy, since 
story comprehension is driven by a network of inferences, whether the story is read, jointly read, 
viewed, or heard (Kendeou, van den Broek, Helder, & Karlsson, 2014). Through the present 
study, I sought to investigate metacognitive processing as a higher order, unconstrained emergent 
literacy capacity (Paris, 2005) during joint picture book reading, wherein comprehension was 
presumably the goal.   
There is urgent demand for better understanding of metacognition in early reading 
and learning. In the United States, there is an increasing demand for metacognitive reading and 
learning, exemplified by the Common Core State Standards’ (Council of Chief State School 
Officers, 2014) emphasis on higher order thinking and metacognition from kindergarten onward. 
According to Afflerbach, Holmberg-Masden, Ozturk, and Faust (2014), “metacognitive 
proficiency is a fundamental underpinning of the new type of critical thinking and self-directed 
reading and learning called for by the new Common Core State Standards” (p. 1). Yet the 
Standards do not provide thorough guidance on how to develop these capacities in young 
learners (Afflerbach et al., 2014; Brown, Garzarek, & Donegan, 2014). In response, the National 
Association for the Education of Young Children (NAEYC, 2012) encouraged the formation of 
connections between preschool experiences and the sophisticated thinking that the Standards 
require as soon as kindergarten. Exploration of the ways that preschool children can be 
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metacognitive, and how metacognition can aid their comprehension, is a reasonable response to 
this recommendation. Description of comprehension and metacognition during joint reading can 
contribute specific examples of the thinking that preschoolers can rely on during their 
interactions with texts featuring ideas, structured information, and narrative situations (van den 
Broek et al., 2011). 
Studying metacognition during emergent picture book reading may help to inform 
connections between emergent literacy and the metacognition that is in demand during 
conventional reading. In fact, Annevirta et al. (2007) reported a positive relationship between 
growth in metacognitive knowledge before reading and eventual reading comprehension. 
Lysaker and Hopper (2015) proposed that “finding continuities between early meaning-making 
practices and later conventional reading strategies could inform early reading instruction and 
help children make important connections between meaning making with non-print and print-
related tasks” (p. 650). Finally, Markman (1977) cautioned that a comfortable tolerance of 
incomprehension (caused by a lack of metacognition) can begin early and persist throughout 
conventional literacy. 
Developmentally-appropriate, relevant methods can advance the study of reading-
relevant metacognition before print reading. Joint picture book reading may reveal more 
information about early metacognitive processing than prior approaches such as independent 
pretend reading or error detection procedures. Historically, researchers have asked preschool-
aged or slightly older participants to react to an error in text read aloud (Baker, 2005; Flavell, 
1979; Garner, 1987; Markman, 1977; Revelle et al., 1985). These oral procedures were based on 
tasks in which conventional readers were invited to detect errors implanted in printed text. Better 
error detectors tended to be better comprehenders (Garner, 1987; Oakhill, Hartt, & Samols, 
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2005), suggesting that this approach revealed insights about how readers detected and 
communicated their comprehension problems (Garner, 1987). In a classic example, Flavell 
(1987) asked kindergarteners to build a block tower according to instructions played from a tape 
player. Some of the instructions were “ambiguous, impossible to execute, or otherwise 
inadequate” (p. 24). Flavell reported that 5-year-olds and 6-year-olds displayed and verbalized 
puzzlement yet still attempted to carry out the problematic instructions. Many of these 
participants claimed that the instructions were “good” (p. 24) and that their tower met the 
requirements. Markman (1977) found similar results for first-graders, but she also noted that 
first-graders’ performances improved after witnessing a demonstration. Markman (1977) 
concluded that a demonstration mediated task demands by presenting abstract ideas on a physical 
plane (Vygotsky, 1987). In other words, additional scaffolding led to more successful 
metacognitive processing for participants who had previously been determined to be incapable of 
useful metacognition. Flavell speculated that young children may have feelings of 
“incomprehension” (1987, p. 25), yet not be able to rely on them to inform their next steps. 
Markman’s (1977) results suggested that reducing task demands—through joint participation—
helped children put metacognition into action.  
These error detection procedures exemplified how an unfamiliar task can underestimate 
the metacognitive abilities of young children (Markman, 1981; Revelle et al., 1985; Whitebread 
et al., 2009). By embedding an error detection task into the familiar procedure of a storybook 
read aloud, Skarakis-Doyle and Dempsey (2008) found that preschoolers noticed and objected to 
erroneous information inserted for research purposes. Their results further support the contention 
that young children are better able to utilize any available metacognition in the context of a 
familiar and mediated experience. A logical next step is to investigate the relevance of 
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metacognition to the mediated (i.e., joint) reading of a book as preschoolers are likely to 
encounter it, at home, at preschool or day care, or in a library.  
Jointly reading picture book stories is a promising method for documenting 
metacognitive processes. The cognitive processes involved in comprehending typical preschool 
stories can be fertile ground for developing both comprehension skills and metacognition (Lynch 
et al., 2008; Schickedanz & McGee, 2010). Stories are unfolding communication events that 
provide opportunities to respond personally, compare information to world knowledge, and 
change one’s mind (Flavell, 1987; Markman, 1977; McGee & Schickedanz, 2007; Stahl, 2014, 
van Kleeck, 2008). Whether a story is read, heard, or interpreted from illustrations, similar 
meaning-making processes are involved (Baker, 2005; Flavell, 1981; Kendeou et al., 2014; Paris 
& Paris, 2003; Stahl, 2014). For example, to establish understanding of stories viewed and/or 
heard, preschoolers might need to assimilate unexpected plot twists or discern how a character is 
suffering from a false belief. Joint reading is thus a challenging yet familiar and mediated 
context. Based on the reasoning discussed in the prior section, I assumed that these 
characteristics would enable opportunities for young children to experience and manifest 
metacognition. Furthermore, since meaning-making processes can vary situationally based on 
interest, familiarity, text complexity, and available schema (Baker & Brown, 1984; Kintsch, 
2004; Rosenblatt, 1978), I decided to study preschoolers’ interactions with multiple texts. 
Statement of the Problem 
 The issues discussed throughout my rationale can be summarized in the following 
statement of the problem. More than a decade ago, Veenman et al. (2006) called for our 
understanding of metacognition to be broadened, including the accommodation of mounting 
evidence of young children’s (5-year-olds, in their example) metacognitive capacities. However, 
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our present understanding of metacognition during preschool emergent literacy remains limited. 
A relative paucity of research in this area may be attributable to expectations set by Flavell 
(1979, 1992, 1993), who excluded preschoolers from full metacognitive agency, or by 
characterizations of early metacognition as exceptions to the contention that reading-relevant 
metacognition develops later (Baker & Brown, 1984; Marulis, 2014; Veenman et al., 2006). 
Emergent literacy scholarship did not historically prioritize metacognition, as exemplified by an 
exclusion of preschoolers from the discussion of metacognition and an exclusion of the term 
metacognition from the discussion of preschool pedagogies (e.g., Snow et al., 1998). Finally, the 
research that has produced evidence of preschoolers’ metacognitive capacities has not utilized 
joint reading as a task context, in spite of the importance of this dynamic to emergent literacy.  
Both exclusion and diminution are called into question by evidence of 4-year-olds’ 
metacognitive engagement across developmentally-appropriate literacy tasks and scenarios: 
emergent writing tasks (e.g., Fang & Cox, 1999; Rowe, 1994), modified storybook read alouds 
(e.g., Skarakis-Doyle & Dempsey, 2008), and daily learning in the preschool classroom (e.g., 
Neuman & Roskos, 1997; Whitebread et al., 2009). Joint storybook reading is a 
developmentally-appropriate task of equal familiarity and importance. Joint reading of a 
narrative picture book also has special potential to manifest metacognition. Within this familiar 
procedure, a moderate degree of challenge and need for metacognition may be posed by the 
information presented through the story and through the conversation with the adult reading 
partner. Therefore, exploratory research on metacognition in this particular context is needed to 
more fully understand the relevance of metacognition during emergent literacy and to provide 
detailed descriptions of early metacognitive activities that can contribute to the updating of 
conceptualizations of this phenomenon.  
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Purpose of Study   
Given the nature of the problem space and my rationale, the purpose of my study was to 
examine the metacognition manifested by preschoolers participating in joint readings of narrative 
picture books typical for the preschool audience. I intended to investigate how preschool children 
understood and reacted to these stories and how they could manifest comprehension and reading-
related metacognition. I anticipated that the joint reading dynamic could be a context for the 
documentation of metacognitive experiences, metacognitive knowledge, and metacognitive 
regulation. I intended to use the open-ended and mediated dynamic of joint reading to help make 
preschoolers’ cognitive processes observable so I could document, describe, and categorize 
them.  
Research Question  
 I posed the following research question: How can 4-year-old pre-readers manifest 
metacognition during joint picture book reading? This question enabled a qualitative and 
exploratory approach to the research problem. To answer this question, I engaged 4-year-olds in 
repeated joint picture book readings as a special form of participant observation and as a context 
for data generation and collection. 
Overview of Methodological Approach 
I entered the study site as a classroom volunteer. From 9 a.m. to 10 a.m. each school day, 
I interacted with pre-kindergarten class members as they engaged in free choice morning centers. 
I invited preschoolers who weren’t occupied to select a book from the classroom library and read 
it with me. By the second week, reading with me was a regular option during centers. By the 
third week, I began to implement a joint reading procedure with enrolled participants. Since my 
aim was exploratory, I interacted with 4-year-olds through informal yet purposeful conversation. 
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I introduced the title and cover of each book and invited each participant to “read it with me.” I 
allowed each reading session to uniquely unfold, as long as we proceeded through the text from 
the front cover to the last page. I prepared for my role by developing comprehension questions 
and metacognitive prompts based on my review of literature. I posed these questions and 
prompts when there was a lull in dialogue or when I thought questioning would spur useful 
metacognition or aid comprehension. I recorded each session, transcribed all utterances, and 
inserted observational notes.  
I began thematic coding during the first week of data collection and conducted additional 
rounds through a constant comparative process until all data were coded. I confirmed the 
accuracy of my transcription through an independent review by a professional transcriptionist. I 
eventually conducted a final round of coding which confirmed seven categories of 
metacognition. I then established acceptable inter-coder consistency by requesting that a second 
rater independently code a randomly-selected sample of transcripts. I reduced this data set by 
presenting descriptive statistics of occurrences of seven categories of metacognition and by 
writing case impressions for each participant. In Chapter 4, I use these cases to discuss what 
occurred before and after instances of metacognition and to compare joint reading performances 
between participants, across books, and across readings.  
Applying Flavell’s Conceptualization of Metacognition to a Reading Task 
To pursue my research question, I applied Flavell’s definition of metacognition to 
conventional reading. Then I adapted Flavell’s (1979, 1981) model of cognitive monitoring for 
use as a model of metacognition within an emergent joint picture book reading task. Flavell 
intended for this model to “capture the variety of things that can happen during a cognitive 
enterprise in which the subject does at least some monitoring of cognitive goals, experiences, and 
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actions” (1981, p. 39). Since all metacognitive activity can be presumed to result from some 
second-level monitoring of engagement of the self in an activity, domain, or enterprise (Flavell, 
1976, 1981), this model can be used to support investigation of metacognition in both 
conventional and emergent reading.  
Flavell (1992) endorsed a cognitive constructivist framework for the study of learning 
and development. In this framework, the young child is always engaged in “intellectual 
commerce with the environment” (Flavell, 1992, p. 998). Accordingly, I chose to investigate the 
thoughts and motivations of the child to understand joint reading behaviors. Per Brown’s (1983) 
description of constructive engagement, I expected preschoolers to engage in “knowledge-
extending and knowledge-refining activities … [to] question the veracity or range of 
applicability of their theories … [to] perform thought experiments, question their own basic 
assumptions … and [to] reason on the basis of whatever knowledge they have” (as cited in 
Flavell, 1992, p. 998). 
Reading tasks, especially for young children, tend to pose at least some degree of novelty 
or difficulty and have the ostensible goals of completing the text and understanding it. Ideally, 
reading is a dynamic process of active and reflective meaning-making, making cognitive and 
metacognitive aspects variably relevant (Baker & Brown, 1984; Bransford et al., 2000; Flavell, 
1981; Pressley & Gaskins, 2006). In fact, Baker & Brown (1984) advocated that the process of 
comprehending be seen as inherently metacognitive, as constructive meaning making involves 
constant formation of a hypothesis of what something is about, followed by confirmation, 
expansion, or revision of the hypothesis as more information is encountered and more processing 
takes place.  
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As shown in Figure 1, Flavell’s model of cognitive monitoring (1979, 1981), used here as 
a visual representation of metacognition during a literary task, features metacognitive 







Metacognitive knowledge can be gained about one’s self, task demands, or cognitive 
actions one may take. These three forms of metacognitive knowledge may influence each other 
in complex ways, and each may interact with factors represented in other parts of the model to 
influence reading task performance. Sometimes, the meta- or second level of knowledge in any 
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knowledge of the self as a literate being can be “intraindividual,” “interindividual,” or 
“universal” (Flavell, 1981, p. 43). A reader may develop the self-knowledge that she or he can’t 
read a word, is able to remember more from reading silently, or that the narrative genre is more 
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taken seriously and acted on. Thus, metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive experiences are 
interconnected, as are all parts of Flavell’s model. Knowledge of a task’s demands, built through 
exposure, instruction, and metacognitive experiences, can help a reader take productive actions 
(Bransford et al., 2000; Griffith & Ruan, 2005; Pressley & Gaskins, 2006). Cognitive and 
metacognitive knowledge of actions that are called for by a task can be gained through individual 
experience, social learning, and formal instruction. Though experience is a key component of 
expertise, the constructive efforts of novices are worthy of study (Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982). 
Metacognitive experiences occur frequently, such as when readers consciously realize 
something or have a feeling of confusion relative to their desire for understanding (Flavell, 
1981). Since these more nebulous, second-level insights may occur at any point during or after a 
task (Flavell, 1979), arbitrary limitations on reaction times may cause metacognitive experiences 
to be discouraged or dismissed. Also, according to Flavell (1981), metacognitive experiences 
tend to have affective dimensions in addition to cognitive ones. Clay (1991) incorporated this 
idea in her description of how metacognitive experiences are fundamental to early print reading: 
a kindergartener or first grader must coordinate multiple cognitive and perceptual efforts to 
decipher printed English and must also possess the motivation to try to do so and the resilience to 
keep trying when efforts fail. Because of these characteristics, Flavell (1981) proposed that 
readers may have more difficulty identifying and reporting on metacognitive experiences as 
opposed to metacognitive knowledge, which tends to function as a stateable fact from long term 
memory. Thus, despite the relative ubiquity of metacognitive experiences, readers may not 
always translate them into stateable metacognitive knowledge or productive actions (Baker & 
Brown, 1984; Bransford et al., 2000). This scenario suggests the revelatory value of prompting in 
research and the academic value of metacognitive education in general. Flavell (1981) provided 
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the following examples of metacognitive experiences that are relevant to reading education: 
realizing that part of a message is critical and must be remembered, surmising that the teacher is 
reading too fast for you to keep up, recognizing that you are overwhelmed by a large amount of 
information or a limited time for rehearsal, and realizing that there can be another way to 
approach a task or meet a goal.  
Cognitive goals, such as comprehension of text or completion of a reading task, define 
what actions should be taken. Familiarity with a task or a goal supports more efficient selection 
of actions taken to reach that goal. Hence, reading education has significant potential to increase 
cognitive and metacognitive efficiency, and vice versa (Bransford et al., 2000; Flavell, 1979, 
1981; Palincsar & Brown, 1984). Cumulative successes or failures can lead a reader to adjust 
goals upwards or downwards. Over time, achieving or missing goals can contribute to what is 
believed to be knowledge about the self, such as being able or not able to read or read well.  
Cognitive actions are taken to reach a goal. Actions taken in pursuit of a goal may be 
mastered skills, rote procedures, the application of a formal strategy, or an effort made as a result 
of intuition or experimentation in the moment. Flavell (1981) provided the following examples 
of cognitive actions: trying another approach, redoing a task, paraphrasing, taking notes, and 
using memorization techniques. Metacognition can bring together cognitive actions and first-
level knowledge during a task. For example, realizing the need to try another approach to 
constructing meaning for a text is a metacognitive experience. Knowing that this feeling should 
always be taken seriously and acted on is metacognitive knowledge. Trying another approach is 
a cognitive action. Knowing three possible approaches is cognitive knowledge (Flavell, 1981).  
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A commitment to a strategic approach to reading can increase the likelihood of applying 
metacognition when needed (Palincsar & Brown, 1984; Pressley & Gaskins, 2006). Reading 
comprehension strategies, such as re-reading, pausing to define unknown terms, and determining 
relative importance are examples of productive actions while reading (Palincsar & Brown, 1984; 
Palincsar & Schutz, 2011). At the cognitive level, a reader can name a strategy and follow its 
component steps. At the metacognitive level, the reader has ideas about her or his proficiency 
with a strategy and makes a thoughtful choice about when to use it. These forms of knowledge 
are referred to in the literature as declarative, procedural, and conditional (Jacobs & Paris, 1987). 
These distinctions highlight the complexities of investigating whether task performance can be 
attributed to cognitive factors, metacognitive factors, or some combination or interaction. Lack 
of metacognition is considered to be an availability deficiency; inability to apply metacognition 
is considered to be a production deficiency (Veenman et al., 2006). 
Adapting a Model for Joint Reading with Preschoolers 
Flavell (1993) recognized that preschoolers are aware of thinking as an internal, 
representational, mental activity. In this view, Flavell considered the preschooler to be more 
advanced than did Piaget (1929/1997), who insisted that children as old as five or six years still 
did not understand thinking as an abstract enterprise. Nonetheless, Flavell (1979, 1992, 1993) 
concluded that preschoolers cannot consistently or productively rely on a continuous stream of 
consciousness to help themselves cope with task demands through metacognition. Flavell (1981) 
also concluded that preschoolers are not yet able to process messages from text as cognitive units 
upon which more mental work may be done. However, Flavell did not test his ideas about young 
children in the interactive and supportive context of joint picture book reading, which can 
20 
 
mediate connections between the cognitive and the metacognitive through the process of 
comprehending as well as interaction with the adult reading partner (Pellegrini & Galda, 2003).   
The essence of Flavell’s (1981) task-oriented model of cognitive monitoring and his 
distinction between knowledge, experience, and regulation can be applied to emergent joint 
picture book reading. I claim that 4-year-olds can engage in constructively-responsive meaning 
making during joint reading and that metacognition is a situationally relevant part of this 
response, manifesting in ways that make sense for the reader, the text, and the task. Thus, as 
shown in Figure 2, I adapted Flavell’s (1981) model for use in the study of joint picture book 
reading and inserted the seven forms of metacognition that I identified through coding. 
 







Preschoolers may engage in many cognitive actions during joint reading, as shown in the 
middle box of Figure 2. The primary adaptation of this model for use in emergent versus 
conventional reading is the positioning of these emergent literacy actions as a medium that 
Metacognitive Regulation 
 
• Task Planning 
• Expanding Storytelling 
• Verbal Self-Revising 
  
Metacognitive Experiences 
• Feeling of Knowing Story 
Content 
• Judging Story Difficulty 









• Story comprehension 
• Word or concept learning 
• Dialogic participation  
Self Task 
Action 
Cognitive Actions in Joint 
Picture Book Reading 
• Book handling 
• Page-turning 
• Pointing at pictures 






• Applying background 
knowledge 
• Pretend reading 
• Listening to read aloud 
• Commenting and discussing 
 
Figure 2. Flavell’s model of cognitive monitoring (1981) adapted for a joint reading task 
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engaged preschoolers in a developmentally-appropriate task that enabled metacognition. This 
task provided a meaningful context that connected age-typical behaviors in pursuit of a goal. 
Additionally, I presumed that preschoolers’ text interaction behaviors would be less strategic 
than what can be observed in proficient elementary, middle, and high school readers who have 
had years of formal schooling. I also presumed that this difference would not lessen the 
relevance of metacognition to their emergent reading. In sum, I viewed preschoolers’ 
manifestations of metacognition as proportional to the reader, the text, and the task. Participants’ 
metacognition co-occurred with their discussion of the pancakes, ducklings, baby birds, and 
fireflies that were central to study texts.  
I anticipated that jointly reading a well-structured narrative would enable opportunities to 
construct understanding, to learn, to discuss information, and to be metacognitive. Dooley and 
Matthews applied a constructive and transactional (i.e., self, text, and task; 2009) lens to the 
study of preschool emergent literacy by using developmentally-appropriate texts and tasks. In 
my adapted model, the preschool child is a cognitive-constructive and metacognitive agent 
engaged in a variety of age-typical cognitive and metacognitive efforts in the context of joint 
picture book reading. In sum, I relied on Flavell’s situational (i.e., task-oriented) model of 
metacognition, complemented by a cognitive-constructivist lens, to make claims about 
metacognition and comprehension during joint picture book reading.  
Goals imply conscious intentionality. Flavell (1981) described a bi-directional 
relationship between cognitive goals and metacognition. The more experience one has with an 
academic or literary task, such as understanding a story or describing its plot, the easier it 
becomes to set appropriate goals and select appropriate resources. Appropriateness is multi-
faceted. What persons need to be successful on a task tends to vary based on their knowledge, 
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task experience, interests, and motivations. Thus, mindful familiarity with a task can facilitate 
productive intentionality. Goals can be set by the reader or by the task. Setting goals and 
behaving intentionally both reflect and contribute to the growth of metacognition. 
Flavell explained that “metacognitive knowledge is that segment of your (a child’s, an 
adult’s) stored world knowledge that has to do with people as cognitive creatures and with their 
diverse cognitive tasks, goals, actions, and experiences” (1979, p. 906). Such knowledge can be 
gained through explicit instruction, statements about reading made by parents, teachers, and 
caregivers, social or academic feedback, and informal literacy experiences. In turn, it can 
influence subsequent efforts and experiences while reading. In the present study, I documented 
Reflecting on Reading as a manifestation of emergent metacognitive knowledge when 
participants articulated, in their own words, a budding awareness of the self as reader, of reading 
as a particular type of mental activity involving extracting or constructing meaning, of the text as 
a story to be understood, or of the task of joint reading as working through the book with me 
from front to back, going back and forth between storytelling and other dialogue. Knowledge is a 
constructive mental resource; it can be applied to achieve more efficient, productive, and 
powerful reading behaviors. I aimed to describe the metacognitive knowledge that pre-readers 
articulated before formal K-12 instruction, as this knowledge can influence their engagement in 
constructive meaning making.  
Brenna (1995) prompted precocious preschool readers to articulate statements of self, 
task, and text knowledge that were relevant to their early independent reading experiences. 
Strommen and Mates (1997) explained that many pre-reading preschoolers, and not just 
precocious readers, are already constructing knowledge about themselves as readers, reading as a 
task, and text as something to be read. In other words, preschoolers are beginning to reflect on 
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themselves as readers, on the text as messages to be interpreted and processed, and on reading as 
a defined cognitive enterprise. The beginning of an identity as a literate person has already been 
recognized to be an aspect of emergent literacy (Dooley & Matthews, 2009; Sulzby, 1985). I 
sought to document and describe how metacognitive aspects of this phenomenon manifested and 
mattered during joint picture book reading. Metacognitive knowledge is only one aspect of 
metacognition. It is important to document, but it has limited value on its own. As noted by 
Veenman, “individual beliefs are personal and subjective by nature, and so remains 
metacognitive knowledge when it is not put to the test by the actual execution of strategies or 
skills (2014, p. 3).  
Flavell (1979) explained that metacognitive experiences function as feelings, realizations, 
or states, such as puzzlement, failure, or success. The content of a metacognitive experience may 
overlap with metacognitive knowledge. However, metacognitive experience functions as a state 
of being versus defined information or fact. Metacognitive experiences are not easily 
documented, even when working with mature, experienced, and conventional readers. They are 
thus likely to be even more challenging to research in preschoolers, who have less reading 
experience, fewer verbal labels for their experiences, and fewer opportunities to discuss them. 
Nonetheless, they can spur the application of strategies and growth in metacognitive knowledge. 
For example, the metacognitive experience of being confused can spur a young reader to ask 
questions. As reflected in the inter-connectedness of the parts of Flavell’s model, cognitive 
knowledge and goals would affect the precision of the question. Readers do not need to know 
and do not ask questions about every detail encountered. The feeling of not knowing some 
information that you need to know does not occur constantly. It is therefore noteworthy to 
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describe under what conditions it does occur for novice comprehenders, prior to formal 
instruction. 
In the present study, I claim that preschoolers experienced metacognitive feelings, 
sensations, and realizations while participating in joint reading, manifested as Feelings of 
Knowing Story Content, Justifications of Prior Verbalizations, and Judgments of Story Difficulty. 
Feeling of Knowing and Judgment of Difficulty are typically considered to be expressions of 
Metamemory, which itself was historically considered to be a form of metacognitive knowledge 
(Veenman, 2014). However, Veenman noted that since feeling and judging involve active and 
coordinated self-evaluation within a particular situation, they are better conceptualized as forms 
of “metacognitive skillfulness” (2014, p. 4) with procedural relevance.  
An example of Feeling of Knowing comes from Cultice, Somerville, and Wellman 
(1983), who found that 4-year-olds expressed reasonably accurate Feelings of Knowing when 
asked if they would recognize pictures of preschool classmates, children from neighboring 
classes, classroom visitors, and people they had never met. Lockl and Schneider (2002) 
commented that Cultice at al.’s results, which suggested greater Feeling of Knowing capacities 
than previously assumed for young children, could be attributed to the developmental 
appropriateness and personal relevance of the task. Cultice et al.’s (1983) Feeling of Knowing 
task provided important evidence of this capacity in preschoolers. However, when the task is 
reading, what one does with information that is known or not, in pursuit of comprehension, is a 
more complicated expression of a feeling of knowing or not knowing. A preschooler’s 
experiential capacity to feel whether she or he knows something in the story is important to 
monitoring whether a mental model is being built. A feeling of not recognizing, knowing, or 
being able to name a character, object, or idea can trigger corrective action. This feedback loop is 
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especially important to comprehension when unknown information is critical. Positive feelings 
of knowing can be presumed to occur without conscious recognition, and negative feelings of 
knowing may be experienced but not expressed. Therefore, in addition to observing whether a 
child asked a question or sought help, prompting a verbal report of knowing can facilitate the 
assessment of this experience within the joint reading dynamic.   
Well-structured stories, such as the four picture book stories that I used in this study, are 
composed of narrative elements and embellished with numerous details. The entire story is also a 
holistic unit of meaning that can be referred to by title (Thorndyke, 1977). Thus, a child’s sense 
of how difficult it was to understand a part of or the whole story is a valid metacognitive insight. 
According to Veenman, conventional metacognitive readers “evaluate their comprehension of 
the text against their reading goals” after reading (2014, p. 9). An assessment, or Judgment, of 
difficulty could reveal insights about what specifically made a story challenging or salient for a 
pre-conventional preschooler, and whether this young child can be aware of and articulate the 
nature of any difficulty experienced (Touroutoglou & Efklides, 2010). Being prompted to 
evaluate and share an experience of difficulty or ease while reading a book may bring attention 
to, and help develop labels for, this type of insight and how to respond to it. Such prompting may 
also provide an early opportunity to think about the story as a whole and the processes 
undertaken to understand it. Over time, a young child could internalize such prompting and 
feedback and begin to engage in metacognitive processes under his or her own direction (Muñoz 
& Santa Cruz, 2016; Pellegrini & Galda, 2003). Being aware that a reading experience is 
difficult can lead to more sensitive self-monitoring and more adept response practices in the 
conventional reader. During pre-reading emergent literacy, being able to report difficulty implies 
an emerging, self-aware capacity to name and interpret one’s experiences and discuss them.  
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Justifying a prior verbalization is an outward, verbal manifestation of an awareness of 
why one had a thought about the story (Paris & Paris, 2003; Whitebread et al., 2009). That there 
are reasons for thoughts is a sophisticated, abstract, and second-level concept requiring a theory 
of mind and an ability to understand and use metacognitive language (e.g., think, know) in 
conversation (Flavell et al., 1995). Reporting why a claim was made involves recall and 
articulation of one’s thoughts; the reporting expresses a metacognitive insight into the thought 
itself as an object. Vygotsky stated that “to be conscious of a mental operation means to transfer 
it from the plane of action to that of language” (1986, p. 163). The content of the justification 
would have to enter one’s consciousness to be reported. Most readers do not spontaneously 
justify or explain why they are thinking something. Such a discourse pattern might be more 
typical to formal reading instruction or writing a geometric proof. However, I found in the 
present study that preschoolers understood my Justification prompts (i.e., Why do you think 
that?) and provided reasonable responses. Though they typically had to be prompted to justify 
their thoughts, they could do so.  
The adapted model features a box titled Metacognitive Regulation. Metacognitive 
regulation encompasses the manifestations of metacognition that most directly propelled the 
reader through the joint reading task, starting with introduction to the book and continuing 
through the process of building and updating a mental model of the story. These were Task 
Planning, Verbal Self-Revising, and Expanding Storytelling. Though all seven forms of 
metacognition identified in the present study can be characterized as active and constructive, 
these three categories were immediately observable forms of engagement with the task. They 
involved in-progress choices that could be observed to determine what happened next.  
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Metacognitive Task Planning involved developing a plan of action based on knowledge 
of self, text, and task. Implementing the plan involved one or more cognitive actions, such as 
choosing where to sit or how to manipulate the book. Veenman explained that the “higher-order 
processes of evaluation and planning at the meta-level govern the object level” (2014, p. 10). In 
the present study, one participant wanted to read with me, but did not want to read through the 
entire book on that particular day. She requested that we open the book in the middle and read 
from that point forward. She then followed through on her stated plan. She actively exerted 
control over how she engaged in the task to match her personal preference for not wanting to 
read the entire book. Her plan reflected an assertion of her coordinated knowledge of the text 
(e.g., an approximate middle), knowledge of the task (e.g., that she was still participating in her 
own way), and knowledge of reading as an enterprise (e.g., that you can read half of a text). Fang 
and Cox (1999) documented preschoolers’ planning behaviors when dictating an original story as 
a form of metacognitive “self-management” (p. 175). In their study, planning was an active form 
of participation in the tasks of story construction and communicating with an adult scribe 
partner. Similar to Jacobs and Paris (1987), Fang and Cox (1999) thought that planning worked 
in concert with monitoring and regulating relative to a presumed intention for constructing 
meaning. Fang and Cox (1999, p. 179) counted children’s conversational verbalizations such as 
“Now what do I do?” and “Let me think” as verbal evidence of planning (see also Cox & Sulzby, 
1982).  
Verbal Self-Revising refers to a scenario wherein a verbalization was offered and then 
replaced with an updated version, within the same reading session, and sometimes within the 
same speech turn. This category is essentially self-correction, as the subsequent statement 
cancels out the first. I assumed that children were correcting themselves for misspeaking or 
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misunderstanding. Fang and Cox (1999) counted children’s oral edits as they dictated a story 
about a personal memory as self-correction based on misspeaking relative to their intentions for 
their story. Monitoring one’s performance enables the correction of errors, whether the errors 
were due to casual misspeaking or underlying incomprehension. In the present study, Revising 
was relatively easy to document; it manifested as immediate or prompt correction of one’s 
storytelling or other verbal statements (Fang & Cox, 1999; Rowe, 1989; Vygotsky, 1978). Most 
Revisions were spontaneous, suggesting not only self-motivated self-monitoring but also the 
capacity to act on problems detected through monitoring. Revising also offered the most 
immediate and observable benefit to the participants, by allowing them to be more accurate in 
their storytelling and in statements made as part of the joint reading conversation. 
Expanding Storytelling involved updating an earlier verbalization to extend or embellish 
it, as opposed to contradicting it. I based the category of Expanding on Fang and Cox’s (1999) 
approach of counting children’s elaborations as literacy-related metacognition. When reading, 
Expanding Storytelling results in story telling that is more like what the author intended. Since I 
did not coach children in how to tell a story, I assumed that Expanding Storytelling manifested 
constant updating of their mental model of the story, achieved through ongoing constructive 
processing and monitoring within and across readings (Baker & Brown, 1984; Kintsch, 1998). 
Expanding was based on the idea that reading is an inherently constructive and metacognitive 
activity (Baker & Brown, 1984). Expanding manifested the dynamic and responsive 
development and management of hypotheses and mental models that are the subject of further 
processing. Feuerstein, Feuerstein, and Falik (2010) emphasized that the capacity to grow and 
change is a fundamental manifestation of metacognition. The Expanding category accounts for 
both the ability and the proclivity to do so when jointly reading a story.  
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Definitions of Key Terms  
Flavell defined metacognition as “knowledge or cognition that takes as its object or 
regulates any aspect of any cognitive endeavor” (1981, p. 37). This broad definition of 
metacognition describes a second level of processing that may be variably observable, relevant, 
or beneficial, depending on a reader’s strengths and weaknesses and challenges posed by a task. 
In the present study, I defined metacognition as the revisiting of an act or aspect of cognitive 
participation in joint reading that enabled insight about the relationship between task 
participation and the self as a reader, the text as something to be read, or the task of reading as a 
defined act of extracting or constructing information. The seven manifestations of metacognition 
described in the present study (Feeling of Knowing Story Content, Judgment of Difficulty, 
Reflecting on Reading, Verbal Self-Revising, Expanding Storytelling, Task Planning, and 
Justifying Verbalizations) represented secondary levels of processing of a thought or reading 
behavior. Each involved the objectification, storage, retrieval, articulation, and re-examination of 
some prior cognition. All of these concepts have been recognized as possibilities for four-year-
olds. In the present study, I described their metacognitive nature and relevance to the joint 
reading dynamic.  
Investigating metacognitive processing during joint picture book reading implicates many 
different behaviors, skills, and experiences. I therefore complemented my use of Flavell’s 
original definition of metacognition with key terms and concepts from multiple areas. I drew on 
literature describing the cognitive-constructive processes involved in comprehension, such as 
applying background knowledge, making inferences, and synthesizing and prioritizing 
information (Kintsch, 1998; Pressley & Gaskins, 2006). I also referred to literature describing the 
unique processes implicated by narrative comprehension, such as relying on a theory of mind 
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and recognizing false belief scenarios (Flavell, 2004; Lynch et al., 2008; Paris & Paris, 2003). To 
define forms of metacognitive processing possible in a joint reading task context, I drew on 
research from psychology and education describing the metacognitive capacities of 4-year-olds. 
From this collection of literature, I identified and defined the following key terms.  
Reading. I employed the RAND Reading Study Group’s definition of reading as a 
transactional process of “simultaneously extracting and constructing meaning through interaction 
and involvement with written language” (Snow, 2002, p. 11). For conventional readers reading 
printed text, this definition applies to reading words in the text and understanding the idea units 
conveyed through words, sentences, paragraphs, and other expressive conventions of written 
language (Kintsch, 2004; Purcell-Gates, 2001). For preschoolers, analogous actions to reading 
the printed word are listening to and responding to the written language read aloud and 
extracting and responding to information presented through illustrations (Dooley & Matthews, 
2009). The stories in wordless or near-wordless books were conceived of in written language by 
the author. Likewise, the story they present can be pretend read in storybook language by the 
reader. Thus, the essence of this definition makes it viable for use in a study of joint reading 
using three types of picture books (traditional, near-wordless, and wordless). The “extraction” 
element of this definition is consistent with the idea that the mental labor required to understand 
might vary given particular combinations of reader and text. The “construction” element is 
consistent with the cognitive constructive orientation of the present study and with Kintsch’s 
model of comprehension. Both extracting and constructing meaning create opportunities for 
metacognitive processing (Baker & Brown, 1984).  
Joint reading. Joint reading is a collaborative and interactive emergent literacy technique 
that can be practiced in a preschool classroom or in the home with a reading caregiver (Morrison, 
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2008). Joint reading places the burden of word recognition on the adult or older reader, thus 
enabling a pre-reader to construct meaning through other pathways (Morrison, 2008). Joint 
picture book reading with preschoolers is most often intended to be dialogic; an adult reader 
encourages active participation in whatever ways are feasible and poses questions to help the 
child process the content (Zevenbergen & Whitehurst, 2003). I chose to conduct one-to-one joint 
reading to enable the collection of the most verbal and non-verbal data possible. In a 
conventional instructional setting, working individually with the teacher is considered to have 
the most instructional intensity (van Kleeck, 2008). Using this dynamic as a research device 
followed the same principle and also allowed participants to internalize aspects of my 
contributions to the dialogue about the book and the process of reading it (Cox & Sulzby, 1982; 
Vygotsky, 1978). Pellegrini and Galda noted the special potential for joint reading to manifest 
and develop “thought and meaning-making processes” (2003, p. 308). Referencing Vygotsky, 
they claimed that “children’s metacognition is seen to have its origins in the social interchange 
between children and their tutors” in such a dynamic (p. 308).  
The joint reading dynamic allowed me to document multiple forms of reading-relevant 
metacognition that manifested underlying awareness, knowledge, and regulation. Since 
participants were free to focus on and provide data about any aspect of the joint reading 
experience, the object of their metacognition could have been their interpretation of a picture, 
recognition of a letter, incomprehension of a main idea, or the entirety of their mental model of 
the text. Participants could have also articulated meta-level knowledge concerning their identity 
as readers or reading as a task or meta-experiences of being puzzled by unknown content.  
Dialogue. Joint reading is dialogic; it involves multiple forms of social and verbal 
interaction that can benefit the younger participant. The U.S. Department of Education (2014) 
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defined dialogic reading as “an interactive shared picture book reading practice designed to 
enhance young children’s language and literacy skills.” Dialogic book reading is a recommended 
emergent literacy practice, yet it is often used to develop relatively constrained skills such as 
learning discrete vocabulary words (Paris, 2011; Schickedanz & McGee, 2010). By jointly 
reading a book in which the pictures convey a portion of meaning, an adult and child can share 
responsibility for constructing a story through informal discussion. In this dynamic, the work of 
meaning-making, which often includes reflection and problem-solving, can be shared (Dooley & 
Matthews, 2009). Joint reading arrangements can vary from highly structured (i.e., scripted) to 
loosely-structured conversations influenced by the adult in a situational manner (NELP, 2008; 
Schickedanz & McGee, 2010).  
In contrast to Sulzby’s (1985) independent pretend reading procedure, joint reading is a 
space for multiple types of text interaction patterns and corresponding forms of dialogic 
interaction: independent pretend reading, listening to an adult read aloud, and implementation of 
a question and answer regime. In the present study, I intended for each joint reading session to be 
perceived as informal and conversational. I influenced the dialogue by posing pre-planned 
questions meant to elicit comprehension and metacognition. However, participants shared 
control of the overall dynamic. They could choose to pretend read or request to be read to. 
Additionally, I acknowledged and engaged with their spontaneous verbalizations and behaviors, 
which resulted in unpredictable conversations about the book. My approach differed from that of 
Skarakis-Doyle and Dempsey (2008), who prioritized standardized procedures over spontaneous 
commentaries, as well as that of Fang and Cox (1999), who affirmed children’s commentaries 
but did not elaborate on them. I intended to engage participants in dialogic conversation.  
Removing the times I read the printed text aloud, the number of my speech turns roughly equaled 
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the number of the participant’s turns in each session. Overall, participants set a new topic for 
discussion approximately 30% of the time. 
Comprehension. According to Kintsch and Rawson (2005), comprehension is a 
situationally-influenced process and product. Based on Kintsch’s Construction-Integration model 
of text comprehension (2004), I defined comprehension as an internally consistent working 
mental model of a story that grasped the author’s message. Working with this definition allowed 
me to focus on the actions that participants took to achieve understanding as opposed to the 
verbal sophistication of their pretend reading performance. Kintsch (1998, 2004) contended that 
comprehension results from (re)creating a mental model of the text. To achieve this “situation 
model” (Kintsch & Rawson, 2005, p. 223), a reader must integrate information from the smaller 
meaning units of words, sentences, paragraphs, and main ideas. Each proposition (e.g., word, 
idea, fact, relationship, or detail) can be thought of as a thread; readers weave together multiple 
propositions into a microstructure of literal meanings. Successful readers then use the text’s main 
ideas to construct a macro-level structure of this information. Together, the microstructure and 
the macrostructure form the text base—what the author communicated through print. 
Background knowledge, life experiences, familiarity with genre, and affective factors influence a 
reader’s final understanding. Many inferences are made along the way, such as to resolve a 
pronoun’s antecedent, to determine the main idea, or to explain why a character took a dangerous 
action (Cain & Oakhill, 1999; Kintsch & Rawson, 2005; Stahl, 2014). In sum, comprehension is 
constructive, multi-faceted, and cumulative.  
Comprehension is also transactional (Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995). The RAND Reading 
Study Group’s Reading for Understanding defined reading comprehension as “the process of 
simultaneously extracting and constructing meaning through interaction and involvement with 
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written language” (Snow, 2002, p. 11). The three pillars in this process are “the reader, the text, 
and the activity or purpose for reading” (Snow, 2002, p. 11). The RAND group recommended 
study of the “coordinated operation” (Kintsch & Rawson, 2005, p. 226) of these processes in 
each situation of reader and text meeting. Unless a reader already knows a text, or all the 
information referenced by it, effortful mental work is required to comprehend, creating 
opportunities for successes, failures, repairs, and reflection (Baker & Brown, 1984). Narrative 
comprehension implicates the coordination of multiple thinking and literacy skills; for pre-
reading preschoolers, it is both practice for and predictive of comprehension during conventional 
reading (Lynch et al., 2008). 
For pre-reading preschoolers, Dooley defined emergent comprehension as “that period 
when young children, prior to conventional text comprehension, engage in personally 
meaningful experiences that stimulate use of meaning-making strategies with the potential to 
affect later reading comprehension” (2010, p. 274). This definition echoes that of Marie Clay, 
who described both emergent and early reading as a “message-getting and problem-solving 
activity” (1991, p. 6). In the present study, I intended for my procedures to instigate constructive 
meaning making. Participants could have constructed meaning from listening to me read aloud, 
looking at the pictures, or recalling prior exposure to the text. They could have been aided by my 
questions or prompts or my reactions to their verbalizations or behaviors.  
Emergent literacy. Pre-reading preschoolers are considered to be emergently literate 
(Clay, 1991; Dooley & Matthews, 2009; Sulzby & Otto, 1982). Through a joint statement, the 
National Association for the Education of Young Children and the International Literacy 
Association (1998) defined emergent literacy as basic understandings of literacy concepts and 
functions, including symbols, oral language, pictures, print, and play, as well as creating and 
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communicating meaning in a variety of ways. Their statement used the term “metacognitive 
strategies” in association with “primary grades” learning, but not preschool learning (1998, p. 7). 
The International Literacy Association’s 2018 brief entitled Effective Pre-K Literacy Instruction 
promoted open-ended shared reading as a method to facilitate vocabulary acquisition and 
develop comprehension skills, but it also did not explicitly reference metacognition.  
Marie Clay (1991) noted the following emergent reading skills for preschoolers: 
becoming familiar with the predictable layout of books, telling stories in the written register of 
language, recognizing that reading is an act of interpreting meaningful messages, and developing 
an affinity for books and reading. Clay (1991) considered these skills to be as important as print 
and phonological skills. Clay (1991) also suggested that pre-readers are already coordinating 
multiple streams of information when they independently re-read familiar picture books, such as 
balancing what they recall from an adult’s oral reading, making a story out of the pictures, and 
composing sentences in storybook language. She documented verbal self-corrections during 
these processes, which she thought manifested self-monitoring.  
Narrative genre. According to Fountas and Pinnell, “genre refers to any type or kind of 
literary or artistic work or a class of artistic endeavor that has a characteristic form or technique” 
(2012, p. 2). The narrative genre refers to stories with elements such as setting, character, goal, 
problem, events, and resolution, presented along a narrative arc of logically-connected rising and 
falling actions (Yopp & Yopp, 2000). Narratives that have these elements have a salient, holistic 
structure; they are easier to comprehend than stories with missing elements (Leslie & Caldwell, 
2010). Through his classic study of comprehension and recall, Thorndyke (1977) demonstrated 
that readers tend to remember and understand holistically, and that fully-formed narratives are a 
relatable whole. The four study texts were fully-formed narratives that afforded opportunities to 
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think and respond and perhaps change thinking as more information was revealed (Baker & 
Brown, 1984; Markman, 1977). They also employed familiar themes, emotions, and experiences, 
which allowed more cognitive resources to be spent on reflection versus coping with completely 
novel information (Skarakis-Doyle & Dempsey, 2008). The content of the four study texts and 
the dialogue surrounding them were challenging enough to elicit a range of cognitive and 
metacognitive efforts from participants. This moderate difficulty scenario is consistent with 
Flavell’s (1981) and Brown’s (1987) ideas about when metacognition could be most easily 
observed or most relevant to a task. 
Picture books. Picture books are commercially-available trade books that convey either a 
significant portion of or all of the author’s intended meaning through rich and salient illustrations 
created with a preschooler or young reader in mind. Two of the four picture books used in the 
study, The Very Lonely Firefly and Are You My Mother? also featured fully printed stories that 
could be read aloud. When interacting with these texts, participants could have gleaned 
information from my read aloud of the printed text within each session or from a prior read 
aloud. In contrast, wordless picture books “rely entirely on illustrations to tell a story” (Jalongo, 
Dragich, Conrad, & Zhang, 2002, p. 167). In this study, Pancakes for Breakfast was completely 
wordless and Have You Seen My Duckling? was nearly wordless. Since an entire story could not 
be read aloud from print in these texts, both researcher and participants had to rely on the 
pictures to construct meaning without the constraint (or scaffold) of printed words from the 
author. Interaction with wordless books could thus allow for or require greater originality. 
Preschool. Preschool refers to any organized educational placement before kindergarten 
or to participants who are old enough (three to five years of age in the U.S.) to attend such a 
placement. Three states offer universal, free public education beginning at age four, 
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Massachusetts does so at age three, and the rest not until five years of age (National Center for 
Education Statistics, 2015). Universal public preschool is not available for 4-year-olds in the 
state where this study took place. The setting of this study was a private, non-profit daycare 
program that was licensed by the state to provide preschool or pre-kindergarten education. 
Tuition could be paid for through two tiers of financial-assistance vouchers or private payment of 
$175 a week. This organization, its clients, and the surrounding community variably referred to 









CHAPTER 2:  REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
 
Metacognition, or thinking about thinking, has been an important part of educational 
thought for some time. According to Brown (1987), historical concern for metacognition can be 
found in the works of Plato, Aristotle, and Locke. American educational philosopher John 
Dewey claimed that metacognition was at the “very roots of the learning process” (Brown, 1987, 
p. 66). Twentieth century information processing theorists depicted metacognition as a governor 
of cognitive subsystems (Alexander & Fox, 2004; Brown, 1987).  
I rely on the work of Flavell, a progenitor of the study of metacognition in the past three 
decades, to define metacognition in the present study. Since Flavell did not consider preschool 
children to be metacognitive, he relied on adults, mature learners, and conventional readers to 
explain how metacognition can benefit a learner. This conceptualization of metacognition is 
consistent with the foundational learning theories of both Piaget and Vygotsky. Vygotsky (1978) 
claimed that metacognition, manifested as self-regulation, is a hallmark of socially-driven 
intellectual development. Vygotsky observed that preschoolers consistently failed to utilize 
readily-available aids to help themselves succeed in a card game. Since older children were 
much better at using the aids, Vygotsky concluded that a capacity to engage in second-level self-
awareness and self-regulation of effort had not yet come online for preschoolers. Conscious, self-
aware management of knowledge is also fundamental to Piaget’s constructivist theories about 
learning (Brown, 1987). However, Piaget considered the pre-operational, preschool child to be 
bound by the concrete and therefore incapable of the abstract intellectual skill of metacognition.  
In contrast to these views, the following review of literature provides evidence that 4-




experiences, and engaging in metacognitive regulatory actions that fit with Flavell’s original 
definition and model. The tasks that produced this evidence differed from those utilized by 
Flavell, Piaget, or Vygotsky. Study tasks in this review of literature involved engaging young 
children in representation of and communication about information that was immediately 
relevant to them, such as thinking about classmates or interpreting and constructing stories.  
In the next sections, I discuss and coordinate literature that addresses narrative  
comprehension as a cognitive-constructive process and multiple manifestations of metacognition  
and narrative comprehension during emergent literacy. As shown in Figure 3, I intended to 
coordinate literature in order to support my claim that preschoolers can engage in meaningful 









-Literal and inferential 
comprehension
-Role of background knowledge 
and vocabulary
-Theory of mind and false beliefs
(Kendou, Bohn-Gettler, White, & 
van den Broek, 2008; Trabasso & 
Van den Broek, 1985)
Literature Describing      
Emergent Literacy 
-Limitations of pretend reding





(Paris & Paris, 2003; Skarakis-
Doyle & Dempsey, 2008; Sulzby, 
1985)
Literature Describing 





-Expanding and referencing 
metacognitive knowledge
(Flavell, 1979,1993; Flavell, 
Green, & Flavell, 1995)
Figure 3. Multiple areas of research inform the present study of metacognition in joint reading. 
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Literature Review Procedures 
  I began my search for sources in scholarly volumes relevant to the multiple phenomena 
involved in my study. In this initial phase, I hand searched Flavell’s most relevant publications 
as well as titles from the field of education, including Metacognition in Literacy Learning (2005) 
and multiple volumes of the Handbook of Reading Research (1984, 2000, 2011). I also hand 
searched the journals Metacognition and Learning and Child Development. These sources 
provided background information and perspective and suggested seminal studies for review.  
 Next, in order to design my developmentally appropriate study of metacognition within 
the context of joint storybook reading, I selected and reviewed prior investigations of literacy-
relevant metacognition with preschool participants. To locate studies, I searched the Education 
Source and PsycINFO databases for peer-reviewed studies published in English in any year, 
using combinations of the search terms in Table 1. Therefore, the research tasks in my included 
studies involved a range of emergent literacy and learning tasks as well as non-literacy tasks that 
I deemed to be relevant to literacy processes, such as naming and remembering.    
Table 1 
Literature Search Terms by Category 
Category Descriptors 
To describe metacognition metacognition, awareness, mind, think, monitor, regulate 
To describe my target 
population 
preschool, emergent literacy, 4-year-old 
To describe methods pretend reading, shared reading, dialogic reading, joint reading, 
storybook, narrative 
To describe comprehension 
processes 





 I included studies that met the following five criteria: 1) researchers directly interacted 
with or observed young children, 2) participants were engaged in literacy or literacy-relevant 
tasks, 3) the authors claimed to address some form of metacognition, 4) study procedures could 
be used in typical classroom settings, and 5) the authors provided qualitative description of 
children’s cognitive and metacognitive processes. Metacognition is a complicated construct; it 
can affect individual comprehension in varying ways based on constellations of reader, text, task, 
and context (Flavell, 1987). In order to avoid artificially conscribed versions of a phenomenon 
that is not yet thoroughly understood (Baker, 2005), I sought studies wherein researchers 
provided first-hand descriptions of metacognitive processes. 
Comprehension as a Cognitive Constructive and Metacognitive Process 
Kintsch’s (1998) model of text comprehension intersects at multiple points with Flavell’s 
(1979, 1987) conceptualization of metacognition as a cognitive-constructive capacity. Kintsch’s 
(1998) model is based on “a comprehender who has specific goals, a given background of 
knowledge and experience, and a given perceptual situation” (p. 4). This comprehender 
constructs an orderly representation by integrating multiple streams of input from the varying 
units of information in the text. Examples of units, or forms, of input include words, pictures, 
sentences, paragraphs, text structure, and genre. According to Kintsch (1998), texts present not 
only topics, concepts, or ideas, but also propositions about the relationships between topics, 
concepts, and ideas. In other words, texts do not just present information, but also relationships 
between and among pieces of information.  Different units of information about a text (e.g., a 
single word, a catchy rhyming pattern, a scene, or a global theme) may variably influence a 
reader (Kintsch, 1998). Therefore, even if preschoolers provide relatively simple or limited 
verbal data during conversation about a text, that data may still reveal important qualitative 
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evidence of comprehension and metacognitive processes, such as prioritization of more 
important content, inferential claims that help to make sense of a story, or a spontaneous revision 
of a flawed interpretation. In other words, the content of preschoolers’ simple or brief verbal 
statements about a story can communicate meaningful processing. 
There are two main parts of Kintsch’s model (1998, 2004). First, readers construct a text 
base from printed words, sentences, and paragraphs. This is a literal, text-bound representation of 
what the text “said”. For simple or straightforward texts, the text base may represent all of the 
information that the author intended. However, most authors, including those writing for a 
preschool audience, do not explicitly state everything that they want or expect the reader to 
know, think, or feel (Peskin & Astington, 2004). Thus, a reader must construct a situation model, 
the second part of Kintsch’s model. Situation models are constructed through a process of 
inferring information that was not explicitly stated yet needed to understand. For example, 
comprehension of a well-structured narrative requires inferences about story characters’ mental 
states and unstated motivations (Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1993; Kintsch, 1998; van Kleeck, 
2008). In another example, the relative importance of multiple pieces of information has to be 
inferred.  
Ultimately, the reader’s situation model arises from an integration of the text base, the 
reader’s prior knowledge, and goals for interacting with that text (Kintsch, 1998). Many forms of 
knowledge are relevant to constructing a situation model, including world knowledge, genre 
knowledge, and linguistic knowledge (Kintsch, 1998). Situation models are cumulative and 
dynamic representations of the text as a whole, but they are not guaranteed to be accurate 
(Kintsch, 1998). Kintsch (1998) illuminated the relationship between text base and situation 
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model by pointing out that one can recall a text without understanding it or understand a text’s 
fundamental message without being able to recall individual sentences or claims.  
Kintsch’s (1998) fundamental claim was that “we comprehend a text, understand 
something, by building a mental model” (p. 93). Mental representation of text allows abstract 
consideration of the text and one’s thoughts about it (Kintsch, 1998). A comprehender can use 
many tools to build this mental model, including world knowledge, familiarity, vocabulary, and 
interest. The ability to use these tools is subject to both social and developmental influences. 
Thus, consistent with Vygotsky (1978), Kintsch claims that comprehension processes are a result 
of both “phylogenetic” (culturally influenced) and “ontogenetic” (internally unfolding) 
influences (p. 16). In other words, comprehension performance is both socially-influenced (e.g. 
vocabulary used and book reading experiences in the home) and developmentally-influenced 
(e.g., biological limitations on working memory by age; see Baker, 2017). Studies should 
therefore address both of these lines of influence.  
Though Kintsch’s model is intended for use with conventional readers perceiving printed 
text, its fundamental ideas can be applied to preschool comprehenders invited to react to and 
make sense of information provided through words read aloud by the researcher and/or 
illustrations (Paris & Paris, 2003; Skarakis-Doyle & Dempsey, 2008). Through text read aloud, 
some information is explicitly stated, and some is implied. The same is true of illustrations. 
Background knowledge, vocabulary, expectations, and familiarity with story form may influence 
both pre-readers and conventional readers. For example, scripts from daily life experiences, such 
as grocery shopping, can contribute to the understanding of a text base about grocery shopping 
and to the construction of the overall situation model (Flavell et al., 1993; Kintsch, 1998; 
Skarakis-Doyle & Dempsey, 2008).  
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Processes Involved in Narrative Comprehension 
Flavell et al. (1993) noted connections between the development of narrative 
comprehension and cognitive and metacognitive development. Stories are powerful contexts for 
cognitive and metacognitive development. The abstract and representational nature of text as a 
communication medium, the mixture of familiar and unfamiliar content, and the structure of the 
narrative arc create many opportunities for cognition and metacognition. Notable emergent 
literacy research involving stories has often overlooked these features of stories in order to focus 
on the acquisition of pretend storybook reading, book handling skills, concepts about print, and 
growth in oral language (Clay, 1991; Purcell-Gates, 2001; Sulzby, 1985). The aforementioned 
skills are important milestones in a literate society and variably contribute to conventional 
reading outcomes (NELP, 2008). However, because there is well-structured content to be 
understood in stories (Kintsch, 1998; Thorndyke, 1977; Van Kleeck, 2008), it is important to 
include comprehension processes as a research focus. If comprehension is involved, then 
metacognition is implicated (Baker & Brown, 1984).  
Given all the cognitive actions involved in reading, there may be meaningful, multiple, 
and constructive relationships between metacognition and comprehension for any reader. Baker 
and Brown (1984) relied on Flavell’s model (1979) and Brown’s original work (1980) to define 
metacognition as "the knowledge and control the child has over her or his own thinking and 
learning activities, including reading" (p. 353). Baker and Brown (1984) cited Brown (1980, p. 
354) to explain that metacognition is implicated in conventional reading comprehension in the 
following ways: 




 2. identifying the important aspects of a message, 
 3. focusing attention on the major content rather than trivia, 
 4. monitoring ongoing activities to determine whether comprehension is occurring, 
 5. engaging in self-questioning to determine whether goals are being achieved, and 
 6. taking corrective action when failures in comprehension are detected”    
 These six actions are part of an overall model of metacognition in reading in which 
metacognitive knowledge involves declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge and 
metacognitive regulation involves planning, monitoring, and evaluating (Jacobs & Paris, 1987). 
Preschool children may not have enough formal experiences with tasks in order to have 
declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge. However, the essence of metacognitive 
knowledge can be captured in notions of who you are and what you can do (Jacobs & Paris, 
1987). These questions are relevant to preschool children who are beginning to think of 
themselves as “readers” (Strommen & Mates, 1997) or at least meaning-makers (Dooley, 2010). 
Metacognitive experiences may inform and facilitate growth in these areas, though they are 
harder to define, observe, and predict (Flavell, 1981). The demands of intermediate-difficulty 
reading tasks challenge and offer growth and feedback opportunities in both the knowledge and 
control dimensions of metacognition (Brown & DeLoach, 1978; Fisher, 1998; Flavell, 1981).  
Though there is limited research on metacognition in pre-reading text comprehension, the 
field of psychology has produced a large body of work on preschoolers’ metacognitive capacities 
for oral comprehension, perceptual tasks, memory tasks, and on their rapidly developing theory 
of mind and metacognitive vocabulary. Many of these constructs are especially or uniquely 
relevant to the comprehension of narrative texts, in which characters are driven by internal 
motivations to take actions towards an ultimate goal. Many topics in this section come very close 
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to being metacognitive or can have a relationship with metacognition. For example, the last topic 
in this section is use of metacognitive language. Narrative situations use or implicate the use of 
metacognitive terms. For example, in order to comprehend, a reader must be concerned with 
what a character thought, wanted, or will decide to do (Peskin & Astington, 2004). However, a 
child’s use of metacognitive language may or may not manifest actual metacognition, and a 
book’s use of metacognitive terms may implicate comprehension but not necessarily 
metacognition. Therefore, in this study, I treated use of metacognitive language as a distinct yet 
situationally-related capacity to comprehension and metacognition. 
Having a theory of mind. According to Flavell (2004), having a Theory of Mind enables 
a functional awareness of “the inner world inhabited by beliefs, desires, emotions, thoughts, 
perceptions, intentions, and other mental states” (p. 274). This knowledge can be used to infer 
the internal states of characters that drive their actions and help the story make relatable sense. 
Therefore, it is relevant to comprehension and often an object of metacognition. Kuhn (2000) 
claimed that three-year-olds can think of themselves as knowers and think of knowledge as an 
object to be known. They are starting to develop a theory of mind — thinking of one’s self as 
having a mind distinct from others— which facilitates recognition of varying perspectives, 
playing hide-and-seek, and fibbing with the intent of getting away with it (Crain, 1992; Flavell, 
2004). Lockl and Schneider (2006) defined theory of mind as the “ability to attribute mental 
states, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, to self and others, [including the] knowledge that 
mental representations of events need not correspond to reality” (p. 16). A working theory of 
mind is required to label thinking as a phenomenon and articulate thinking to others, since no 
one can read your mind. Flavell (2004) explained that “theory-of-mind development is the area 
of cognitive development research that investigates the nature and development of our 
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understanding of the mental world—the inner world inhabited by beliefs, desires, emotions, 
thoughts, perceptions, intentions, and other mental states” (p. 274). Flavell (1979) found that 
younger preschoolers were not able to recognize that a belief can be false, but subsequently 
claimed that developmentally-sensitive techniques could lead to results that favor a more 
sophisticated view of the 4-year-old.  
Theory of mind also includes understanding what you can do with your mind. Schraw 
and Moshman (1995) concluded that “children as young as three or four appear to possess tacit 
theories of their own cognition” that serve “social and cognitive functions” (p. 356; see also 
Flavell et al., 1993). Tacit theories are challenging to articulate or otherwise communicate 
(Schraw & Moshman, 1995), yet preschoolers were not historically given the opportunity to 
begin to learn to do so. Williams and Atkins (2009) criticized the separation of theory of mind 
research with preschoolers and strategic comprehension research with elementary readers. They 
called for “longitudinal studies of children, followed until they reach literacy” (Williams & 
Atkins, 2009, p. 40). Emerging metacognition encompasses theory of mind, and theory of mind 
encompasses the following abilities relevant to storybook comprehension: recognition of false 
beliefs, inferring the mental states of others, using metacognitive vocabulary, and experiencing 
metamemory (Peskin & Astington, 2004; Van Kleeck, 2008). In addition to facilitating narrative 
comprehension, a theory of mind enables a preschooler to do the work of thinking of one’s self 
as a reader or a meaning maker through mental effort. In sum, theory of mind is important to 
reflecting on reading and to the capacity to learn from that reflection.  
Recognizing false beliefs. Theory of mind also enables the recognition of false beliefs. 
Lockl and Schneider (2006) highlighted this relationship in their definition of theory of mind as 
“children’s ability to attribute mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, to self and 
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others [including] their knowledge that mental representations of events need not correspond to 
reality” (p. 16). Around age four, children begin to understand that others, including book 
characters, can have false beliefs—that is, a belief based on incorrect or incomplete knowledge 
(Kuhn, 2000). A classic false belief test involves showing a child that a box labeled candy 
actually contains pencils (Flavell, 1979). Children younger than five tend to claim that someone 
who has not seen the inside of the box knows that pencils can be found there (Flavell, 1979). 
There is no empirical reason to make this claim; younger preschoolers were unable to consider 
that the person who has not been granted insight to the contents of the opaque candy box have no 
way of knowing that it actually contains pencils. Subsequent studies have granted more 
sophistication in detection of false beliefs to 4-year-olds (Flavell, 1987; Lockl & Schneider, 
2006).  
False beliefs are relevant to narrative text comprehension in that a reader, in order to 
build a reasonable model of the text, may need to know something important that the main 
character does not know yet or will never know (Kintsch, 1998; Paris & Paris, 2003; Peskin & 
Astington, 2004). Awareness that beliefs can be false and that unique characters and actors do 
not always have the same information are signs of a developing theory of mind (Flavell, 1987). 
Per Vygotsky (1986), theory of mind sophistication does not switch on at a pre-programmed age. 
Rather, developmental capabilities enable certain capacities, and exposure to abstract 
representations of information (Lockl & Schneider, 2006), such as through reading, writing, and 
social interaction around texts, spurs development in this area (Fang & Cox, 1999; Peskin & 
Astington, 2004). 
 Inferring the mental states of others. Inferring the mental states of characters is a 
fundamental aspect of narrative comprehension, as characters’ feelings and attributes spur their 
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goal-driven actions in the plot and undergird elements of story such as characterization, conflict, 
and resolution (Paris & Paris, 2003; Van Kleeck, 2008). This important aspect of narrative 
comprehension is enabled by a working theory of mind. Thus, psychological research on this 
topic has implications for comprehension research. For example, Flavell et al. (1995) used 
simple pictures of people with an object pictured in a thought bubble above their heads. After 
training, preschoolers as young as three distinguished between what a pictured child was doing 
from what the pictured child was thinking about (as shown in the thought bubble). Flavell et al. 
(1995) realized that participants could have simply memorized that questions about what the 
pictured child was thinking involved referencing the thought bubble and questions concerning 
what the child was doing involved referencing the other picture. They then investigated whether 
a child knew that a researcher could think about a doll that she saw a few minutes ago but could 
not presently see. Preschoolers discerned between being able to see the doll and thinking about 
it. This finding supported the claim that once familiar with the thought bubble as a graphic 
format, preschoolers understood the basic idea that a pictured person can be thinking about 
something, whether or not they could see the object of thought (Flavell et al., 1995). This basic 
capacity helps to unlock many narrative plots.  
 Across multiple laboratory tasks, Flavell et al.’s (1995) preschoolers could generally 
recognize, with stronger performance at the higher end of the three-to-five age range, that 
someone was thinking when looking pensive, trying to solve a problem or make a decision, or 
responding to emotional arousal. In conclusion, aspects of metacognition facilitated 
comprehension of pictured situations. It could also be concluded that reading and doing 
purposeful mental tasks with what is read (e.g., recalling, reconsidering, evaluating, discussing), 
helps to develop theory of mind and metacognition (Vygotsky, 1978). 
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 One of Flavell et al.’s (1995) studies of theory of mind relevant to narrative 
comprehension did not produce promising results. However, the technique employed may have 
limited the outcomes. Flavell et al. (1995) presented 4-year-olds with a simple picture of people 
and an accompanying story about what was happening in the picture. Less than half of 4-year-
olds offered a reasonable inference as to exactly what was going on in the minds of the pictured 
persons. Furthermore, 4-year-olds did not reliably indicate that pictured people were thinking at 
all, though they generally indicated that people actively doing something or responding to an 
emotional event were more likely to be thinking than people sleeping or staring blankly. 
Participants just one year older (age five) had more mature performances and were better at 
expressing what pictured people were probably thinking about.   
 Flavell et al. (1995) utilized isolated laboratory tasks, whereas engaging with the deep 
structure of a story through shared or joint reading may afford a more holistic context for 
understanding a pictured character’s mental life. If Whitebread et al. (2009) were correct that 
preschoolers have more sophisticated metacognition when engaged in ecologically valid tasks, 
then shared reading of stories can be expected to produce a different performance. In Vygotskian 
terminology, if 4-year-olds are sometimes capable of inferring what a pictured character is 
thinking and applying other aspects of theory of mind to the task of comprehension, then 
interaction with a more skilled other may help them progress towards fuller realization of their 
potential for this type of mental work.  
 Using metacognitive language. Metacognitive language refers to specific words used to 
express mental states and actions involved in thinking and learning. Flavell et al. (1995) tested 
children’s ability to distinguish between the metacognitive terms think and know. Results 
indicated that 4-year-olds can distinguish between the terms thinking and knowing in their 
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receptive and expressive vocabularies, though they do not always do so, and they are not always 
proficient at inferring what someone is thinking about. In other words, 4-year-olds have two 
distinct words in their vocabularies—think and know—but they do not consistently use these 
words to describe an internal state based on specific epistemological reasons, such as access to 
information or the status of the information within the subject’s mind (Lockl & Schneider, 2006; 
Trawick-Smith, 2006). It appears that preschoolers acquire metacognitive vocabulary in the same 
way that they acquire vocabulary in general—they begin to use words at the beginning of a long 
process of learning to use them correctly (Lockl & Schneider, 2006; Trawick-Smith, 2006). 
Thus, preschoolers’ use of metacognitive language is best triangulated with other data.  
Peskin and Astington (2004) examined how pre-kindergarteners in low-income 
neighborhoods responded to read alouds of storybooks as published or with the insertion of 
explicit metacognitive terminology. Each condition featured the same stories, and all participants 
were invited to understand characters’ feelings, states of mind, knowledge, and perspectives. 
Children in the experimental condition (n=24) heard stories implanted with mental state verbs. 
The insertion of explicit metacognitive terms changed how the reader was invited to interact with 
the text. For example, a sample from a control group story read “Fox is not careful and bumps 
into a rake. Rosie hears the loud BUMP, but does she turn around?” The experimental group’s 
version of this text read “Did you know that Fox would bump into a rake? Rosie heard the loud 
BUMP, but did she figure out that it was hungry Fox behind her?” 
 Peskin and Astington (2004) were concerned with the functioning of “metacognitive 
terms in fostering a representational understanding of the mind” (e. g., know and figure out, p. 
254). They inserted metacognitive terms such as think, know, remember, wonder, figure out, and 
guess into the modified experimental texts and corresponding comprehension questions to 
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investigate whether explicit exposure to these terms would result in metacognitive growth at the 
end of the four-week study period. 
 Peskin and Astington (2004) utilized five forms of assessment to collect a range of 
information about preschoolers’ theory of mind during their emergent literacy: 
1. Through a false-belief prediction task, children reported their thoughts before and after 
finding out critical information. Then they reported the thoughts of a hypothetical peer who 
lacked the critical information. Understanding why the peer would be ignorant provided 
evidence of understanding that some people can hold false beliefs. A working theory of mind 
undergirds false belief proficiency (Flavell, 2004).  
2. Through a false-belief explanation task, children inferred the thinking behind the 
misguided and/or ignorant actions of story characters who lacked information. Reporting on a 
false belief is evidence of representational thinking – i.e., examining the belief as a mental object 
(versus examining a toy as a physical object; Flavell, 1987). 
3. Through a metacognitive verb comprehension task, children distinguished between the 
terms know and think, based on a brief story. This task assessed receptive comprehension of 
these terms, in order to triangulate valid inferences about children’s use of these terms later in 
the study.  
4. Through a metacognitive verb production task, children used props to create a story 
about a wolf who can deceive to get what it wants. This task allowed the researcher to count the 




5. The Test of Early Language Development assessed expressive and receptive language, 
since communicative proficiency could have confounded inferences about children’s use of 
specific “metacognitive” terms. 
Peskin and Astington (2004) found that their short-term, explicit training in 
metacognitive terms had limited benefits. Experimental group members increased their use of 
metacognitive language in subsequent storytelling, but they did not increase their understanding 
of what these words really meant. Furthermore, control group members out-performed 
experimental group members in identifying the false beliefs held by storybook characters. The 
authors concluded that young children often use new terms before they truly know what they 
mean. An implication of this result is that preschoolers’ use of metacognitive terms cannot be 
assumed to match an internal metacognitive state; more information would be needed to 
determine whether preschoolers used these words to knowingly articulate their metacognition. 
Another important implication concerns the potential for stories to both support the development 
of and aid in the research of cognitive and metacognitive capacities. The experiences and 
emotions of characters driven by internal motivations can encourage children to think about 
dimensions of theory of mind. Likewise, unfolding plots with twists and turns can invite children 
to revise their evolving mental model of the story.  
As Mar and Oatley (2008) explained, “literary fiction allows us to experience social 
situations vicariously, thus allowing for personal consideration of response and action. The 
simulation of interacting ideas and emotions evoked by a story simultaneously permits the 
exploration of our own ideas, feelings, and desires, and of our own potential reactions to the 
story’s plot” (p. 183). Thus, another important implication of these results is that well-structured 
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stories can be used as experimental texts for metacognition research without any modifications. 
Researchers do not have to insert contrived errors or metacognitive language.  
Processes Involved in Emergent Literacy 
Picture book stories can provide preschoolers with meaningful opportunities to 
experience comprehension and metacognition. The mental capacities that enable narrative 
comprehension are already a part of the child’s social world (Stahl, 2014; Vygotsky, 1978). 
Toddlers gain familiarity with elements of story (e.g., problem and resolution) as they pursue 
daily goals and experience successes and setbacks. Preschoolers can produce oral stories 
showing sensitivity to these elements and can also appreciate and relate to characters going 
through familiar struggles (Flavell et al., 1993; Rowe, 1989; van den Broek et al., 2011). Since 
preschoolers bring to stories what they first experience through socio-emotional and physical 
learning (Vygotsky, 1978), familiar settings, routines, and relationships can be relied on to 
understand a represented sequence of events (Skarakis-Doyle & Dempsey, 2008). Preschoolers 
can also make inferences, as needed, to create holistically relatable situations from given 
information (Flavell et al., 1993; Markman, 1981; Tompkins et al., 2013). In sum, as explained 
by Stahl (2014), “the foundations of reading comprehension begin well before school entry” (p. 
384).  
Although exposure to a variety of types of books is important during the early years, 
stories are especially well suited to provoke early experiences with a full range of comprehension 
processes and with situationally-relevant metacognition (Markman, 1977). Indeed, Tompkins et 
al. (2013) reported that narrative comprehension in preschool can predict conventional reading 
comprehension outcomes. Ongoing investigation of the cognitive and metacognitive processes 
that might underlie this outcome is needed. Picture books with fully formed stories might help 
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children bridge the gap between social comprehension and narrative comprehension by 
introducing a developmentally-appropriate balance of the concrete and the abstract, as well as the 
familiar and the unfamiliar. Skarakis-Doyle and Dempsey (2008), referencing Kintsch (2004), 
stated “comprehending a story requires children to construct a mental representation of the 
material” (p. 131). Representing ideas in the mind provides opportunities for metacognition – 
thinking about one’s thinking. Responding to familiar objects and situations invites labeling and 
naming, and this is complemented by the more sophisticated processing required to create a 
situation out of constituent details. Accordingly, Skarakis-Doyle and Dempsey noted that even 
emergent comprehension involves higher order cognition, as “to create such a representation, 
children must marshal a coalition of knowledge processes from their developing social, 
cognitive, and linguistic systems” (2008, p. 131). Hannon and Frias (2012) concluded that 
preschoolers go through the same types of cognitive processes as adults when presented with 
structured information to be understood. This range of processing creates opportunities for 
metacognition to occur in situationally-relevant ways as children engage with familiar and 
unfamiliar information and situations in stories. A focus on children’s processing of the 
information in stories differs from a focus on the sophistication of their oral discourse while 
pretend reading a story.  
Independent, pretend reading. Literacy researchers have three main options for 
investigating reading processes in children who cannot yet read print: listening to an adult 
reading aloud, joint reading with an adult, or observing independent “pretend” reading. Sulzby’s 
(1985) seminal schemata of emergent literacy levels was informed by using the latter method. 
She investigated how preschoolers pretended to read their favorite storybooks sent into the 
preschool classroom from home. Sulzby employed a standardized pretend reading procedure. 
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She asked her participants to independently read their books to her and engaged in minimal 
interaction. Her analysis of data collected from 2-year-olds through kindergarteners suggested a 
developmental pattern in emergent book reading behaviors. The youngest participants tended to 
“read” by providing a series of labels for pictured objects. In contrast, older pre-readers, mainly 
kindergarteners, performed a pretend reading that better resembled the story as written. More 
advanced renderings featured explanation of scenes versus isolated labeling, use of storybook 
language, and speech in a written versus an oral register of language (Purcell-Gates, 2001; 
Sulzby, 1985). The most advanced participants in her schemata fluently read print. Whether the 
child could read print or not, overall storytelling behaviors progressed with age and skill from 
being dialogic, i.e., immediate and conversational, to being monologic, i.e., rendering a story for 
an audience separated from the author by time and space (Purcell-Gates, 2001; Sulzby, 1985). 
Thus, Sulzby’s work prioritized the child’s acquisition of the discourse form of printed story text 
(Cazden, 2002). Correspondingly, in her schemata, cognitive sophistication was presumed to be 
manifested by scene-level pretend reading performed in a monologic fashion (Cox & Sulzby, 
1982; Sulzby, 1985). 
 Though Sulzby’s work did not directly address comprehension (Paris & Paris, 2003), her 
notion of progression from context-bound to abstract has influenced emergent literacy research. 
Sulzby wanted to address comprehension but lacked an intentional link between her research 
design and whether children understood the various books from home that they “read.”  
Furthermore, the books brought in from home were not necessarily well-structured narratives, 
meaning that comprehension could not be compared across readers. Of particular importance to 
the present study, Sulzby (1985) noted that a participant who was at a relatively lower level in 
her schemata offered spontaneous “meta-statements” during his pretend reading, such as 
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commenting that certain parts of the story were enjoyed more (p. 465). Though Sulzby reported 
this observation, she did not privilege a role for meta-statements in her schemata. Since Sulzby’s 
schemata is often used as a proxy for overall emergent literacy sophistication, it was important to 
review what it, and pretend reading in general, do and do not reveal about children’s capacities. 
How do pre-readers understand content? Sulzby’s schemata (1985) yields useful 
information about how preschool-aged children continually develop in the direction of the formal 
“print register” of a literate person (Purcell-Gates, 2001). The delivery style of a pretend 
storybook reading can be a proxy for the processing of structured content. However, other work 
that directly addresses comprehension and metacognitive processes is needed to fully understand 
preschoolers’ capacities. In response to this gap, Paris and Paris (2003) developed the Picture 
Walk procedure (PW) to simultaneously assess narrative comprehension processing and 
emergent literacy skills in kindergarten through second grade students. Many of Paris and Paris’ 
kindergarten participants could not yet decode, making the assumptions and procedures behind 
the PW relevant to pre-reading pre-kindergarteners. The PW utilized wordless narrative picture 
books as study texts, such that a fully-structured narrative story was conveyed through 
illustrations. Through a series of studies, Paris and Paris (2003) established validity and 
reliability for their use of the PW to assess narrative comprehension independent of print 
proficiency. Thus, the PW addressed a need in the field, as young children’s ability to read print 
lags their ability to understand the content of stories. The PW distinguished among book 
handling skills, affective engagement, picture comments, story-level comments, and 
comprehension strategies. Through this multi-faceted approach, pre-reading kindergarteners 
were found to have meaningful literal and inferential comprehension of structured information 
and sensitivity to major elements of story (e.g., setting, character). However, they showed 
58 
 
relatively lesser use of comprehension strategies assumed to manifest comprehension 
monitoring, such as asking questions, looking back and forward as needed, making predictions, 
and self-correcting.  
Paris and Paris also posed what I considered to be a proto-metacognitive prompt (Why do 
you think so?; 2003, p. 51) to follow up on children’s initial responses to comprehension 
questions. Though this was termed an elaboration prompt, it did invite a self-referential report of 
processing as opposed to more details that would answer the original question. Nonetheless, 
Paris and Paris’ work demonstrated a developmentally-appropriate integration of comprehension 
and metacognition, even if not languaged as such. Thus, Paris and Paris’s approach provided a 
more comprehensive assessment of emergent literacy than Sulzby’s schemata.   
The PW task can be used with any fully-formed narrative presented through a wordless 
picture book. Since a PW does not require creation or alteration of a text, it can be highly 
relevant to children’s experiences with commercially-available texts. The PW procedure allows 
for documentation of a variety of constrained and unconstrained emergent literacy behaviors, 
from storytelling style, vocabulary, and response to questions. The procedure also invites 
participants to revisit and justify answers given to comprehension questions during reading. 
Revisiting a prior thought meets Flavell’s (1979) original definition of metacognition in that the 
child is asked to reconsider and comment upon this thought as an object for further 
consideration. However, wordless picture books are only one type of picture book, and 
metacognition is likely to be relevant in more ways than in their study design.  
Alternatives to pretend reading. The discussion of the Picture Walk exemplified that 
there are alternative procedures to pretend reading. Skarakis-Doyle and Dempsey (2008) 
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reviewed options for assessing pre-reading preschoolers’ story comprehension. These procedures 
can be used as alternatives to the prevailing model of pretend reading. In this next subsection, I 
discuss their commentary and integrate additional research.  
1) Posing questions during reading. Skarakis-Doyle and Dempsey (2008) explained that 
both literal and inferential comprehension questions are appropriate to use with preschoolers, and 
that they can be pre-planned and customized to the text. However, some preschoolers may not 
understand the questions as posed, especially if they confuse wh- words (e.g., who, what, why). 
Memory and expressive language may also diminish the validity of a child’s answers in 
indicating comprehension. To reduce verbal output demands, a researcher may ask for yes/no or 
single word responses, but this type of data may curtail expression of how each child is making 
sense of the story.  
Van den Broek et al. (2011) reported more success with using online (i.e., during reading) 
questioning with preschoolers than with posing questions after reading. Stahl (2014) pointed out 
that adults can use questions and interactive prompts during reading to help preschoolers gain 
experience with making both local and global inferences. Stahl (2014) distinguished between 
local inferences, such as resolving anaphoric references and using context clues to resolve an 
unknown word, and global inferences, such as speculation on a character’s unstated inner 
experiences. Both types can be relevant to joint reading. 
2) Joint Story Retelling (JSR). Children in the primary grades are often asked to retell 
stories after reading or hearing them. Retelling can assess memory of and recall of idea units and 
elements of story (Leslie & Caldwell, 2010). Older children can be expected to reproduce a story 
grammar, but this task is generally too complicated for preschoolers (van den Broek et al., 2011). 
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Because retellings are open-ended, they allow for diverse data from each reteller (van den Broek 
et al., 2011). However, retellings can underestimate comprehension if the child has limited 
expressive language or a different cultural model for how to tell stories. Brown and French 
(1976) found that preschoolers are capable of ordering three events in a simple story, though they 
tend to fixate on the last event. 
Skarakis-Doyle and Dempsey (2008) developed a joint story retelling (JSR) technique. 
Their joint technique utilized an oral form of the cloze procedure in order to overcome 
developmental limitations for participants aged two and one-half to four years. The contribution 
of the researcher to the retelling compensated for limited expressive language and working 
memory. The examiner read stories about daily life routines and then asked for the child’s help 
with a second reading. The child “helped” the researcher by supplying missing information. This 
procedure resembled parent-child book reading and lowered the output demands on young 
children. Children only had to make sense of a small section of text at a time, and they could 
answer from memory, context clues in the second reading, or a combination thereof. Empirical 
studies by the authors have shown that JSR has validity and reliability. Though their 
modifications allow for many children to successfully participate, children who have limited 
expressive vocabularies and/or limited English proficiency may struggle with supplying the 
exact word that is called for by the cloze prompt.  
3) Expectancy Violation Detection Task (EVDT). Skarakis-Doyle and Dempsey (2008) 
developed the EVDT to investigate preschoolers’ comprehension monitoring. A preschool-aged 
child is assumed to have expectations about everyday routines such as bath time (Flavell et al., 
1993; Markman, 1981); their reactions to violations of these expectations are assumed to 
manifest comprehension monitoring. In the EVDT task, three types of expectancy violations are 
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inserted into the second reading of a familiar story: goal disruptions, within-story substitutions, 
and unacceptable changes of content. Goal disruptions are encountered when an unexpected 
obstacle confounds normal progression toward the story’s goal. In within-story substitutions, a 
character or highly relevant object is replaced with another. In content violations, relevant 
material is placed at a point in the story where it does not make sense or help the story progress 
toward the anticipated outcome. On a second reading of the story, the child is tasked with 
catching the mistakes. Verbal and non-verbal manifestations of confusion are noted. The authors 
considered the EVDT to be a real-time technique that reduced the need for memory, genre 
familiarity, or sophisticated verbal output — the young participant either reacts to violations or 
not. However, even with practice, some children may be uncomfortable with correcting an adult 
or may be distracted by other aspects of the EVDT that do not resemble typical book reading 
experiences. 
4) Televised story viewing. Televised shows and movies that many preschool children 
view can provide experience with the narrative structure. Sitcoms, cartoons, and children’s 
movies can feature high quality storytelling with character development, implied motivations, 
goals, a sequenced plot, and a resolution. Thus, these media can give children experience in 
sequencing, memorizing and recalling, noting details, and inferring important information to 
make sense of a situation. Children can be asked to respond to comprehension questions and/or 
retell stories that they view. Skarakis-Doyle and Dempsey (2008) noted that the audiovisual 
medium is more concrete, multi-sensory, and dynamic than static pictures in a physical book. 
Preschoolers can be asked to answer questions about and otherwise discuss audiovisual 
presentations just as they can for print books. 
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 However, use of audio-visual media has its own set of limitations. The continuous nature 
of episodes in media versus having to turn a page of a book may provide a scaffold for 
understanding the story as a connected whole. On the contrary, turning the page between 
episodes may help children chunk information and have time to question or respond before 
continuing. Kendeou, Bohn-Gettler, White, and van den Broek (2008) found that preschoolers’ 
inference making abilities were consistent across a televised story viewing condition and a read 
aloud condition. Thus, though audio-visual media may be more appealing in some ways, the 
fundamental work of processing the structured information of a story presented through any 
media remains the same.  
I discussed these four procedures as alternatives to pretend reading procedures. Each 
featured a different approach to the assessment of comprehension (e.g., asking questions), 
metacognition (e.g., EVDT), or both comprehension and metacognition (e.g., PW). Because they 
focused on cognitive and/or metacognitive processing, the meaningfulness of how young 
children responded to text took precedence over how they communicated. Sulzby’s pretend 
reading procedure tasked children with relaying or re-enacting a familiar book. The child’s oral 
performance is assessed. Neither the book itself nor the reader-text interaction is analyzed, and 
therefore not much is uncovered about whether and how children understood what they were 
“reading.” A highly rated reenactment could result from multiple exposures and verbatim 
memory, but this high rating would not necessarily reveal whether the child engaged in higher or 
lower order comprehension processing or metacognitive processing. In contrast, a preschooler 
could participate in the Expectancy Violation Detection Task (EVDT) without speaking at all 
(e.g., through non-verbal protestation) and still provide insight into early metacognitive 
processing. Not all stories will be familiar, and the strengths and weaknesses that a reader brings 
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to each story will vary. In other words, the cognitive and metacognitive processing needed to 
understand will vary for each reader and text. This scenario suggests that literacy researchers 
should utilize a full range of methods to investigate emergent literacy, in order to fully 
understand the capacities of young children.  
In sum, the alternatives to pretend reading discussed above offered robust ways to collect 
data about comprehension and metacognition without relying on the capacity to read print. By 
taking print proficiency and sometimes verbal responding out of the equation, meaning-making 
processes received fuller attention. Furthermore, the practices discussed above are important 
because young children experience many of them in their regular lives when not under study. 
Through audio-visual media and the trade book market, young children may experience 
extensive exposure to structured narrative stories, and thus have opportunities to engage in 
comprehension and metacognitive processes. Pretend reading and error detection procedures are 
only two of many investigative options for these phenomena. These examples of alternative 
techniques showed the relevance of the comprehension of structured information and 
metacognition to the everyday thought life of preschoolers. In the next section, I discuss 
literature describing a fuller range of preschooler’s metacognitive capacities that could be 
relevant to narrative comprehension. 
Review of Studies of Metacognition During Emergent Literacy 
 The prior discussion of comprehension highlighted intersections among developmental 
capacities, narrative comprehension, and forms of metacognition. These interconnections may be 
routinely unrecognized if there are low expectations for cognition and metacognition before 
conventional literacy (Marulis, Palincsar, Berhenke, & Whitebread, 2016). It is possible that 
metacognition has always played an important role in early comprehension processes without 
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being identified. For example, DeBruin-Parecki & Squib (2011) noted positive outcomes of 
training preschool teachers to utilize four comprehension strategies (connecting new ideas to 
held knowledge, connecting new words to known words, predicting, and retelling) when reading 
storybooks aloud to the class. DeBruin-Parecki & Squib (2011) attributed their results to the 
intentionality of strategy instruction and the integration of strategies, but they did not mention 
the term metacognition.  
Even authors who have claimed metacognition may not have fully appreciated it. 
Flavell’s model features metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive experiences, and 
metacognitive regulation as major categories, and it suggests that these factors work together 
variably in any one situation based on reader-text-task demands. Isolating any part of this model 
may lead to incomplete understanding of metacognitive capacities. For example, some authors 
have implicated metacognition by investigating either one major category or a small range of 
predefined forms of it. Either approach can result in incomplete description of what actually took 
place for a child working on a task that implicated metacognition.  Brown et al. (2014) 
successfully trained a small group of 4-year-old preschoolers at-risk for academic failure to 
monitor whether they were including the major elements of story in their retellings. Brown et al. 
(2014) used the broad term monitor to describe what could be many different cognitive and 
metacognitive processes involved in reading and retelling. Hsieh, Ku, and Chen (2013) also used 
a broad term—revise—to encompass a range of children’s meta-behaviors when creating a story 
from a wordless picture book. Hsieh et al. (2013) categorized children’s storytelling revisions 
into three categories based on whether the revision was offered before, during, or after the scribe 
wrote it down. However, many more factors in addition to when the revision was offered were 
likely to have been influential on children’s choices for this task.  
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In the next section, I present literature describing a wide range of specific ways that the 
preschool-aged child may be metacognitive. Comprehension is not the most frequent context for 
studies reviewed in the next section. However, all forms of metacognition reviewed are directly 
relevant to the cognitive processes involved in participating in joint reading. 
Metacognition in the context of emergent reading processes. Emergent reading may 
include pretend reading, listening to an adult or caregiver read aloud, or interactive reading. 
Since print recognition is not required, the focus in all of these dynamics is on comprehension of 
structured information. The overall goal of comprehension, however, may situationally include 
learning new words or ideas, correcting a misconception, or coordinating multiple streams of 
information (e.g., memory of prior readings, topical background knowledge, information in 
pictures). The studies reviewed in this section exemplified the range of cognitive and 
metacognitive knowledges, skills, and experiences that are relevant to a variety of emergent 
reading experiences. At the conclusion of this section, I identified the forms of metacognition 
claimed by the author(s) as well as latent forms that I felt were not distinguished or identified. I 
used this information to connect to and justify my thematic codes. 
Skarakis-Doyle and Dempsey (2008) employed an error detection methodology to 
analyze the self-monitoring skills of three groups of preschoolers: typically developing (n = 13), 
Language Impaired (LI; n =10), and typical younger children with receptive vocabulary 
matching the LI group (n = 14). The LI group had deficiencies in auditory comprehension, 
vocabulary, syntax, and communicative language use. The researchers were interested in 
uncovering how LI might affect both comprehension and comprehension monitoring. 
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To carry out their investigation, Skarakis-Doyle and Dempsey (2008) created the 
narrative picture book Splish-Splash about the everyday routine of bath time. Researchers read 
this story while children looked at the pictures and posed comprehension questions. Then the 
researchers began the monitoring phase. First, they trained children to verbalize protests to 
alterations (Violations) of a favorite storybook brought from home. After training, researchers 
began their Expectancy Violation Detection Task (EVDT) with Splish Splash using eight 
violations: two goal-disrupting events, five within-story substitutions of names or words, and one 
insertion of content antithetical to the gist. Children were assessed on whether and how they 
responded to these errors, which were presumed to conflict with their expectations for the second 
reading of a familiar story. Participants’ expectations could have been violated by incongruity 
between the error and familiarity with the story or between the error and background knowledge. 
Any form of protest given within five seconds of the presentation of the error was assumed to be 
an outward sign of comprehension monitoring.   
This approach is consistent with the work of Markman (1981) and Flavell et al. (1993) on 
the origins of narrative comprehension, which are rooted in practical knowledge about the world, 
especially daily experiences and corresponding discourses. Violations of expectations about 
routines represented in stories were expected to trigger comprehension monitoring, which could 
occur in the form of error (violation) detection, evaluation, and/or correction.  The researchers 
accepted verbal and non-verbal data as evidence of error detection and recognized three possible 
manifestations of monitoring—error detection, evaluation, and correction. Acceptable inter-rater 
agreement for these factors was reached for a sample representing 38% of the collected data.  
All children noticed deviations from typical bathtime routines, indicating that 
preschoolers can monitor their comprehension of simple, relatable stories for which they have 
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experiential expectations and a corresponding discourse. However, participants in the three 
groups seemed to take different actions in response to the violation. Typically developing 
children engaged in double the amount of protests with added corrections versus protests without 
correction. The LI group and the young group showed the reverse pattern. The LI group also had 
limited participation. Four of ten members did not respond at all, and the six who did protest did 
so nonverbally. The LI group resembled the young group in terms of comprehension yet had the 
weakest demonstration of monitoring. In sum, members of all three groups showed some 
evidence of comprehension monitoring. However, members of the most advanced group were 
more likely to participate and to provide more fluent verbal data. 
Skarakis-Doyle and Dempsey (2008) successfully obtained meaningful verbal and 
nonverbal data about comprehension monitoring. Since they had multiple tiers of data, they were 
able to validate their methods by confirming a low false-positive rate for nonverbal displays of 
expectancy violation. However, this study is not without limitations. Procedurally, the 
researchers did not engage with children’s spontaneous comments during shared reading, but 
instead gave a pre-planned neutral response. Protestations had to be initiated within five seconds 
of the violation. Meaningful data about metacognitive processing could have been lost by the 
dismissal of spontaneous or delayed comments. Legitimate processing of new information may 
take place long after five seconds of the presentation of that information. Thus, their study 
highlighted a methodological tension between standardization of procedures and obtaining all 
available verbal data from each participant. Pre-defining strict constraints on data collection 
facilitated data collection and comparison, yet it may have excluded some evidence of 
comprehension and comprehension monitoring.  
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In contrast, Paris and Paris’ Picture Walk (PW; 2003) invited participants to say whatever 
came to mind as they looked through the pictures. The PW’s less structured approach yielded 
observational data on book handling skills, interest in the task, and spontaneous interactions with 
the book. After making their commentary, PW participants were asked to close the book and 
retell the story. Their verbalizations were transcribed and graded on recognition of elements of 
story. Then the participant was instructed to look through the text a second time and answer 
literal and inferential comprehension questions. Researchers followed up on inferential responses 
by posing why questions to elicit elaboration, justification, or alternative explanations. 
Observations were thematically coded and inter-rater agreement of at least 90% was reached.  
Analysis of variance did not show a significant difference between the Picture Walk 
performances of pre-readers versus readers in the first grade. Regression analysis revealed that 
age and code-based skills were positively related to comprehension, but that comprehension was 
not completely explained by these factors. These findings supported the conclusion that the 
thinking skills involved in comprehension were a unique ability meriting focused investigation. 
Paris and Paris (2003) concluded that constructing a story from a narrative picture book involves 
many of the same cognitive actions involved in comprehension of printed text. These cognitive 
actions include integrating multiple pieces of information, focusing on the most important 
information, monitoring understanding, and checking previous pictures to correct 
misunderstandings. Thus, many cognitive actions were involved in their task, which created 
many situational opportunities for metacognition to be relevant based on person, task, and 
strategy characteristics (Flavell, 1979). In sum, using the PW procedure with published picture 
books may have produced different results and more insight into processing than either the 
EVDT’s error detection methodology or the independent pretend reading methodology. 
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Hsieh et al. (2013) measured typically-developing preschoolers’ metacognition through 
an entirely different approach than the PW or EVDT. Using the published wordless storybook, A 
Boy, A Dog, and A Frog (Mayer, 1967), Hsieh et al. engaged Taiwanese preschoolers in creating 
a story from the pictures. During a second round, they reread the participants’ first versions and 
actively sought revisions. They considered that just over 90% of their participants engaged in at 
least one of three types of metacognitive revisions. However, preschoolers’ revisions tended to 
focus on their feelings and opinions whereas first graders attended to larger units of meaning– 
such as a sentence or a paragraph. 
Hsieh et al. (2013) divided the children’s revisions into three types: immediate revisions, 
delayed revisions, and reviewed revisions. Timing determined membership in the respective 
category. Immediate revisions were given before the scribe could write down the child’s story 
rendering, delayed revisions were initiated before the scribe finished recording, and reviewed 
revisions were initiated by the child after the scribe had stopped writing. Though this approach 
exemplified a more open-ended and naturalistic approach than error detection, and a more 
interactive approach than observation of pretend reading, it still featured an artificial limit on 
how the child could be metacognitive. Revision is a broad category and, based on sampled 
anecdotes, appeared to encompass forms of metacognition such as Planning and Reflecting. 
Hsieh et al. directly addressed the comprehension-metacognition relationship by evaluating the 
coherence of the story transcribed. Though first graders’ metacognition appeared to influence 
performance on storytelling, no consistent benefit emerged for the preschoolers.  
However, Brown et al. (2014) were able to document benefits of metacognition to 
preschoolers. They trained a small group of four-year-old preschoolers considered at-risk for 
academic failure to self-monitor their retelling of a story. The goal was for 4-year-olds to 
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independently include five major elements of story in their retellings after small group training 
sessions that used commercially-available storybooks. Training was a part of typical small-group 
rotations in the classroom. The intervention was successful for the three 4-year-old participants. 
They essentially quadrupled the number of story components included in their retelling from 
baseline to post-intervention assessment, and they showed a further increase at a maintenance 
assessment two weeks later. The 4-year-old participants appeared to have internalized the 
“guided self-monitoring” (p. 161) from the intervention procedures. The measured outcome, the 
number of key ideas in the retelling, is typically considered to be a proxy for comprehension. 
The children were taught these abstract elements as a cognitive strategy and then received 
assistance with monitoring their compliance. Since the details of “correct” responses varied by 
story, application of a strategy was what was taught. This study’s approach thus exemplified how 
strategic processing could be a nexus between comprehension and certain forms of 
metacognition, even for pre-readers. 
Story elements can be considered to be macrostructures; they fill in the story’s narrative 
arc and together form at least the text base of a story. They also provide a consistent (though 
abstract) scaffold for retelling across stories. Other scaffolds in Brown et al.’s study included the 
small group interaction during the training sessions and picture prompts for five pre-selected 
story elements: the main character, the initiating event, the main character’s internal motivation, 
main actions, and final consequence or outcome. Brown et al.’s methods and results 
demonstrated how a focus on monitoring allows for investigation of the integration of 
comprehension and metacognition. However, participants were invited to perform – and 
therefore monitor – only one way of interacting with a story (retelling it). There are many more 
cognitive and metacognitive experiences relevant to story comprehension. 
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Brenna (1995) observed that precocious preschool readers utilized a variety of 
metacognitive strategies, some more than others. Though Brenna (1995) worked with early print 
readers, her concern was for the “thinking and reasoning processes early readers use in 
comprehending text”—which she anticipated would be highly metacognitive (p. 55). Brenna 
identified a developing “text knowledge” (p. 55) as a form of metacognition, which she 
considered to work with knowledge of self and task. Brenna’s text knowledge consisted of 
standard concepts about print typically assessed during emergent literacy, as well as more literate 
knowledge, such as recognizing a reciprocity between reading and writing. Her construct of text 
knowledge is very closely related to person knowledge, as a view of the self as a reader and 
writer makes text knowledge meaningful. Brenna’s person-task-strategy (action) framework, 
based on Flavell (1979, 1981), made visible the various ways that metacognitive knowledge, 
metacognitive experiences, and cognitive and metacognitive strategies implicated and 
contributed to each other.   
Brenna (1995) triangulated information from interviews, observations of home literacy 
life, and observations of independent reading in order to reach her conclusions. In addition to 
recognizing metacognitive strategies in precocious 4-year-old readers, she recommended that 
multiple methods be used in any one study in order to fully understand young children’s 
emergent literacy and metacognition. Though her early readers shared common characteristics, 
they also demonstrated important individual differences in how they approached the reading task 
and employed metacognition. Brenna pointed out that different data collection methods can yield 
different results and lead to different conclusions. A singular method or a singular data collection 
technique may thus fail to document relevant phenomena in a multi-faceted situation such as 
storybook reading. Error detection, observation of independent pretend reading, and pre/post 
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intervention studies may be too narrowly focused to capture all metacognitive processing in a 
complicated problem space such as reading.  
Summary of forms of metacognition identified in emergent reading studies. I 
identified the following forms of emergent metacognition in research describing young 
children’s emergent reading interactions with texts: self-monitoring, self-revising, self-reflecting, 
and justification of verbalizations. Studies that used reading as their task seemed to let the broad 
categories of self-monitoring and self-revising represent metacognition.  
Self-monitoring. Self-monitoring is a major category of metacognition. Monitoring may 
be challenging to measure in preschool participants because this form of strategic behavior may 
lack an outward manifestation. Or, monitoring may have many different outward manifestations. 
Researchers have traditionally used error detection methodologies to overcome this challenge by 
providing participants with an opportunity to demonstrably react to an error. Skarakis-Doyle and 
Dempsey (2008) implanted objectionable information into a familiar story and measured 
protestations as manifestations of monitoring. Participants had to protest or object to an error in 
order to reconcile the threat to their reasonable expectations. However, many situational factors 
other than monitoring could have facilitated or suppressed an outward protest. Background 
knowledge, memory of the first reading, and comparison of the first to the second reading could 
have been variably influential. Furthermore, many aspects of a story reading experience may be 
monitored. Error detection is one step removed from the study of literacy processing; attention is 
given to children’s reactions to contrived alterations of the story, but not to monitoring whether 
one learned anything, realized something new, or applied or changed comprehension strategies. 
Thus, only one form of monitoring was called monitoring.  
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Self-revising. Hsieh et al. (2013) used the term revising with the same broad brush. 
Revising is an active form of metacognition from the regulation category of Flavell’s model. Just 
as there can be many manifestations of monitoring, there may be many types of revisions. Stories 
inspire a wide range of cognitive and metacognitive actions and experiences and allow for 
various forms of metacognitive knowledge to be acquired, affirmed, and/or applied. Based on 
evidence that preschoolers can engage in meaningful monitoring and revising, I aimed to 
broaden the possibilities for data collection on these phenomena, in order to explore any subtle 
and various manifestations not documented by prior approaches.   
Justifications of verbalizations. In their Picture Walk procedure, Paris and Paris (2003) 
followed up on children’s responses to comprehension questions with the elaboration prompt 
“Why do you think that?” They found that young children (as young as pre-reading 
kindergarteners) could revisit their answers and comments as they discussed the story with an 
adult. Thus, consistent with Flavell’s original definition (1979), students’ thoughts were an 
object for reconsideration. A prompt may have led them to engage in such an action at that 
moment, but the capacity was within the young child. As with any verbal reporting, the threat of 
words not matching true inner processes always exists. Ideally, multiple methods would 
triangulate whether intrapersonal insight is communicated through statements. I concluded that 
Paris and Paris’ elaboration prompt was actually metacognitive in nature, and I aimed to 
determine whether my preschoolers understood such a request and could reply to it through intra-
personal insight into their comprehension processing.   
Reflecting on reading as a task. Brenna (1995) highlighted the person, task, and strategy 
knowledge that precocious early readers used as they engaged in reading. Each of these inter-
related forms of knowledge had a meta-level appreciation for the self as a literate or 
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communicative agent that gave deep meaning to relatively small and rudimentary forms of 
reading and writing. Brenna’s work highlighted the affordances of using a reader-task-strategy 
view based on Flavell’s model of metacognition. Important early literacy phenomena could have 
gone undocumented without it. 
Metacognition in the context of emergent writing processes. Writing involves the 
intentional construction of meaningful information to be shared with others. Writing, as a form 
of literary communication, unfolds (as reading does) through a process. Literary processes invite 
revisiting, reconsideration, and revision, perhaps more than isolated tasks (Fang & Cox, 1999). 
Revisiting and reconsidering text helps a learner to further understand the abstract and 
representational nature of text, and vice versa (Fang & Cox, 1999; Vygotsky, 1978). Both 
readers and writers have goals for understanding or being understood; goals implicate Planning, 
Monitoring, and Revising. Children who are too young to engage in conventional writing may 
compose connected oral discourse that an adult scribe may write down. Just as understanding is 
at the heart of reading, composing coherent communication is at the heart of writing (Fang & 
Cox, 1999). Therefore, emergent writing can be a context for metacognition (Rowe, 1989).  
Fang and Cox (1999) examined preschoolers’ self-monitoring while dictating a story 
about a personal life event. All 44 of their participants were in a pre-reading, pre-writing stage of 
emergent literacy, yet three-quarters engaged in some form of metacognition while composing 
their story. After establishing rapport, a researcher/scribe asked the preschoolers to talk about a 
personal memory. Then the researcher/scribe invited the child to relay the memory again, but in 
the form of a story that other children would like to hear. As the child told the “autonomous” 
story, the researcher/scribe dictated verbatim and periodically reviewed what was said. The 
researcher/scribe did not give the child any formal prompts or pre-planned feedback concerning 
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the quality or coherence of the story. Children’s spontaneous metacognitive utterances while 
composing their autonomous story with the scribe were counted and categorized.  
This study addressed both cognition and metacognition. First, the researcher asked the 
child to recount an interesting life event from memory, without the benefit of pictures, props, or 
a parent who could provide memory cues. Then, the researcher asked the child to tell this event 
again, in the form of an interesting story. The cognition involved memory and familiarity with 
the story format. Metacognition was expected of the child during the presentation of the 
information in story form—through monitoring of the sequence, coherence, and accuracy of the 
story as it was dictated. For example, when the researcher stopped to recap what was dictated so 
far, the child could compare the unfolding story to his or her intended communication and revise 
accordingly. Referencing the duality of awareness and regulation in metacognition, Fang and 
Cox (1999) assumed that self-regulation of storytelling would proceed from self-appraisal of 
what was already said, and that it would be easier to observe than metacognitive awareness.  
Fang and Cox (1999) used a Vygotskyian framework to highlight the importance of 
spoken and tacit language in thinking. They used a challenging task to encourage preschoolers to 
vocalize their inner speech to the scribe, who took on the mechanical burden of writing. The 
mental work of composing a story relative to their intention and meeting the requirements of 
“autonomy” was done by the child. Based on the idea that “early forms of metacognition or its 
precursors may be observed in children’s natural speech as they engage in challenging activities” 
(p. 176), the researchers delineated two categories of verbal data: the text that the child 
composed and any metacognitive utterances made throughout the composition process. These 




To create an autonomous text, participants had to monitor coherence while considering a 
hypothetical audience. The researchers transcribed the autonomous stories and assigned a 
“cohesive harmony” score through a multi-step analysis of lexical units and overall logical 
consistency (p. 179). They also assessed participants’ emergent literacy using Sulzby’s (1985) 
schemata, which revealed that while no children were attending to print, their abilities to render a 
story from pictures varied. Analysis of variance revealed that this emergent literacy level had a 
statistically significant (p = 0.00) effect on metacognition, measured as metacognitive utterances 
during dictation. Perhaps because writing is a self-reflexive process, the type of metacognition 
instigated and the type of outcome were positively related in this study. However, nine of the 
fourteen children who did not verbalize any evidence of metacognition while telling their own 
story exhibited some evidence of overall story structure while pretend reading a storybook. In 
conclusion, emergent literacy sophistication was influential, but not clearly deterministic.  
Fang and Cox (1999) expected and observed two main forms of emergent metacognition 
in their study: strategic planning for dictating their story to the scribe and regulation of the 
comprehensibility of the story that was being formed through this process. Their task involved 
many emergent literacy skills and posed a special challenge by asking for the second telling of 
the story to be delivered in the written register (Purcell-Gates, 1995). Fang and Cox (1999) 
claimed validity by analyzing “children’s spontaneous speech during a natural literacy event 
(i.e., the composition of a personal story) to infer their metacognitive processes” (p. 179). Fang 
and Cox avoided unwarranted inferences from verbal report data or other forms of self-report by 
obtaining concurrent metacognition during an actual literary event. In other words, children 
discussed something they were doing in the moment.  
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Through a more extended design, Rowe (1989) made weekly observations of 21 three 
and 4-year-olds engaged in their classroom’s literacy center. Rowe (1989) used the constant 
comparative method to “generate theoretical propositions about the role of metacognition in 
young children’s literacy learning” (p. 67). Rowe recorded observations and engaged in thematic 
coding of metacognition relevant to what the children were working on in the writing center. She 
triangulated her interpretations by conferring with the children’s regular preschool teachers. 
Rowe identified nine major categories of metacognitive behavior in preschoolers’ self-initiated 
writing activities in the preschool classroom. In parentheses, I matched each to thematic 
categories from the present study: 
1. Referring to self as a reader or writer (Reflecting on Reading) 
2. Referring to cognitive strategies used in the task (Reflecting on Reading) 
3. Requesting help when needed relative to task goal (Feeling of Knowing) 
4. Articulating task plans (Task Planning) 
5. Identifying and discussing barriers to goals (Task Planning) 
6. Self-correcting (Self Revising) 
7. Identifying discoveries (Judgment of Learning from Story) 
8. Referring to peers as readers and writers (Reflecting on Reading) 
9. Discussing the task (Reflecting on Reading) 
Consistent with Flavell’s model, Rowe (1989) claimed that she observed person, task, 
and strategy knowledge. Rowe considered preschoolers to exhibit knowledge along the personal 
dimension when they spoke about themselves as readers and writers and consciously carried on 
as readers and writers for their own literary purposes in the classroom. Such behavior included 
an awareness of what reading and writing entailed, how to engage in it, and how to seek help 
from others who also have reading and writing skills. Underneath these behaviors was an 
awareness of reading and writing as communicative domains in which all class members 
participated. In other words, knowledge of self as a writer is metacognitive in nature because it 
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involves acting out of an awareness of mental capacities that are called for by the task one is 
engaged in.  
 Writing can take on many forms and serve many purposes; even for preschoolers, many 
tasks can be included under the umbrella of writing. This scenario provided opportunities for 
naturalistic observation of task choice, goal setting, and goal-seeking actions. Rowe (1989) 
considered knowledge about how to complete the task and how hard the task is in general to 
represent the task dimension of Flavell’s model. Rowe’s preschoolers manifested task knowledge 
by explaining that they couldn’t read pictures (since they lack words) and by requesting the time 
and space they needed in proportion to the difficulty of a task. Finally, Rowe claimed that the 
preschoolers she observed exhibited the strategy dimension of metacognitive knowledge when 
they consciously employed a cognitive strategy to accomplish a writing goal. They often knew 
that a certain strategy was well suited to a certain task. For example, one child consciously chose 
to observe another child in order to learn how to do something. In sum, Rowe documented a 
wide range of self-regulatory behaviors, in which children used their metacognitive knowledge 
to monitor themselves and others in different classroom situations.  
 Rowe’s (1989) extensive interaction with participants allowed for the collection of a large 
data set collected under familiar conditions and demands. Though Rowe directly observed the 
children, it is not known how they would have reacted to questions or prompts. By viewing the 
task from the child’s perspective versus the adult’s perspective, Rowe was able to describe how 
important metacognition was to their participation in emergent literacy tasks. Preschoolers’ 
cognitions and metacognitions appeared to be less sophisticated and less efficiently intertwined 
than that of older children, but no less relevant to the task, from their perspective. Due to the 
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variety, challenge, and abstract representation involved in writing, both cognition and 
metacognition seemed to occur in connection and with reciprocal benefit.   
Summary of forms of metacognition identified in emergent writing studies. This 
collection of literature suggests that the following forms of emergent metacognition can be 
observed in young children’s typical and prompted emergent writing behaviors: reflective self- 
awareness, self-monitoring, self-revising, self-expanding, task planning, and feeling of knowing. 
Self-awareness, monitoring, revising, and expanding. Writing is a communicative, 
evolving, and self-referential process by design. Because young writers have goals in mind, akin 
to a mental model of a text, they have intentions that can be monitored as they work to produce 
story content. Some revisions cancelled out an earlier statement, as if it had been mistaken or in 
jest. These were straightforward examples of monitoring and putting monitoring into action by 
revising. However, some verbalizations embellished, elaborated on, and/or further integrated 
prior verbalizations into the whole of the story. These additional statements had a qualitatively 
different purpose. Thus, they support the creation of Expanding as a thematic category distinct 
from revising. For example, I considered the metacognitive utterance “I wanna change the word” 
to revise whereas “He listen to them, to his mommy” expands because it adds a second category 
of people listened to. Revising cancels and replaces prior information whereas expanding adds 
additional information in a logical connection to and implicit affirmation of prior information. I 
presumed the young child felt internally driven to volunteer additional information due to 
monitoring satisfaction with her or his story production relative to an intended mental model of 
what should be articulated.  
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Task Planning. The above discussion of monitoring, revising, and expanding illustrated 
how the intentionality of the writing process—whether self-initiated or in response to an adult’s 
prompting—involves having an initial goal, vision, or mental model that is pursued. Thus, 
planning, monitoring, revising, and expanding have dynamic and intertwined relationships. As 
pointed out by Brenna (1995) and Rowe (1989), a nascent awareness of the self as a literate 
agent seems to allow young children to make and coordinate cognitive and metacognitive efforts 
towards a literacy goal. 
Feeling of Knowing. In the studies reviewed, if preschool writers didn’t know something 
needed for their task, they sought to uncover the missing information or helpful resources. Thus, 
I interpreted a Feeling of Knowing as a metacognitive experience that manifested a finer 
gradation of monitoring. I concluded that knowing of knowing would represent metacognitive 
knowledge, whereas feeling that you do or do not know a specific piece of information relevant 
to your goal is a metacognitive experience in relationship with monitoring. Thus, it can be 
spontaneous, scaffolded, or prompted.  
Metacognition in the context of classroom learning centers. Whitebread et al. (2009) 
recorded preschoolers’ verbal reports of their self-monitoring and observed preschoolers’ self-
regulated behavior while they engaged in typical classroom tasks. According to Whitebread et al. 
(2009), their observation of semi-structured engagement at learning centers filled a 
methodological gap by using careful observation to investigate preschoolers’ “internal 
representations” (p. 78). They intended for their close observations to reveal as much processing 
as think aloud methods, which they considered too challenging for the preschool population. 
Whitebread et al. (2009) argued that observation is more valid for preschool participants because 
it enables researchers to see what three to five-year-olds can do before they can report doing it. 
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Observation of speech during meaningful action may also enable the linking of actions and task 
details in ways that can more thoroughly explain what young children can and cannot do. 
To advance these aims, they developed the Children’s Independent Learning 
Development checklist (CHILD) for use by preschool teachers. CHILD assessed metacognition 
as the cognitive aspect of self-regulation in a classroom setting. CHILD used observation of 
stimulating learning tasks to overcome a fundamental challenge in researching metacognition in 
preschoolers—less metacognition and/or qualitatively different metacognition may be just as 
important to the young participant’s task engagement as more or more sophisticated 
metacognition is to an older participant’s engagement in a task. Whitebread et al. (2009) pointed 
out that traditional research on metacognition in preschoolers has mistaken limitations on verbal 
ability and working memory as characteristics of limited metacognition. However, these are 
actually separate constructs. Whitebread et al. (2009) concluded that preschoolers can give more 
advanced performances when tasks are “ecologically valid and meaningful” (p. 65). 
 Whitebread et al. (2009) encouraged future researchers to consider non-verbal data such 
as gesturing and eye gaze focal points. Non-verbal communicative data can indicate thinking that 
cannot be expressed verbally. Non-verbal behaviors may also help the child develop cognitive 
and metacognitive processing; concrete interactions with books and learning tools are an 
important intermediate step towards abstract or purely representational processing (Vygotsky, 
1986).  
 The CHILD was designed for general preschool classroom use. I considered the 
following metacognitive performances from the CHILD to be relevant to the processes involved 
in joint reading and used them to support development of my thematic codes (in parentheses):  
1. Child can speak about how s/he interacted with text (Reflecting on Reading) 
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2. Child can speak about what s/he learned from text (Judgment of Learning from 
Story) 
3. Child can speak about a plan to interact with text in a certain way in the future 
(Task Planning) 
4. Child states a reason for a choice or decision (Justification) 
5. Child spontaneously asks questions to try to better understand – seemingly to fill 
in missing information (Feeling of Knowing Story Information) 
Neuman and Roskos (1997) also documented metacognition in preschoolers’ 
participation in classroom learning centers. They observed 3- and 4-year-old children’s talk and 
behavior at three thematic literacy centers: the post office, the doctor’s office, and a restaurant. 
Each center was introduced through a themed learning unit that included read alouds of relevant 
literature and relevant field trips or guest speakers.  
Children’s activities were captured by motion-activated cameras, resulting in 20 hours of 
videotaped data of 76 episodes. Adults did not prompt or otherwise interact with children while 
they played at the centers. The preschoolers’ monologic and dialogic talk was transcribed 
verbatim and coordinated with non-verbal behaviors (e.g., pointing, turning to a conversation 
partner). This data set revealed children’s cognitive and metacognitive sophistication when the 
only available scaffolds were familiarity from world knowledge or prior instruction, interaction 
with other children, and the physical environment. Adults did not guide or prompt.  
Neuman and Roskos (1997) posed three research questions to their collected data: “1) 
What features distinguished literacy in practice? 2) What knowledges did the activities require? 
and 3) What cognitive and metacognitive operations were involved in the activities?” (p. 14). 
After coding each speech turn or gestural unit, coding categories were refined, and acceptable 
inter-coder agreement was reached. Three levels of analysis were then applied – broad features 
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of literacy in practice, literacy knowledge in practice, and the relationship between domain-
specific and strategic literacy activity.  
Literacy knowledge in practice was divided into instances of declarative and procedural 
knowledge. For example, in the post office center, children expressed that they knew what 
writing paper, stamps, and envelopes were for, and they corrected each other for using these 
things outside of the norm. When confusions or disagreements arose, children resorted to a 
reflective, meta-level review of the situation to reach a resolution. For example, children 
debating whether the post office was open referred to the word closed printed on a sign to 
resolve the issue. Though they had difficulty reading the word, one child decided to state each 
letter to confirm that the word was indeed closed. The child’s awareness of cognitive uncertainty 
(i.e., What is that word? How can we find out?) and strategic decision to resolve the uncertainty 
by applying formal knowledge (letter names) was considered metacognitive. Thus, independent 
of print accuracy, a separate and often-prioritized cognitive skill, preschool children consciously 
employed and articulated reasonable actions to reach their cognitive goal. Print accuracy will 
likely develop later; the impressive finding in this episode was the meta-approach to the task that 
employed what was known about self and language. This scenario fits Flavell’s model, even 
though some children were technically missing key information. They applied what they knew. 
Neuman and Roskos (1997) concluded that they had observed the same types of 
processing seen in mature or conventional learners, although in qualitatively different forms 
relative to their young agents and their tasks. They observed declarative knowledge (I know 
that…) and procedural knowledge (I know how to …), though evidence of procedural knowledge 
exceeded that of declarative knowledge in all three centers. They considered this finding as 
indicative of children’s developmental tendency to perform actions before being able to 
84 
 
thoroughly discuss them. The implication of this finding is that when researching literacy skills 
with young children, behaviors should be analyzed along with verbalizations, and strategies 
should be analyzed alongside accuracy.  
Neuman and Roskos (1997) also concluded that they observed “strategic knowledge” – a 
meta-level of processing that spanned settings, whereas declarative and procedural knowledges 
were tied to a domain (p. 23). Neuman and Roskos (1997, p. 23) claimed that their participants 
engaged in six types of metacognitive, strategic behaviors. I correlated their categories with 
categories from the present study in parentheses:  
1) seeking needed information (Feeling of Knowing) 
2) correcting others 
3) self-correcting (Self-Revising) 
4) assigning roles and resources (Task Planning) 
5) checking correctness (Self-Revising) 
6) gathering resources for a desired action (Task Planning) 
 
I considered the seeking and checking behaviors to have been driven by an underlying 
Feeling of Knowing. For example, Neuman and Roskos (1997) noted that in the vignette from 
the post office center, strategic knowledge was abundant while declarative and procedural 
knowledges were lacking. Metacognitive strategy use came online to surmount the challenge that 
missing information posed to the pursuit of task goals. An awareness of a lack of important 
information occurred to participants without prompting. This interpretation of results is also 
consistent with Flavell’s (1978, 1979) situational model of metacognition, in that children knew 
they needed more information to fulfill their task goals. 
Though Neuman and Roskos’ analysis was elegant, they did not resolve some endemic 
complications of working with verbal data from young children. For example, a portion of their 
verbal data consisted of a child ostensibly verbalizing why she or he was doing something 
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(“Excuse me, I have to write something down, so I won’t forget,” p. 25). In this example, it is not 
known for sure if the child was mimicking a behavior seen in the home or if the child 
spontaneously and strategically chose to write something down for the articulated goal of 
remembering it later. Researchers made inferences when coding children’s verbalizations and 
when analyzing their meaning. Ideally, another source of data would have bolstered confidence 
in the true metacognitive or strategic value of the verbalizations from such young participants. 
As observed by Peskin and Astington (2004), preschoolers’ verbalizations may not always match 
underlying cognitive or metacognitive processes.  
This study informed my own. First, the authors concluded that preschoolers can access, 
monitor, articulate, and follow through on their literacy-related thoughts. These capacities are 
required to study metacognition through joint reading. Second, their findings illustrate the many 
situated ways that preschoolers may be metacognitive, such as to confirm the identity of a letter 
or word or to check the clarity and communicative effect of a spoken sentence. Their analysis 
supports my categories of Self-Revision, Feeling of Knowing Story Information, and Task 
Planning.  
Though Neuman and Roskos (1997) obtained sufficient verbal data through observation 
alone, they did not assess if questions or prompts can lead to more or more sophisticated data. 
Vygotsky (1978) posited that schooling should challenge students, and Flavell (1979) suggested 
metacognitive training. Joint reading as an interactive dynamic may allow for the benefits of 
both prompting and observation.  
Summary of forms of metacognition identified in observations of children at 
learning centers. The selected literature describing preschoolers’ work at learning centers 
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suggested the most diverse and robust forms of metacognition across this literature review. 
Whitebread et al.’s (2009) study provided evidence for five of the seven forms of metacognition 
coded for in the present study (all except Judging Difficulty and Expanding Storytelling). The 
open-ended nature of learning centers may have invited more and more varied activity, and it 
may have allowed children to interpret or define tasks for themselves. Also, since children were 
not engaged in storytelling at the two center studies, they did not have an opportunity to Expand. 
Creating or interpreting text appears to invite Expansion in ways that atextual tasks do not.  
Whitebread et al. (2009) and Neuman and Roskos (1997) detailed the available scaffolds 
for participants as they worked through a task–other children, the materials provided, and 
classroom instruction. As opposed to scripted procedures with an adult, these studies could 
include behavior completely initiated and carried out by a young child. Without the immediate 
presence of an adult, it was easier to ascribe holistic meaning to observed behaviors. Thus, while 
scripted reading and writing studies may have overlooked some forms of metacognition, 
observational studies may have considered almost everything the children did to be 
metacognitive. The following forms of emergent metacognition were observed in young 
children’s activities at classroom learning centers: 
Self-Revising. Neuman and Roskos’ (1997) example of self-revising is set in the context 
of play at centers. One of their participants placed a letter in a cash register and then commented 
“Oops, that doesn’t go there” (p. 24). They also considered correcting others to be a 
metacognitive strategy. For example, one participant told a peer “You can’t send money in the 
mail” (p. 24). What united correcting self and others and what made these actions metacognitive 
was their attempt to change, cancel, correct, or improve upon an effort in relation to a task goal. 
These actions likely resulted from monitoring.  
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Feeling of Knowing. Neuman and Roskos’ (1997) documentation of pre-readers solving 
an unknown word reveals much about the meta-level processing that they brought to a situation 
wherein their cognitive resources were not sufficient. Their feeling of not knowing relevant 
information spurred corrective action to reach a goal. Future research may help to reveal if a 
Feeling of Knowing (or not Knowing) is spurred by or spurs monitoring. In reference to the 
present study, it is justified to interpret a task-based or story-based Feeling of Knowing that 
accesses whether or not key story information is being understood. During the process of 
meaning making, knowing or not is critical. Preschoolers were found to be aware of and able to 
report on knowing or not. In observational studies, not knowing led to questioning or taking 
corrective action. Since knowing did not require repair, it was not as easily observed. 
Task Planning. Whitebread et al. (2009) and Neuman and Roskos (1997) documented 
multiple instances of conscious planning, wherein preferences and goals were considered before 
actions were taken. Planning enables monitoring of progress towards a goal. Additionally, 
spontaneous reasons for monitoring may occur throughout any task. In the practical behaviors 
invited by Neuman and Roskos’ (1997) classroom centers, planning involved “assigning roles 
and resources,” such as selecting the dress up clothing needed to match a pretend environment 
(p. 24).  
Justification of Verbalizations and Reflecting on an Emerging Literacy. Whitebread et 
al. (2009) observed that preschoolers engaged in multiple forms of conversation about their 
activities at learning centers. They justified or defended the reasonableness of their statements 
and they discussed their activity with books in a way that showed early awareness of being a 
reader (i.e., someone who gets meaning from books) and engaging in reading as a defined mental 
activity. In both of these metacognitive activities, young children were able to review or mentally 
88 
 
revisit their cognitive efforts as an object for examination and discussion. As with writing, the 
practical, holistic, and familiar nature of center tasks gave children something to do, which may 
have been a useful scaffold for reflective thinking about what they were doing.  
Metacognition in the context of relevant activities. Many early metacognitive 
capacities have been documented through experimental tasks that did not directly involve 
literacy skills. Since many of these studies were produced through psychological research, there 
are no holistic emergent literacy settings or tasks to describe. Therefore, I directly organized this 
section of my review by type of metacognition. In the subsections that follow, I review literature 
describing the following forms of metacognition that I considered relevant to joint storybook 
reading: Metamemory, Self-Monitoring, Feeling of Knowing, Judgment of Difficulty, and 
Judgment of Learning.  
Metamemory. After multiple rounds of coding, Metamemory was ultimately excluded as 
a category in this study. However, there was some evidence from the literature and from 
collected data that this form of metacognition may be relevant under different circumstances. 
Therefore, I discuss it. Many investigations of early metacognition have focused on memory as 
the first-level cognition. Brown (1978) defined metamemory as “knowledge concerning one’s 
own memory abilities and strategies” (p. 81). Brown (1978) explained that younger children lag 
older children in both memory and metamemory. The two are related (Schneider, 2001). Brown 
(1978) detailed that younger children know less, have less organization of what they do know, 
are not efficient at storage and retrieval, and have limited recall techniques. Larkin (2009) 
referred to metamemory as the awareness of one’s memory and the ability to use the vocabulary 
of remembering. Larkin (2009) explained that metamemory emerges during typical social 
interactions in the preschool years. According to a recent review by Lai (2011), most authors 
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agree that children begin to use memory verbs around the age of four. In other words, 4-year-
olds are aware of, can label, and can communicate aspects of remembering. However, as 
demonstrated by Peskin & Astington (2004), the depth of the match between metacognitive 
verbs and knowledge or performance of metacognition is hard to confirm in the young child. In 
everyday experience, a child with metamemory can communicate that she or he forgot where a 
toy was hidden, understand why she or he cannot find it, and request help from an adult to 
resolve the situation (Larkin, 2009). Brown (1978) did not consider preschoolers to be 
developmentally capable of having metamemory or related capacities that conventional readers 
would regularly rely on to read, study, and learn. However, Flavell and Wellman’s (1977) 
distinctions between situational performance of metamemory, sensitivity to the relevance of 
memory to the task, and stable, declarative knowledge of memory as a cognitive enterprise 
suggest that young children may have limited meta-level abilities that they can’t report on or 
consistently benefit from. In this regard, a fragmented emergence of Metamemory may resemble 
the emergence of other forms of metacognition. In the final analysis, I concluded that data that I 
originally coded as Metamemory could not be characterized as self-aware discussion of memory 
as a mental action. 
Self-Monitoring. Revelle et al. (1985) implemented an error detection technique to assess 
preschoolers’ cognitive monitoring during a contrived task set in the regular preschool 
classroom. Revelle et al. (1985) gave various oral instructions for children to carry out tasks such 
as retrieving an item from a classroom location and bringing it to the experimenter. Some 
instructions were fungible, but some were ambiguous, nonsensical, purposefully inaudible, too 
much to remember, or impossible to perform. Reasonable reactions to these obstacles to task 
completion were considered evidence of self-monitoring. The youngest participants only 
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responded to the inaudible instructions and appeared to be insensitive to breakdowns in meaning. 
Older preschoolers began to react to meaning-based problems in the given instructions. This 
technique did not involve a connected story, but oral instructions for completing a task. The 
experimenter was not the children’s regular teacher, and the children’s perceptions of the 
meaningfulness of the tasks were not known. It is not known if children would have performed 
differently if the teacher had been the requestor or if the tasks had been part of a holistic and 
meaningful classroom activity, such as building a block house or working on a class project.  
Feeling of Knowing. Wellman (1977; as cited in Karably & Zarbucky, 2009) referred to 
a feeling of knowing as a form of confidence in one’s ability to recognize (i.e., know that you 
know) a target, independent of the ability to provide a name or label for it. Knowing that you 
know or do not know can be obscured by being able to label something that is not understood. In 
the context of a holistic task, a sensation of knowing or not should lead to maintenance or 
adjustment of effort. However, this capacity is often documented as being present or not, versus 
being investigated as one of many factors in a constant stream of cognitive or metacognitive 
efforts implicated by a multi-faceted task. For example, Hembacher and Ghetti (2014) 
investigated 3- to 5-year-olds’ feelings of certainty or uncertainty concerning the accuracy of 
their memories. Hembacher and Ghetti (2014) exposed preschoolers to a simple picture and then 
asked them to choose whether they had seen the picture before. They also asked their 
preschoolers to indicate their confidence in their answers (i.e., I saw it or I did not see it) by 
requesting that their answer be recorded or disregarded. Participants in each age group expressed 
uncertainty when they really did not know if they had seen a picture, though the 4- and 5-year-
olds did so more often. Hembacher and Ghetti (2014) concluded that feelings of uncertainty may 
be a precursor to conscious cognitive monitoring of memory. Since introspection concerning 
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memory is part of the umbrella of metacognition, their study illustrated the existence of 
metacognitive experiences in the preschool population (Flavell, 1981).  
In another study, Cultice et al. (1983) presented 4-year-olds with pictures of other 
children who were very likely to be known, somewhat likely to known, or not likely to be 
known. Participants were asked to state whether they knew the pictured child and to provide a 
name. Their participants understood the dual nature of the task (recognizing and naming), had 
accurate feelings of knowing, and spontaneously used metacognitive language to report on their 
mental states relative to the task (e.g., “I know her, but I don’t remember her name”, p. 1485). 
Cultice et al. (1983) concluded that 4-year-olds are capable of meaningful Feelings of Knowing. 
In concurrence, Ghetti, Hembacher, and Coughlin (2013) referred to a “judicious preschooler” 
(p. 160) who makes choices about how to proceed with a task based on knowledge levels and 
who can report on knowing or not. Ghetti et al. (2013) explained that their intent to investigate 
metacognition led them to their conclusion: “by adopting a metacognitive framework, we have 
discovered skills in introspection and control earlier in development than previously believed, 
which has opened exciting avenues for inquiry” (p. 164).  
These findings suggested that 4-year-olds can be trusted to intend to be accurate and to 
monitor their grasp of information. Since people of any age do not constantly share whether they 
know something or not, prompts are often used to obtain verbal reports of this metacognitive 
state. As with other forms of metacognition, it may be difficult to know for sure if the prompt 
cued the metacognitive state or substituted for it, especially when a yes/no answer could be 
given. To add to the literature, I sought to investigate how Feeling of Knowing Story Information 
could be experienced and reported throughout the task of joint reading. 
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Judgment of Learning. Determinations of “learning that occur during or soon after 
learning of new materials” (Lockl & Schneider, 2002, p. 327) are Judgments of Learning. 
According to Schneider, Vise, Lockl, and Nelson (2000), preschoolers tend to overestimate their 
ability to be successful on a task before they perform it. This type of prediction is conceptualized 
as a form of metamemory. Gaining academic thinking experiences from attending conventional 
schooling seems to help even slightly older children calibrate their Judgments. This construct can 
be adapted to accommodate the academic learning demands placed on conventional readers. 
Thus, I used the term Judgment of Learning (JoL) to refer to retroactive evaluation of whether 
content recently presented in the story had been learned. For conventional readers, a JoL 
evaluation may influence choices about subsequent studying. Research is ongoing about how to 
maximize the academic benefits of JoLs. For example, Bui, Pyc, and Bailey (2018) found that 
delaying JoLs led to greater accuracy for adults. Other studies have found the opposite. JoLs are 
typically investigated under laboratory conditions, using a list of multiple discrete items or one 
item at a time (see Schneider et al., 2000). Preschoolers do not typically study to learn.  
However, after interacting with a book, being able to state whether something was 
learned or not provides valuable insight. In the present study, I developed the category Judgment 
of Learning from the Story that closely resembles metacomprehension or “a person’s ability to 
judge his or her own learning and/or comprehension of text materials” (Dunlosky & Lipko, 2007, 
p. 228). In the constant comparative process, initial analysis suggested that some participants 
were capable of reporting that they had learned something from reading the book in a way that 
met this definition. However, after the final round of coding, Judgment of Learning was 
considered to be out of reach of preschoolers in the present study. Future studies that only task 
the young child with comprehension and retroactive or even in-progress Judgment of Learning 
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may produce different results. In the present study, prompting for multiple types of 
comprehension processing and metacognition may have diluted how much each participant could 
dedicate to any one form of metacognition.  
Judgment of Difficulty. Touroutoglou and Efklides (2010) described a “feeling of 
difficulty” (p. 171) as a metacognitive experience within the learner, separate from the objective 
difficulty of the task itself.  They explained that many features of the task may result in a learner 
perceiving difficulty or challenge, such as a sense that one’s working memory is overloaded 
(Baker, 2017), knowledge of high task demands, or perplexing content. Per Touroutoglou and 
Efklides, a related concept is the predicted “ease of learning” content that older learners can rely 
on to plan for studying, e.g., allocating time or selecting and obtaining resources. Touroutoglou 
and Efklides explained that a feeling of difficulty can help a learner adjust effort on a difficult 
task, thus leading to success. However, feeling that a simple task is difficult may just provide 
insight into the fact that it really is. Touroutoglou and Efklides (2010) also explained that 
complex tasks tend to result in greater feelings of difficulty. Reading comprehension is a 
complex task. An accurate rendering can be arrived at through multiple pathways, can be hard to 
obtain, and can be dynamic (Fisher, 1998).  
Participating in joint reading is a complex task with comprehension as the presumed goal. 
A straightforward Judgment of Difficulty would involve a rating of the ease or difficulty of a task 
(Karably & Zarbucky, 2009). Due to the lack of studies of this capacity in preschoolers and the 
overlapping nature of the Judgment categories, I assumed that preschoolers might be able to 
retroactively judge the difficulty of a reading session if a plain-language prompt was posed very 
soon after the story ended. I did not expect them to have much experience with this line of 
thought (see Schneider et al., 2000), but I anticipated that they could verbalize basic insight into 
94 
 
their perception of story or task difficulty. Preschoolers’ sensitivity to perceived difficulty may 
be an important aspect of their emerging comprehension and metacognition. Furthermore, it is 
possible that a joint reading context could allow for documentation of not only their evaluation 
of difficulty, but also whether their behaviors during the task seemed to correlate with their 
evaluation.  
Synthesis of Literature  
  My review of the literature establishes that many preschoolers are capable of 
metacognition, depending on the tasks and settings. The literature may be expanded by research 
questions that ask how, when, and why these children are metacognitive, and to what beneficial 
end. Adapting Flavell’s person-task-strategy model of metacognition to include emergent 
literacy tasks would support such lines of questioning while adhering to the fundamental 
principles of metacognitive theory.  
The results of my literature review fit with my adaptation of Flavell’s model, as shown in 
Figure 4. Through the accretion of metacognitive experiences, declarative metacognitive 
knowledges are built. These in turn support expectations for having recognizable metacognitive 
experiences, which in turn may confirm and expand metacognitive knowledge. An emergent 
literacy task gives young children something real and concrete to do and something abstract and 
meaningful to think about and discuss. Thus, the middle box displays various cognitive actions 
common in emergent literacy functions as a medium through which the cognitive and 
metacognitive interact—sometimes in straightforward ways, as in the detection of an implanted 












   Figure 4 displays the metacognitive actions, metacognitive experiences, and 
metacognitive knowledge that I observed in the present study. The actions were constructive, 
purposeful, and meaningful acts conducted to participate in joint picture book reading. The 
experiences and knowledge were important to the joint reading. Participants’ metacognitive 
knowledge, experiences, and actions were immediately relevant to the task. They influenced and 
were influenced by the typical cognitive efforts one might expect of a 4-year-old. 
Since I synthesized and repackaged some forms of metacognition from prior studies, I 
provide other names used for my categories in Table 2. The literature reviewed for this study 
included research from the fields of psychology and education. Therefore, in the body of the 
literature review, I provided the authors’ operational definitions and then explained how these 




• Planning participation 
• Expanding Storytelling 
• Revising a verbalization 
  
Metacognitive Experiences 
• Feeling of Knowing 
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Cognitive Actions  
• Book handling 
• Page-turning 
• Pointing at pictures 






• Applying background 
knowledge 
• Pretend reading 
• Listening to read aloud 
• Commenting and discussing 
 




Other Names for Categories of Metacognition in Present Study  
Category in Present Study Construct Name in Prior Studies 




Judging Difficulty  Ease of Learning Judgment 
 
Justifying Verbalizations  Elaboration (as a form of comprehension) 
 
Expanding Storytelling  Monitoring, Revising 
 
Reflecting on Reading  “Meta-statements” 
Self and Task Knowledge 
 
Feeling of Knowing Story 
Content  
Feeling of Knowing (as a form of Metamemory) 
 
Judgment of Learning from Story  Judgment of Learning as a form of Metamemory 
 
Self-Monitoring Self-Monitoring, metacomprehension 
 
Metamemory for Reading Metamemory 
 
In Appendix A (Table 27), I summarized the evidence for and against preschoolers’ 
abilities to engage in the specific forms of metacognition that I gleaned from the literature. I 
formed my categories through a constant comparative process, going back and forth between 
data collection, data analysis, and literature review. Early in the process, I expected participants 
to manifest evidence of these forms of metacognition. However, in my final analysis, I decided 
that instances originally coded as Judgment of Learning and Metamemory did not fully meet 
evidentiary standards based on the literature. In addition, I considered cognitive monitoring to be 
too broad of a category for coding. Therefore, monitoring is not specifically named in my codes, 




Conclusions and Implications for Methodology  
By engaging participants in meaningful, familiar, or developmentally-appropriate tasks, 
researchers across psychology and education are expanding evidence in favor of the 
metacognitive capabilities of preschoolers (Hsieh et al., 2013; Whitebread et al., 2009). Though 
preschoolers may have less sophisticated or less efficient metacognition than older children or 
adults, their metacognition is just as relevant to their texts and tasks. It occurs where and how it 
would be expected to occur—relative to learner characteristics, task knowledge, and repertoire of 
emergent literacy strategies or actions. Therefore, after reviewing the literature, I concluded that 
Flavell’s model is a fitting theoretical framework through which to consider preschoolers’ 
cognitive and metacognitive efforts during the joint reading task (Rowe, 1989). In the studies 
reviewed, preschoolers had stateable metacognitive knowledge of self and task, they could 
mindfully regulate their efforts towards a goal, and they had meaningful metacognitive 
experiences. 
Whether observational, interactive, or experimental, the studies that I reviewed utilized 
verbal and behavioral data from preschoolers in order to study metacognition. However, they did 
not necessarily capture all possible data. Strict predefinitions of metacognition and highly 
structured procedures narrowed how a young child might be metacognitive. These approaches 
were overrepresented in studies of defined emergent reading and writing tasks. In contrast, 
observation of unstructured engagement at learning centers led to more liberal interpretation of 
the ways that a young child could be metacognitive. Though all procedures in reviewed studies 
could be viewed through a situational lens, each study varied in its reliance on a situational 
model. The education studies tended to use holistic tasks and therefore included at least some 
description of person, task, and strategy variables. The psychological studies tended to use 
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contrived tasks in isolation, meaning that the tasks might not be repeated in the child’s regular 
home or school life. Therefore, not as much context was described. More work needs to be done 
to correlate children’s documented capacities on isolated laboratory tasks with typical emergent 
literacy experiences.  
As opposed to discrete tasks, reading and writing always have person, task, and strategy 
(or action) dimensions. Comprehension, the goal of reading, and coherence, the goal of writing, 
are situationally-influenced. As Paris and Paris (2003) reasoned, “If narrative competence is a 
general characteristic of children's thinking and reading, it should be evident in a variety of 
materials and stories” (p. 51). Therefore, the study of metacognition, especially in conjunction 
with comprehension, needs to be situational. I concluded that exploratory investigation of 
metacognition during repeated joint readings was needed to add to the literature. Repeated joint 
reading would prioritize situational use of metacognition while balancing the affordances and 
limitations of participation versus observation. Below, I discuss in more detail the 
methodological implications drawn from this conclusion.  
Developmental parameters are not deterministic. Developmental parameters, such as 
limitations on short and long-term memory, working memory, attention span, metamemory, and 
theory of mind, undoubtedly affect comprehension and metacognition (Baker, 2017; Stahl, 
2014). However, they are not deterministic. In fact, Baker and Brown (1984) stated that 
“inadequate metacognition” is not just a “disease of childhood” (p. 355). As early as they can 
read print, children can begin to exhibit various forms of metacognition during reading, 
spontaneously or in response to formal instruction (Baker & Brown, 1984; Clay, 1991). Before 
they can read print, children can reflect on information in storybooks and their understanding of 
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it (Baker, 2005). Thus, it is important to research metacognition in preschool emergent literacy 
using a research design that considers the reader, text, task, and context (Brenna, 1995).   
Early print readers, typically in Kindergarten and first grade, are capable of engaging in 
and benefiting from metacognition for an additional purpose—decoding print. In English, 
decoding print requires the visual and cognitive processing and reprocessing of multiple types of 
information (i.e., grapho-phonic, semantic, and syntactic; Clay, 1991; Schmitt, 2001). Self-
monitoring is required to query whether all sources of information coincide (Clay, 1991). 
Reading Recovery, a successful first grade remediation program, incorporates metacognition by 
helping new readers develop “inner control” of their efforts to read (Clay, 1991, p. 234; Griffith 
& Ruan, 2005). However, these slightly older children may have difficulty discussing their 
actions. Martin and Kragler (2011) found that children in kindergarten and first grade had 
difficulty reporting their behaviors during and after reading. These findings do not suggest a 
decrease in metacognitive capacities after preschool or a falsely high rating of the metacognitive 
capacities of pre-readers. Rather, different tasks require different cognitive and metacognitive 
skills. Expectations about the relationships among cognition, metacognition, and verbal reporting 
may have to be reconsidered each time.  
Less structure and more interaction may reveal the most about reading-related 
metacognition. Since reading itself remains imperfectly understood, limitations on 
understanding the meaning of verbal data to the participant must be kept in mind when drawing 
conclusions (Afflerbach & Cho, 2011). However, since “reading is a complex problem space” 
(Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995, p. 3), open-ended verbal data can be relied on to provide evidence 
of “constructively responsive” processing (Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995, p. 2). For very young 
participants, triangulation of what the child meant in the moment is key. For example, Holdaway 
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(1979) recognized that a toddler “reader” consistently shook his head as if to say “no” to indicate 
negation while articulating the rest of a sentence. Thus, verbal data alone may have said “the dog 
want the bone” when the child meant “the dog does not want the bone.” Careful coordination of 
verbal and nonverbal communication in the moment, by a researcher familiar with the child’s 
early literacy behaviors, is required to interpret pre-conventional text discussions.  
Both Flavell’s model and a transactional view of reading implicate thorough and varied 
investigation of a reading event. Multiple readings can increase the quantity of data from 4-year-
olds—a population that produces relatively less talk. Since each experience with a book may be 
unique (Rosenblatt, 1978), multiple readings also allow for deeper and wider data collection 
(Paris & Paris, 2003). Extending this reasoning, repeated readings of multiple texts should 
maximize the quantity and quality of data collection in pursuit of the research question. 
Furthermore, since readers can be characterized by both stable (e.g., world knowledge) and 
dynamic (e.g., interest level) characteristics (Baker & Brown, 1984; Rosenblatt, 1978), repeated 
readings also decrease the likelihood of assigning stable traits to children based on situational 
performances (Brenna, 1995). In sum, repeated readings of four books increases the 
trustworthiness of this study by increasing the volume of data from participants who provide 
relatively limited speech and by enabling comparison of data from different situations. 
Joint reading is preferable to observational, interventional, error detection, or 
pretend reading tasks. Baker and Cerro (2000) observed that chosen measurement techniques 
tend to correspond with an underlying operational definition of metacognition. Pre and post 
intervention studies have to rely on a consistent definition of metacognition written before 
interaction occurs. Thus, they lack the agility to document metacognition that occurs in ways 
other than what is being looked for. Garner (1987) reported that the intent of error-detection 
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studies has been to gain insights into comprehension processes that can be applied when reading 
texts without errors. However, these connections are not clear (Hacker, 1998). Both error 
detection and observation lack the interaction with an adult that can prompt application of 
capacities held but not commonly expressed. Per Vygotsky, novices should be able to do slightly 
more with the help of a more skilled other than they can do independently. In this view, 
interaction does not create metacognition but rather prompts it. Joint reading provides a 
preschooler with opportunities for unstructured, joint meaning-making in a familiar context. As a 
technique, it allows for the most thorough data collection of a preschooler’s metacognitive 
knowledge, actions, and experiences within the context of a meaningful task. Reading occurs 
when not under study and is a fundamental aspect of one’s literacy lifespan.  
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   CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
I generated and collected qualitative data from repeated joint storybook reading sessions 
with 4-year-old preschoolers from Fall 2015 to Spring 2016. Before reading began, I engaged 
participants in toy-playing tasks to ensure that they had the required background knowledge and 
topical vocabulary to understand the gist of each story. Study activities resulted in 86 
conversational data collection events with seven participants. I transcribed each of these sessions 
verbatim and then reduced and interpreted the resulting data set through open and closed coding. 
This process resulted in a narrative case impression of each child’s emergent literacy profile and 
a situational analysis of metacognitive events during joint storybook reading.   
Methodological Rationale 
 Though I designed the broad parameters of the joint reading scenarios and pre-selected 
study texts, I allowed participants to pursue preferences, lines of thought, and tangents during the 
dialogue. Therefore, this study is grounded in symbolic interactionism, as I interpreted meaning 
from how participants engaged in joint reading. I assumed that four-year-olds desired to 
understand, and I investigated whether metacognition would be part of their efforts.  
 Interpreting data. My background inspired commitment to an interpretivist theoretical 
perspective (Crotty, 1998). All data has to be interpreted to some degree, due to cultural and 
personal differences between researcher and participants and pervasive methodological 
limitations. In the present study, preschool participants spoke words and took actions, and I 
assigned meaning to these phenomena (Altheide & Johnson, 1994). To increase the 
trustworthiness of my interpretations, I engaged in reflective and reflexive interpretation 
processes, in order to lessen the role of my biases and reduce the likelihood of unqualified 
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inferences. The interpretivist paradigm provided parameters for my active attempts to 
“understand and explain human and social reality” (Crotty, 1998, p. 66-67). Interpretivism 
recognizes that a value-driven researcher collects and makes sense of data about human 
behaviors that are influenced by culture and history (Lather, 2006).  
Interpretivism derives from a constructionist epistemology, which holds that meaning is 
co-constructed with participants and local stakeholders (Crotty, 1998). This epistemological 
perspective allows the researcher to claim meaning from an interpretive process that subsumes 
participants’ intents and situational influences (Bredo, 2006). Accordingly, validity is achieved 
through argumentation to a community of researchers and stakeholders. Rowe (1989) reviewed 
her interpretations of children’s writing behaviors with their regular preschool teachers. I 
coordinated with my participants’ regular preschool teachers to make sure that study procedures 
seemed typical and comfortable and to ensure that participants were engaging as they typically 
would. In other words, my “created” findings were intended to be relative, “local”, and 
“specific” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 193, 195). They were intended to explain, through 
interpretation, what was happening in the moment.   
 Interpreting verbal data as cognitive data. Vygotsky posited that working with the 
representationality of text enhances abstract thinking, which in turn enhances comprehension 
(Crain, 1992; Flavell et al., 1993). According to Vygotsky (1978), interacting with a more skilled 
other should lead to more sophisticated performance. Vygotsky thought that metacognition 
indicated an individual’s development from being regulated by more skilled others to being self-
regulated (Braten, 1991; Brown, 1987). Self-regulation enables self-direction of the cognitive 
actions necessary or desired to fully engage with text, relative to a goal (Holdaway, 1979). For 
Vygotsky, the process of continually internalizing other regulation from the environment as self-
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regulation begins in early childhood (Brown, 1987). Language, such as the speech that occurs 
within the interactive joint reading discourse, is a tool that children can use to label, organize, 
examine, and express thoughts (Braten, 1991; Kucan & Beck, 1997, Vygotsky, 1978). Language 
enables consideration and reporting of the abstract – thinking about characters’ unspoken 
motivations or thinking about the thinking one has done about that topic (Braten, 1991; Garner, 
1987; Vygotsky, 1978). A challenging task, such as joint reading featuring challenging 
questions, may create a context for participants to be aware of their coping processes, including 
their metacognition (Fang & Cox, 1999; Flavell, 1987). 
My aim of discovering whether and how preschoolers could communicate their thinking 
was thus enabled by connections among verbal data, comprehension, and metacognition. 
Historically, there has been a close relationship between study of metacognition and verbal data. 
Brown (1987) cited Rozin’s accessibility theory to explain this connection: “Conscious access to 
the routines available to the system is the highest form of mature human intelligence” (p. 71). In 
a similar vein, by defining metacognition as knowledge about one’s mental functioning that can 
be shared with others, Jacobs and Paris (1987) highlighted the connection between thinking and 
language that makes think alouds a worthwhile methodology. If thoughts about thoughts are 
conscious, then they can be stated. Thus, the goal of analyzing verbal data, such as dialogic 
participation in shared reading, is to “enrich our understanding of reading” processes 
(Afflerbach, 2000, p. 173). Painstaking work has gone into validating verbal reports as reports of 
cognitive processes (Ericsson & Simon, 1984/1993). Though I did not conduct a formal think 
aloud procedure, I designed and posed questions meant to elicit open-ended articulation of 
thinking (Ericsson & Simon, 1984/1993).  
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Tompkins et al. (2103) found that posing questions to preschoolers during reading is a 
trustworthy method to investigate real-time processing (see also van den Broek et al., 2011). 
Metacognition is an advanced capability that can be fostered by, but is technically not dependent 
on, advanced language skills. Though verbal skillfulness may make metacognition easier to 
research through verbal data, preschoolers can evince metacognition through their natural 
conversational language, talking to themselves, gesturing, staring, and other book interaction or 
communicative behaviors (Flavell et al., 1995; Holdaway, 1979; Whitebread et al., 2009) typical 
for their age.  
In prior studies, verbal data was successfully collected from preschoolers through 
unobtrusive observations (Dooley & Matthews, 2009; Neuman & Roskos, 1997), interaction 
with books with words (Peskin & Astington, 2004), and stories dictated to a scribe (Fang & Cox, 
1999). Though young children may not be able to validate their verbalizations in the way that 
older children or adults can, Dooley and Matthews (2009) and Larkin (2009) promoted the 
practice of interpreting children’s verbalizations and accompanying non-verbal behavior as 
cognitively significant data.  
Interpreting corresponding non-verbal data. Vygotsky’s propositions about thought, 
reflective thought, and language complement Flavell’s theory of metacognition in a study of 
preschoolers’ processes as they engage with stories. Since thoughts are not a concrete object for 
examination and manipulation, the child has to use language inasmuch to think as to 
communicate what is being thought (Braten, 1991; Brown, 1978; Vygotsky, 1978). One of 
Vygotsky’s most celebrated ideas is that inner speech helps one manage cognition (Braten, 1991; 
Kucan & Beck, 1997; Vygotsky, 1978). For example, speech is used to both recall information 
from memory as well as to plan a mental action, such as the application of a strategy (Crain, 
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1992). From a Vygotskyian perspective, verbal data is evidence of mental processes. The essence 
of this claim is actually that communication can provide evidence of mental processes. 
Accordingly, both Holdaway (1979) and Skarakis-Doyle and Dempsey (2008) collected non-
verbal data as an alternative or corroborating form of communicative data when conducting 
emergent storybook reading research with preschoolers. In this population, non-verbal 
communication, such as pointing, staring, gesturing, or slapping, can be meaningful and can 
function as an intermediate step between physical interaction and abstract processing (Holdaway, 
1979; Sulzby, 1985; Vygotsky, 1978).  
 Researcher background and positionality. The study site regularly hosted volunteers 
from the community to read and to interact with the children. I entered the research site as a daily 
volunteer in the pre-kindergarten (4-year-old) classroom. Therefore, I was able to establish 
rapport with the children and teachers before beginning recruitment and data collection. I then 
engaged participants in joint storybook reading within the classroom as a special form of 
participant observation. Due to the non-standardized nature of joint reading with preschoolers, 
my position in the research process influenced my decision-making about the collection and 
interpretation of data (Mukherji & Albon, 2010). According to Lather (2006), positionality refers 
to the nuanced position of the researcher in a socially and politically ordered world. One 
dimension of my positionality is my identity as a white, middle-class, childless woman and 
former classroom teacher. My position could have exerted biased cultural expectations 
concerning book reading and classroom behavior. An affordance of my positionality, however, is 
that my background as an educator sensitized me to the importance of using the familiar to 
engage children in conversation. Since I valued the familiar, I worked with trade books available 
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at bookstores or the local library and conducted the reading sessions during a time when an adult 
volunteer might read with a child or children anyways.  
Joint Storybook Reading as a Context  
 I used joint storybook reading as a form of participant observation to generate and collect 
data. I then organized the data through thematic coding and reduced the data for presentation 
through the creation of narrative impressions of emergent storybook reading and situational 
analyses of metacognitive events within that context. I interpreted the meaning of data from 
these events through reference to the local community, careful inference based on the literature, 
and consideration of counterfactuals.  
 I implemented three repeated sessions of joint reading for each of four books. This 
procedure was a special form of participant-observation (Crotty, 1998), in which interaction and 
activity flowed in a conversational manner. As such, the joint reading sessions were interactive, 
semi-structured, and developmentally-appropriate. Researcher and participant jointly steered 
each book reading session by taking turns and sharing the work of book reading. Similar to the 
format of guided reading (Fountas & Pinnell, 1996), I posed preplanned and spontaneous 
questions and prompts with the intention of highlighting the processes of comprehension and 
metacognition. This design created a naturally “proleptic” dynamic, through which implicit and 
explicit scaffolding occurred through interaction with the researcher (Lee & Schmitt, 2014; 
McGee & Schickedanz, 2007; Palincsar & Brown, 1984, p. 122-123; Vygotsky, 1978).  
Repeating readings. I used repeated joint readings to both generate and collect data. 
From the perspective of Flavell’s theory of metacognition, repeated readings provided more 
opportunities to have metacognitive experiences, which could have informed metacognitive 
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knowledge and decision-making during subsequent tasks. In Kintsch’s construction-integration 
model of comprehension, repeated readings give the reader more time to engage in analytic 
thinking and inference making. Repeated reading is also consistent with the transactional 
definition of reading that I adopted in Chapter 1 (Snow, 2002). Since each interaction with a text 
can be different, one interaction may be insufficient for data collection on the phenomena of 
interest. Repeated shared readings also respected Vygotsky’s ideas about not only assessing what 
a child can do independently, but also what a child can do while interacting with a more skilled 
other, and after internalizing this scaffolding (Cox & Sulzby, 1982; McGee & Schickedanz, 
2007; Vygotsky, 1978). In sum, repeated joint readings were a theoretically justified technique. 
Situational questioning and prompting. The ostensible goal for each session was for 
researcher and participant to jointly read one book from front to back. Exactly how participants 
proceeded towards this goal could and did vary. Thus, participants received differently-worded 
questions and prompts based on how they were responding to the text and participating in the 
session. This type of variance fit in the middle ground between the strictness of error detection 
procedures and the openness of exploratory observation, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
Questioning and prompting offered more opportunities to generate and collect data than 
techniques such as implanting errors and recording responses. Children are not likely to 
encounter texts with contrived errors outside of research studies, but they will spend years in 
various states of comprehension, incomprehension, and meta-comprehension as they interact 
with picture books, basal selections, textbooks, and novels. Jointly reading narrative storybooks 
provided a context for constructive attempts to build and maintain comprehension of structured, 
substantive content. The joint reading context also provided a multiplicity of opportunities to 
understand using the same constructive meaning making processes that conventional readers are 
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thought to use, such as relying on prior life experiences, prior knowledge from learning, cache of 
vocabulary, and/or familiarity with author, genre, text features, or discourse patterns. 
Table 3 highlights the benefits and drawbacks of various research procedures in terms of 
when data collection occurs relative to the phenomena of interest, how the data collection is 
structured, and the distance between the data collection procedures and the task. Repeated joint 
reading offers the benefits of all the techniques listed in Table 3, except for interviewing.  
Table 3  
Options for Researching Metacognition in Preschool Emergent Literacy Activities 
Reviewed Method 






Time Concurrent Retrospective 
or prospective 
All Concurrent All 
Structure Open-






















































text and task; 
invited to 
communicate 
 Affordances of narrative case impressions. Individual joint reading sessions with seven 
participants and four books produced a large volume of loosely-structured, qualitative data. 
Therefore, I created narrative cases for each child to accommodate the complexities of how 
reader, text, and task interacted (Berliner, 2002; Rosenblatt, 1978; Snow, 2002), and how 
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metacognition manifested as a situational resource in these task scenarios (Flavell, 1981). To 
construct the narrative cases presented in Chapter 4, I utilized fundamental principles of 
qualitative research, such as constant comparison of data during collection and analysis and 
thematic categorization of collected data (Wiersma & Jurs, 2009). I used coding to label all data 
and then linked distinct data by a common essence (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996) within and across 
readings. Then I articulated and justified my inferred “linkages” (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996, p. 
27) through my narratives. Within each narrative, I integrated the reporting of many different 
types of findings for each child. Emergent literacy skills, comprehension, and metacognition are 
ultimately individual phenomena, justifying the use of individual narratives of joint storybook 
reading from a cognitive-constructivist perspective (Dinsmore, Alexander, & Loughlin, 2008; 
Kintsch, 1998). 
 Analysis by child, book, and reading. According to Yin (2003), “research design is the 
logic that links the data to be collected (and the conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions 
of the study” (p. 19). Narrative cases foreground the child as the primary unit of analysis while 
allowing for comparisons by book, by reading, and by other characteristics. Each reading session 
was an “abstract” unit of analysis, embedded within the “concrete” child unit of analysis (Yin, 
2003, p. 56). I translated data from each participant’s set of sessions into a narrative case. A 
unique affordance of case impressions was the proximity of data collection processes to the 
phenomena of interest, as actions under study occurred (Flyvbjerg, 2006). I began to compose 
the narratives while data collection was ongoing, in accordance with a constant comparative 
process. 
Increased transparency and trustworthiness. However, a tradeoff of this close 
connection is the risk of bias toward verification of assumptions (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Therefore, I 
111 
 
considered a constant stream of rival hypotheses, triangulated data, expert input, literature, and 
local stakeholder input (Flyvbjerg, 2006). This process increased construct validity, or the match 
between claims about phenomena under study and the true nature of the phenomena (Yin, 2003). 
I honored construct validity by searching for multiple streams of evidence—verbal data in 
response to questions and prompts, spontaneous verbal data, behavioral data in response to 
questions and prompts, and spontaneous behavioral data. These forms of data were interpreted 
consistent with the literature on comprehension and metacognition. By being concerned about 
construct validity throughout the data collection and analysis processes, I increased 
trustworthiness. By documenting my lines of reasoning and changes in them, I increased 
transparency.  
Description of Surrounding Community 
Per Census data, slightly more than 100,000 people (6,000 of whom are children five and 
under) live in Tree County (all names are pseudonyms), a rural area in a Mid-Atlantic state that 
has been deeply affected by the decline in American manufacturing. Census data also indicate 
that Tree County is whiter (96%) and older than the rest of the United States, with more English-
speaking and domestic-born residents than the national average (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016). 
Only 6% of Tree County residents spoke a language other than English at home, as compared to 
22% across the nation. Tree County matched the national average in percent of adults 25 and 
older who are high school graduates yet lagged the national average in percent of persons with a 
bachelor’s degree.  
Also, per 2015 Census data, only 11% of Tree County residents lived in the federal 
definition of poverty, which is below the 15% national average. However, 60% of the county’s 
6,000 children under five lived in “at-risk” households—meaning that family income did not 
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exceed 300% of the federal poverty level. Approximately one out of every ten Tree County 
babies was born to a mother with less than a high school diploma. Furthermore, 43% of children 
in the local public school system received Free or Reduced Price Meals. 
Description of Study Site 
In the town that is the setting of this study, public pre-kindergarten is not provided 
through a school system. Some local preschool children qualify for Head Start, and the rest 
attend a variety of family owned, for-profit, and non-profit providers. Town Child Care (TCC), a 
service of a private, independent, non-profit organization, is the largest provider of childcare in 
Tree County (T. Howard, personal communication, August 1, 2015).  
TCC is housed within a large community activities building that provides social outreach 
and fitness programs to children, adults, disabled adults, and senior citizens. All children enter 
through a single door and proceed to their age-based classroom. Classrooms are separated by 
retractable dividing walls, and the activities of other classrooms can sometimes be heard through 
these walls. All children share a bathroom in the hallway that connects the classroom entrances. 
All classrooms have a rear exit that opens to a shared, fenced-in playground. Beyond the 
playground is a grassy park with picnic tables and the back of a historic, red-brick private school.  
TCC is certified by the state to provide daytime care to babies, toddlers, and 
preschoolers. According to the Parent Handbook (T. Howard, personal communication, August 
1, 2015), TCC’s curriculum was designed to increase “self-help, cognitive, emotional, social, and 
physical skills” and to emphasize positive peer relationships. TCC has a high rating with the state 
and no recorded deficiencies (T. Howard, personal communication, August 1, 2015). TCC feeds 
into two public elementary schools. Both are Title I schools that have adopted the Reading 
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Recovery program. In keeping with its mission to prepare children to be ready to enter public 
kindergarten, TCC takes graduating 4-year-olds on a spring field trip to their assigned 
elementary school. 
Daily activities are intended to address the state’s published Learning Standards for Pre-
Kindergarten (T. Howard, personal communication, August 1, 2015). Two main areas of this 
curriculum are Learning through Play and English Language Arts. Learning through Play 
includes learning standards such as asking questions to learn more and applying knowledge 
taught in one setting to a novel setting. The English Language Arts standards are divided into 
Foundational Skills, Reading Informational Text, Reading Literature, Writing, and Speaking and 
Listening. My procedures did not include any evaluation of classroom experiences relative to 
these standards.  
At TCC, preschoolers followed a daily schedule: breakfast, free center play, whole class 
circle time, structured center play, lunch, nap time, recess, and free center play. As soon as 
children arrived in the morning and finished breakfast, they were free to choose any center(s) for 
approximately 45 minutes. The only rules were no more than three children at a center and to 
clean up before changing centers. It was during this time that my reading sessions were 
introduced as an optional center. Therefore, some children read books with me during this time 
as a classroom volunteer, and some children read to participate in the study. I did not announce 
or distinguish between these two types of visitors to my center. Later, during structured center 
play, children were assigned to move from center to center every 15 minutes in designated 
groups. Special activities at each center were introduced and encouraged at this time. During 
circle time, the weather and letter of the week were discussed, and a book was read aloud. The 
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focal letter influenced the week’s curriculum, though the literature read aloud and made available 
in the room did not necessarily relate to the focal letter.  
According to the Parent Handbook (T. Howard, personal communication, August 1, 
2015), each classroom was staffed by a lead teacher and an assistant teacher. Assistant teachers 
were required to have at least a high school diploma or G. E. D., and the lead classroom teacher 
had some post-secondary training in early childhood education. Each year, teachers received at 
least 18 hours of state-approved professional development for childcare providers. The 
maximum class size for a room with two teachers was 20 children.  
The 4-year-old class in which the study took place was referred to as “Pre-K.” Through 
the placement of furniture, the room was divided into three main sections: group dining and 
activity tables, learning centers, and an alphabet rug where children gathered for morning circle 
and other whole class meetings. A small classroom library with a tiny couch was frequently 
updated through the visiting book-mobile. Tables that were used for breakfast were immediately 
sterilized for use in learning activities. This process repeated at lunch. Around these tables, there 
was enough room for one person to maneuver. I approximated the size of the Pre-K classroom to 
be 500 square feet. A portion of that space was occupied by furniture and by clearance room for 
two doors. To situate that figure, the average living room in new U.S. homes built in 2013 was 
330 square feet (Emrath, 2013). Children working at any location in the classroom could hear 
everyone else’s conversations. Learning centers could accommodate up to four children at a 
time. Each center featured at least one relevant book. Children could pretend read that book or 
request that a teacher read it to or with them. 
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Participant Selection and Recruitment 
 Though I had no information about the home reading experiences of preschoolers who 
attended the chosen school, their attendance at this preschool means that they had daily 
experience with teacher read alouds, weekly experience with story time at the local public 
library, independent reading opportunities at the classroom library center and during nap time, 
and opportunities to request a 1:1 reading with a teacher. Therefore, I assumed that participants 
had experienced enough book interaction to be comfortable with joint reading. 
Recruitment, selection, and consent processes. The two Pre-K classroom teachers 
considered all class members to be typical for the setting, meaning that they felt that each child 
exhibited speaking, listening, and early literacy behaviors that were within their expectations. 
They anticipated that every member of the class could successfully participate in my joint 
reading procedures. Therefore, all 20 class members were recruited. Parents received a sealed 
recruitment package in a brown envelope in their child’s home-school communication folder. 
The package contained a cover letter, two copies of the consent form, and a second sealable 
brown envelope for the confidential return of the consent form. The cover letter explained the 
study and stated my availability to answer questions.   
Ten out of twenty forms sent home were returned, representing a 50% response rate. One 
form declined participation. The other nine returned forms indicated consent for five boys and 
four girls to participate. Out of the pool of nine participants, two children, Aidan and Inez, were 
eventually excluded. Aidan expressed more interest in the camera than in jointly reading the 
books. In his first two sessions, after I convinced him to ignore the camera, he expressed a 
consistent preference to look at the book by himself and not respond to any prompts or questions. 
Aidan conversed normally in the classroom. However, I excluded Aidan because I could not 
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obtain any verbal data from him through my particular study design. Inez, the second child 
excluded, only attended preschool two days a week and often just for half a day. She often 
arrived after breakfast, during free choice morning centers. Her friends were eager to see her, and 
she was typically surrounded by other children who wanted to invite her to play during this free 
choice time. She willingly tried to participate in sessions, but she seemed distracted by her peers 
waiting on her to quickly finish reading so she could play with them. Therefore, she was 
excluded. It is not known how parents who consented and returned the form differed from 
parents who did not respond or consent. The seven children who did participate seemed to 
represent the individual diversity found in the classroom. They had unique family characteristics, 
personalities, verbal abilities, and preferences for participating in classroom life. According to 
Yin (2003), replication across six to ten cases is strong evidence in support of underlying theory.  
Therefore, I considered seven participants engaging in twelve readings each to be sufficient for 
my purpose and design.  
Data Collection Procedures  
 I conducted two types of data collection events with each participant: one toy playing 
session to assess background knowledge and vocabulary and three readings each of four 
commercially-available, narrative picture books. I intended for this study’s procedures to provide 
multiple opportunities for participants to speak spontaneously and in response to questions or 
prompts. I anticipated that the joint reading approach might overcome the limitations of prior 
approaches discussed in the literature review. These included restrictive parameters on what 
could be accepted as metacognitive data (e.g., detecting a planted error), only collecting data 
from observation, or utilizing unfamiliar or acontextual experimental tasks that would not 
normally occur when not under study. I collected verbal and non-verbal data from dialogue and 
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from responses to questions and prompts that occurred during the joint interaction from multiple 
reading sessions using multiple texts.  
Multiple opportunities for data generation. White (1988) suggested that researchers 
study metacognition, cognitive performance, and the relationship between the two through 
multiple approaches. Brenna’s (1995) study of precocious readers aged four to six illustrated the 
need to follow this suggestion; some of her participants evinced metacognition through particular 
data collection methods but not others. Desoete (2008) found the same in a study of 
metacognition in elementary mathematics learning. Therefore, I designed my data collection 
procedures during joint storybook reading to provide multiple opportunities to observe the 
phenomena of interest. For example, I engaged participants in responding to questions meant to 
elicit metacognition and comprehension and in open-ended pretend reading, thinking, and 
conversing.  
Within the joint reading dynamic, participants could have variably relied on each text’s 
illustrations or printed words. This age-appropriate variance in the cognitive actions taken to 
complete a task did not lessen the invitation to create and articulate meaning from the storybook. 
Relying (to at least some degree) on pictures is a typical pre-primary and primary (K-2) reading 
strategy that remains relevant even after the onset of print reading (Fountas & Pinnell, 1996). In 
the present study, the two books with print (Firefly and Mother) relayed the most important 
information through their printed words, with pictures illustrating (e.g., highlighting) content in 
an adjunct capacity. It was possible that participants had heard these texts read aloud before, thus 
exposing them to the text base that the author intended. In contrast, the two wordless picture 
books (Duckling and Pancakes) relied “entirely on illustrations to tell a story” (Jalongo, et al., 
2002, p. 167). These books uniquely required the reader to become an active storyteller, because 
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they could not have been read aloud (Arizpe, 2013). Thus, jointly interacting with richly-
illustrated and wordless texts offered multiple opportunities to collect verbal data, regardless of 
prior exposure to study texts. ` 
Suitable texts. I used four narrative picture books: two with words, one with a few lines 
of simple text on some of the pages, and a truly wordless narrative picture book. These texts 
were commercially available trade books and representative of texts that preschoolers would 
encounter through read alouds, shared reading, or independent book viewing. In 2015, neither 
the Fountas and Pinnell (1996) nor the Lexile (lexile.com) text leveling system evaluated the 
difficulty of wordless or near wordless books. Therefore, in Table 4, I reported characteristics of 
each text that might affect perceived difficulty.  
Data from the background knowledge sessions suggested that all participants had 
sufficient background knowledge to comprehend the gist of study texts. However, toy playing 
sessions could not exhaustively address the minutiae of the content of study texts, especially the 
more esoteric content. For example, due to practical constraints, I did not present props 
representing a butter churn or fireworks, even those these were important in Pancakes and 
Firefly, respectively. In any scene from a picture book, multiple represented objects could play a 
part in the plot. The presence of some challenging or unfamiliar information enhanced the study 
of metacognition by creating opportunities to be aware of and choose how to react to uncertainty 
or incomprehension.  
The four texts were well-structured narrative stories featuring salient, age-appropriate 
themes (e.g., stay close to mom; Flavell et al., 1993; Markman, 1981). In each text, a protagonist 
pursued a relatable, situational goal, encountered obstacles, recovered from failed attempts at 
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goal attainment, and ultimately achieved a satisfactory resolution. Despite this broad appeal, 
each text featured specific content or situations that proved to be variably familiar to participants. 
As previously suggested, these gaps created situational opportunities for metacognitive 
processing and problem-solving. It was not feasible to obtain an objective rating of difficulty of 
each text.  However, in Table 4, I presented an overview of likely difficulty characteristics of 
each text. Then I discuss each text in detail in the sections below. 
Table 4 
Summary of Difficulty Characteristics and Features of Study Texts 












I AD530L 32/247 Baby firefly approaches 
unknown objects and animals 
while seeking to join other 
fireflies 
Are You My 
Mother? 
I 80L 63/698 Baby bird approaches unknown 
objects and animals while 






 WB  
 
 n/a  
 
32/n/a  Mother duck approaches pond 
animals while seeking her 




WB n/a 32/ n/a Little old lady seeks to make 
pancakes, but her efforts are 
thwarted by mishaps  
Note. L = Lexile. LB = labeled pictures. WB = wordless book. AD = adult direction (read aloud) 
recommended. 
   
 The Very Lonely Firefly (Carle, 1995) is a classic Eric Carle picture book. In this story, a 
firefly separated from his family makes several attempts to connect with lights that could, from a 
distance, be the fireflies he is seeking. False belief is implicated in that from a distance, these 
lights appear to be something they are not. For example, the firefly approaches a car’s headlight, 
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a light bulb, and a cat’s eye, but to no avail. The printed text conveys this pattern. This text’s 
Lexile rating of AD530L is the highest in this study. AD stands for the suggestion of adult 
direction or read aloud of this book. This Lexile rating is likely attributable to sophisticated 
descriptive phrases such as “darkening sky” and figurative expressions such as “flooding the 
night”. 
 Are You My Mother? (Eastman, 1960) is the lengthiest narrative in the study. In this 
story, a baby bird hatches while his mother is away from the nest. Not realizing that his mother 
has only left briefly to find food, he decides to leave the safety of the nest to look for his mother. 
Since he does not know what she looks like, he approaches animals and inanimate objects to 
pose the titular refrain “Are you my mother?” Finally, a construction crane returns him to his 
nest, where he is pleased to meet his mother and enjoy the food she brought for him. Due to the 
simplicity of the language of the printed text, this book is the longest in pages but not the highest 
in Lexile rating. Even with its simple text, select world knowledge is needed; knowing what a 
construction crane is and knowing that baby birds cannot yet fly aids comprehension.  
 Have You Seen My Duckling? (Tafuri, 1984/1991) is a short narrative wherein a Mother 
duck repeatedly poses this titular question to different animals around the pond. The reader can 
see that the mischievous missing duckling is close by but not falling in line with the other 
ducklings. After the mother duck asks many animals around the pond if they have seen her 
duckling, the duckling is finally reunited with his family. Most of the text is the refrain, yet many 
pages have no words at all. Therefore, this text shares features of both traditional and wordless 
picture books.  
 Pancakes for Breakfast (de Paola, 1978) is a wordless narrative about a little old lady 
who wakes up wanting pancakes for breakfast but does not have all the necessary ingredients. 
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Across many scenes, she obtains one ingredient at a time only to realize upon her return home 
that she still doesn’t have everything she needs. Instead of going to a grocery store, she collects 
eggs from a hen house, milk from a cow, and maple syrup from a plaid shirted-man by a tree tap. 
However, her efforts are ultimately thwarted by her unsupervised pets. In the end, she invites 
herself to her neighbors’ house to enjoy some of their pancakes. Although pancakes may be 
familiar, this book features information that could be unfamiliar, such as butter being churned 
and maple syrup coming from a tree. Therefore, participants could have learned.                                                                 
Introduction and background knowledge session.  Using background knowledge to aid 
in the understanding of text is an early constructive reading behavior (DeBruin-Parecki & 
Squibb, 2011). Furthermore, having background knowledge is related to using and understanding 
corresponding vocabulary (Hart & Risley, 1995). Therefore, my first session with each 
participant was an introduction and background knowledge session.  I presented toys 
representing important objects and ideas in the four study texts. Per Vygotsky (1978), gesturing 
and physical manipulation of objects is an intermediate step before a child represents ideas on 
the mental plane. Therefore, observing a child use a prop in a certain way was considered an 
indication of knowledge or familiarity, even without corresponding verbal reporting. For 
example, participants could have pretended to mix together ingredients to make pancakes or 
could have pretended to add butter or syrup to the completed pancakes. This behavior could have 
communicated knowledge in spite of or in addition to verbal communication. Participants were 
invited to play with the props however they wanted to while conversing with me. For example, 
for The Very Lonely Firefly, I presented a small plastic flashlight, a lantern, and a stuffed firefly 
with a light-up tail. I asked the participant what the insect was called and what it did. I engaged 
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each child in informal conversation about the items in order to gain a sense of participants’ 
background knowledge and expressive and receptive vocabulary relevant to the story.  
These sessions unfolded in an unstructured and conversational manner. For example, I 
gestured at the selection of pancake ingredients and toy cookware and asked Erin, “What is all 
this stuff?” Erin replied, “Cookin’ stuff.” When pressed further (“What do you use it for?”), Erin 
reiterated “cookin’” and returned to exploring the props that caught her interest. This exchange 
suggested that Erin might not always elaborate by providing greater specificity. Observing this 
behavior when not challenged by a book, question, or prompt also helped me to consider whether 
any lack of elaboration in a reading session might be due to joint reading procedures or if this 
behavior occurred when no text was present.  
Each participant saw each item listed in Table 5. No participant was wholly unfamiliar 
with any of the items presented. I reintroduced myself in this one-to-one setting, briefly 
explained the study, and then explained that we would be starting our work together by playing 
with some toys based on the books. The sessions provided an additional source of insight into 
each child’s verbal sophistication and interaction style. In sum, the goal of the background 
knowledge session was to collect verbal and behavioral data that could be compared to text-




Props and Prompts for Background Knowledge Introduction Session 
Text  Background Knowledge  Props Prompts 
The Very 




• that fireflies have a light up tail, 
easily seen at night 
• that non-lit objects (e.g., animal 
eyes) can reflect light at night and 
“shine” 
• that certain objects give off light 
(e.g., lightbulb, flashlight, car 
headlight) 
• firefly with light up 
tail 
• plastic lantern 
• plastic flashlight 
• mirror 
• toy lightbulb 
• stuffed animal with 
glassy eyes 
1. What do you call 
this bug?  
2. Can this bug do 
anything special? 
3. Show me everything 
that can make light. 
4. How can this give 
off light? 






• that baby birds hatch from eggs 
• that birds live in nests 
• that Mother birds bring food to the 
nest for babies to eat 
 
• baby and Mother 
bird 
• faux bird nest 
• plastic eggs 
• toy construction 
equipment 
1. Why would the big 
bird and little bird 
be together in the 
nest?  
2. What does the baby 
bird need to live? 
3. How does the 










• animals that live in a pond 
• that ducklings typically follow the 
Mother duck closely 








1. What do you call 
these animals?  
2. Where do they live?  
3. Do baby ducks 
follow their moms 
around? Why?  
4. Have you ever seen 
that? 
5. Do you think it’s a 









• how to make pancakes  
• what eggs, milk, syrup, butter, 
pancakes are 
• butter and syrup as 
condiments 
• house in the country 
• dog, cat as indoor pets 









1. Have you ever had 
pancakes?  
2. How do you make 
them?  
3. What goes in them? 
4. Where can you get 
pancakes? 
5. What do you put on 
top of pancakes? 
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Repeated joint storybook reading sessions. In the following sections, I discuss the 
rationale and procedures for questioning and prompting within the joint reading dynamic. 
Questions and prompts posed by an adult are a large part of jointly reading with preschoolers. 
Paris and Paris (2003) noted that adults, such as parents, often “co-narrate” with young children, 
a dynamic in which questioning provides scaffolds for learning what type of information stories 
should communicate. Hannon and Frias (2012) noted that questions spur greater inferencing 
from preschool participants. In this scenario, the young child could make inferences to 
understand the story; questions encouraged them to do so. Therefore, non-standardized 
implementation of questions and prompts is a reasonable feature of an exploratory study of joint 
reading. I posed multiple and varied questions and prompts meant to address multiple aspects of 
comprehension, emergent literacy skills, and metacognition. These varied in nature, wording, 
and placement, yet they shared comprehension of the story as a fundamental essence and were 
carefully based on prior research with posing questions and prompts during joint or shared 
reading with the preschool participant (Stahl, 2012).  
Content of comprehension questions and prompts. Understanding a narrative requires 
understanding the basic elements of this form as well as content specific to each story. Therefore, 
I developed comprehension questions that assessed narrative elements as well as details specific 
to each story. My comprehension questions were based on Stahl’s (2014, p. 385, adapted from 
Van Kleeck, 2008) guidelines for questions when jointly reading stories with preschoolers: 
1. Literal questions can orient the child to key facts or background knowledge that can be 
used in subsequent inferential questions.  
2. Questions should focus on the goals of the character, as these relate to the most 
 important mental states and main actions of the story.  
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3. Questions should draw attention to the relationship between the unfolding of plot 
 events and the characters’ mental states. 
4. Questions should draw attention to the relationship between individual episodes, 
 events, or ideas and the “macrostructure” (p. 385) of the text. 
5. Pose questions that address cause and effect. 
6. Pose questions that address the elements of story. 
7. Pose evaluation questions such as “Did the character do the right thing?” (p. 385) 
Stahl’s (2014, p. 385) suggested questions based on these guidelines are reproduced in Table 6 
with closely corresponding metacognitive questions. 
Table 6 
Questions Crafted and Posed to Assess and Facilitate Comprehension and Metacognition 
 






Cause and Effect 
(C&E) 
Initiating event or 
problem of narrative arc 
What is this story 
about? 
 
What is [the main 
character’s] problem? 
What makes you 
think that? 
 





How does [character] 
feel? What is 
[character] thinking? 
How do you know 
[character] is 






What does [character] 
want/need? What is 
[character] looking for? 
How do you know 







at Goal Attainment 
(GA) 






Goal seeking behavior 
What is happening? 
Why is that important? 
 
What will happen next? 
 
What will [character] 
do to solve this 
problem? 
Why do you think 
that is important? 
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Did [specific attempt] 
work? Why or why 
not? 
How did you know 




 Did [character] get/find 
what s/he was looking 
for? 








Who is in this story? 
 
Where does [character] 
live? 
How did you know 







Concepts and Terms  
Used in Story 
What do you know 
about [topic]? 
What is [that]? Is that 
important in this story? 
 
What is [object in text 
or picture]? 
Where/when did 
you learn that? 
 
What makes you 
think that is 
important? 
Potential for overlap between comprehension and metacognition in questions. Stahl 
also suggested follow up questions such as “How did you know that?” that she did not identify as 
metacognitive, though Paris and Paris (2003) considered this type of follow up question to be 
proto-metacognitive. Since Stahl’s questions are consistent with Kintsch’s (2004) model of 
comprehension, Markman (1981) and Flavell et al.’s (1993) views on the cognitive processing 
invited by narratives, and my theoretical model, I posed them in the study and used her 
categories as codes for data pertaining to story comprehension.  
The difficulty in categorizing a question such as “How did you know that?” draws 
attention to significant correspondence or overlap between comprehension and metacognition. 
As Baker and Brown explained, “any attempt to comprehend must involve comprehension 
monitoring” (1984, p. 355). Accordingly, more successful readers demonstrate better use of 
metacognitive skills (Baker & Beall, 2009; Veenman, 2014). Baker and Brown’s (1984) stance 
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recognizes three main forms of metacognition relevant to reading comprehension: awareness, 
monitoring, and repairing. My stance expanded upon that by claiming that reading, including 
jointly reading a narrative picture book, is metacognitive in nature. Metacognition is mainly 
relevant to establishing, maintaining, and repairing comprehension, but it is also a driver in the 
ongoing cycle of learning content and vocabulary, integrating information to resolve unknowns, 
being open to the need to learn, learning about one’s self as a reader, and learning about reading 
as a defined act. Feedback from all of these processes becomes a part of a reader’s metacognitive 
knowledge and skills, and therefore influences future efforts. A reader who needs to make any 
effort at all to comprehend is thus always accessing, referencing, and being influenced by a 
second level of cognition.  
Reading takes place in the space between what an author instantiated in text and what a 
reader interpreted as the communicated message (Snow, 2002). The mindful and dynamic 
questioning that characterizes joint reading can be used to gather data from that space by 
encouraging and documenting processing and the results of it (van Kleeck, 2008). For texts that 
communicate structured information, such as stories, this space is where constructive meaning 
making operates. The constructive meaning maker allocates mental and affective resources for 
the task, takes risks, and flexibly strives to succeed (Dooley & Matthews, 2009; Pressley & 
Gaskins, 2006). A constructive meaning maker actively responds to the text before, during, and 
after reading by applying background knowledge, respecting personal preferences for reading, 
and monitoring attainment of a desired level of harmony with what they say the text says and 
what they think the text could say. Texts invite readers to constantly assimilate, evaluate, and 
integrate information of many different grain sizes (Kintsch, 1998; Stahl, 2014). In this task 
space, reflexive actions – those that are built off of earlier ones – often result in understanding, 
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deeper understanding, or correction of misunderstanding (based on Baker & Brown, 1981). Thus, 
a reader is constantly relying on not only the text but also their working mental model of the text, 
which was built through interpretation, prioritization, and assimilation. There may be moments 
in all of these efforts when comprehension and metacognition are indistinguishable.  
Content of metacognitive questions and prompts.  In the present study, participants’ 
metacognition was categorized as spontaneous or prompted. The following language was used in 
questions and prompts at critical points in the plot – or critical points in the participants’ 
participation. Since my procedures were less structured than implied in Stahl’s questioning 
regime, my metacognitive questions developed the essence of her questions but did not replicate 
them. In Chapter 4, I report how participants responded to questions. Collectively, these 
represent prompted metacognition. Metacognitive utterances that were instigated by the child 
and not given in response to a question or a prompt from my most recent or one additional 
speech turn were classified as spontaneous. I provided examples of posed questions intended to 
elicit defined types of metacognition in Table 7. 
Table 7 
Questions Crafted and Posed to Prompt Seven Forms of Metacognition 
Metacognitive Category Example of Posed Question Intended  
to Elicit Metacognition 
Justification Yes, the mother duck did say, "Have you seen my duckling?" 
How did you know she keeps saying that?    
Judgment of Difficulty Was this an easy, medium, or hard story? 
Judgment of Learning  Did you learn any new words when reading this book? 
Task Planning Wait, not yet. Is this really the end? 
Expanding Storytelling Do you want to add anything? 
Reflecting on Reading Now, how do you know what words to say, though? 
129 
 
Metacognitive Category Example of Posed Question Intended  
to Elicit Metacognition 
Metamemory for Reading Have you ever read [this book] at your house or at school? 
Self-Revising Is she making it or thinking about it? 
Feeling of Knowing  What’s this called? 
 
Open-ended “thinking” prompts. Well-structured stories present a significant amount of 
information to process and react to. Dorl (2007) recommended that preschool teachers share their 
thinking as they read aloud and invite young children to do the same. In this study, I also posed 
questions that prompted preschoolers to share whatever they were thinking at the moment. 
Though I did not use a think aloud procedure, I based my prompts on Pressley and Afflerbach’s 
(1995) recommendations for think aloud research (based on Ericsson & Simon, 1984/1993): 
1. Ask participants to report their thoughts. Since I expected sharing thinking on demand 
to be a novel task, I integrated a model and used understandable language. For example, for The 
Very Lonely Firefly, I said “I’m thinking in my head that the baby firefly is flying around by 
himself and that he’s really lonely. What are you thinking?”   
2. Rely on short-term memory. I posed prompts so that they were temporally close to 
students’ presumed processing, such as immediately following the presentation of important 
information in the flow of the story or soon after a child’s demonstrated response to the text. 
3. Consider the proleptic nature of the task in interpretation of data. Van Kleeck (2008) 
explained that joint reading is naturally proleptic; the expert-novice dynamic can easily foster the 
development of thinking skills, such as drawing inferences critical to comprehension. Joint 
reading is also a natural setting for a teacher/adult to model metacognitive thinking (Stahl, 2014) 
and for children to internalize and reproduce reflective thinking and literacy behaviors 
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(Vygotsky, 1986). Any increased sophistication could indicate that the joint reading scenario 
corresponded to participants’ zones of proximal development, which could explain why their 
performance improved after interaction with a more capable other (Vygotsky, 1978). Since 
emergent literacy skills are developed slowly through small interactions, this scenario would not 
cast doubt on the metacognitive nature of children’s performances. Metacognition is also 
developed slowly through social and literary interactions (Flavell, 1987). Furthermore, a word 
search conducted on the transcriptions of reading sessions did not suggest verbatim mimicking of 
the researcher’s thinking prompts.  
Frequency and placement of questions and prompts. Questions and prompts are 
important to the joint reading discourse during preschool. Therefore, I interspersed questions and 
prompts throughout my interaction with participants. The minimum recommendation for use of 
questions is one per page, since a page is a naturally-occurring unit for pausing and processing 
(Institute of Education Sciences, 2015). The literature currently does not recommend an ideal or 
maximum number of questions, though a general recommendation is that questions should serve 
to scaffold and engage the young child within a supportive and interactive context (Institute of 
Education Sciences, 2015).  
Though I posed questions and prompts informally, I did so with concern for the role that 
questions and prompts should play before, during, and after reading (Fountas & Pinnell, 1996). 
Before reading, I tried to assess familiarity by posing questions that directed attention to the 
cover or first page. During reading is when the most and most critical processing takes place. 
During reading, I posed comprehension questions about major elements of story soon after the 
presentation of that element. I posed metacognitive questions and prompts in lulls in storytelling 
or when confusion or insufficient information was expressed. After reading, I posed questions 
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implicating a working mental model of the whole story and reactions to that. For example, 
Judgment of Difficulty and Judgment of Learning prompts were always posed after reading, as 
these required reporting a response to the whole of the text and reading session.  
The excerpt below of questions that I posed to Bert before, during, and after his first 
reading of Mother exemplifies these principles. The questions posed before assessed familiarity 
and oriented Bert towards macrostructure clues in the title and on the cover. The example of 
during questions evaluated theory of mind and elicited evaluation of a character’s actions. They 
tasked Bert with thinking critically and deeply about the text base and with responding to it. 
After reading, Bert was asked to consider everything that had occurred during the story to 
evaluate whether the ending was happy.  
Before Reading  
R: Have you read this book before?  
Bert: [Bert shrugs but does not verbally answer.] 
R: Well, it’s about a little birdie, and he goes up to this dog, and he says, “Are you my mother?”  
R: Why is he saying that? 
Bert: ‘Cause his mother leaves to get food for him.  
 
During Reading 
R: “Where is my mother?” he said.  He looked for her. 
R: Now did the mom know that he was going to hatch while she was gone? 
Bert: No. 
R: Should she have left? 
Bert: Yes, to get food. 
R: To get food, right. 
 
After Reading 
R: “You are my mother!” The end! 
R: Was that a happy ending? 
Bert: Mmm-hmm.  
Bert: They lived forever. 
 
 Throughout this first reading of Mother, my use of questions and prompts was 
interwoven in the discourse of joint reading. They occurred as part of the conversational 
discourse that advanced us through the book as reading partners—in concert with reading aloud, 
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providing directions, affirming or clarifying what Bert said, and listening to Bert. In this reading, 
I engaged in 88 speech turns, and Bert engaged in 45 speech turns. Out of my 88 speech turns, 38 
posed questions, 46 involved reading the printed text aloud, and four were used to provide 
procedural directions or clarifications. In the second reading, I engaged in 80 speech turns, and 
Bert engaged in 35. Out of my 80 turns, 31 posed questions, 38 were reading aloud, and 11 were 
procedural directions or clarifications. The content of my turns not used to read aloud provided 
evidence of an informal conversation – an equitable distribution of speech turns between 
researcher and young participant. Table 8 reports the discourse from pages 42-43 of Bert’s 
second reading of Mother. This excerpt exemplified the turn-by-turn integration of these speech 
functions in the conversation that is supposed to take place during joint reading. 
 
Table 8 
Function of Questions in Bert’s Second Reading of Are You My Mother? 
       Speech Turn                                                       Function  
 
R: And then he saw a what?    Comprehension question posed to try and transfer storytelling to 
Bert. 
 
Bert: An airplane.    Bert answered question but did not assume storytelling role. 
 
R: And he called out “Here I 
am!” 
Researcher advanced session by reading printed text aloud. 
 
R: Did the plane stop? Researcher posed a comprehension question that could have been 
answered with a yes or no. 
 
Bert: No.  
Bert: It was too noisy. 
Bert spontaneously elaborated on his binary response by 
explaining that the plane didn’t stop for the bird because it 
couldn’t hear the bird’s small voice over its loud plane noise. 
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Data Analysis Procedures 
 This study was an exploratory, descriptive investigation using informal communicative 
data from a small number of participants. Consistent with Vygotsky’s (1978) view that there is 
no useless speech, all verbalizations, prompted or spontaneous, were analyzed. All recorded non-
verbal data points, such as gesturing, pointing, tapping, book-handling, or page-turning, were 
also analyzed (Whitebread et al., 2009).   
 The background knowledge sessions were videotaped and transcribed verbatim. Field 
notes were coordinated with the audiovisual record. Using an approach based on Hannon and 
Frias (2012), I compared transcripts from background knowledge tasks to reading sessions to 
ascertain whether and how children used their knowledge to comprehend or otherwise interact 
with the text. I also investigated whether children recognized information in the story not 
addressed in the background knowledge tasks.  
 Comprehension data comprised story construction, spontaneous statements and 
behaviors, verbal or behavioral responses to researcher prompts, and responses to comprehension 
questions. Unlike Sulzby (1985) and Paris and Paris (2003), I did not assign proficiency 
categories or scores. Instead, I utilized the principles of grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 
1994) to engage in open and closed coding of joint reading dialogue. I utilized ideas about 
comprehension about gaining meaning from a book from Dooley and Matthews (2009), Sulzby 
(1985), and Stahl (2014). I compiled this information into case narratives in Chapter 4 to 
describe, interpret, and relate the data for each child. I also analyzed children’s performances 
across repeated readings to look for indications of growth in comprehension or metacognition. 
Data from repeated readings comprised any data from the session, including story construction, 
as relevant, and all other verbal and behavioral data (e.g., responses to repeated and non-repeated 
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questions). Since preschoolers may not always be able to declaratively communicate learning or 
realizations, changes across readings were also analyzed.   
 I assessed metacognition through coding and analysis of qualitative data: responses to 
metacognitive questions, metacognitive review prompts, metacognition evinced in response to 
open-ended thinking prompts, and spontaneous metacognitive verbalizations or behaviors. 
Anticipated, useful, and ideal metacognitive verbalizations and behavior were informed by the 
manifestations of metacognition discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.  
Transcription. I transcribed participants’ verbalizations from the reading sessions. I also 
coordinated my field notes and impressions of each session from memoing with this information. 
After completing transcription of audio-visual recordings, I replayed the media file while reading 
through each transcription. This process resulted in minor corrections throughout the typed files 
that did not affect data analysis. A professional transcriptionist independently reviewed two files 
selected at random using the same process. Accuracy was determined to be 90%, with most 
errors being minor in nature and not changing the meaningfulness assigned to data.  
Constant comparison.  Similar to Rowe (1989), I engaged in constant comparison of 
collected data to other data and literature throughout the collection and analysis processes. 
Creswell (2002) explained that “constant comparison is an inductive (from specific to broad) 
data analysis procedure” that is meant to “ground” constructed categories in the data (p. 451). I 
intended for this process to ground categories that I defined in the ways that participants actually 
engaged in emergent reading behaviors (Kolb, 2012).  
Thematic coding. I transcribed verbatim all sessions and inserted field notes at relevant 
locations in the transcripts. I utilized the constant comparative method (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) 
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to begin coding while transcribing and to decide on major categories emerging from early data 
collection, in order to seek out more information for those categories in further data collection 
(Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). I uploaded all transcriptions into the NVIVO qualitative data analysis 
software for coding and analysis. NVIVO is an example of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data 
Analysis (CAQDA; Richards, 1999), which was appropriate for my volume of data. NVIVO’s 
ability to document participants’ verbalizations and behaviors on each page spread of a study text 
supported my goal of analyzing the cognitive and metacognitive processes each child underwent 
at multiple levels— e.g., word, sentence, page, or text (Kinnunen, Vauras, & Niemi, 1998). Use 
of NVIVO also enabled more efficient comparisons by child and by book and by any two 
characteristics compared through a matrix table.  
My open coding process was based upon principles from grounded theory. Grounded 
theory is a “general methodology for developing theory that is grounded in data systematically 
gathered and analyzed” (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 273). A pure grounded theory process allows 
for raw data to inform categorical labels, keeping conceptualizations endogenous (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1994). Though my categories drew their names from existing constructs in the literature, 
each categorical label also captured the unifying essence of corresponding raw data. However, 
my interpretive coding process was once removed from the child’s communications because it 
was informed by exogenous influences and contained inferences about each child’s internal 
states and intentions. I sought to increase the trustworthiness of my findings by articulating each 
step in my coding process and by frequently returning to my raw data. I also reported extensive 
raw data in addition to codings.  
I arrived at my final categories of metacognition by repeatedly reading, coding, and 
recoding transcripts. The final categories represented the nature and range of information from 
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the data set; all designated metacognitive data can be conceptualized in terms of the final 
categories. Thus, the final categories are robust, communicative containers for the information 
collected. They are parsimonious in that there is inter-relationship among categories, but not 
overlap. 
The category definitions and the subsequent ratings within each category are hinge points 
upon which the data can be placed into one group or another. In all cases, the available 
information can be assigned a rating within each of these categories. I strived for trustworthiness 
through constant comparison of data to theory and prior research (Strauss & Corbin, 1994) and 
through obtaining acceptable inter-rater agreement of coded data. 
Open coding. I followed the open coding process outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1994). 
I coded all data, as it was collected, in order to describe it. Then I began to use codes to identify 
thematic categories. Since I compared constantly as I continued to collect data, I reconsidered 
codes until I was confident that they accommodated all data. Once I established categories, I 
coded axially to create subcategories. Subcategories explained more about when, why, and how 
categories mattered, and provided further specification of the observed metacognitive 
phenomena. Finally, I used a review of coded transcripts and graphic models to articulate 
relationships between and among categories. This process was consistent with my commitment 
to situationally and transactionally analyze instances of metacognition, comprehension, and other 
emergent literacy phenomena.  
Closed coding. I used closed coding to code for age, gender, and static features of study 
texts. Text coding was based on standard narrative features and Judgment of how that text or 
illustration would be processed by a proficient conventional reader (Markman, 1981; Thorndyke, 
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1977; van Kleeck, 2008). Coding of text in picture books with words was based on the elements 
of story (van Kleeck, 2008). Coding of illustrations in picture books with words was based on the 
role of the illustration: illustrating specific information in the text, illustrating a general idea in 
the text, providing a critical detail not given by the text, or illustrating a reasonable inference one 
should draw from the text. The illustrations in wordless picture books were also coded based on 
elements of story.  
Reflecting on coding. I reflected on my coding processes by assigning confidence levels, 
triangulating, and writing. I rated my coding of each instance of metacognition as being done 
with high, medium, or lower confidence, based on how much evidence was available to 
categorize that data as a certain type of metacognition. Triangulation played a large role in this 
approach. When sufficient data was available, I triangulated all streams of reader, text, task, and 
context data. This corroboration was intended to bolster the trustworthiness of my claims about 
the abstract phenomena of metacognition and the suitability of interpreting verbal data as 
evidence of processing from young participants (Denzin, 1970, as cited in Atkinson & Delamont, 
2008; Yin, 2003).   
Inter-rater evaluation of coding. To increase the trustworthiness of the study, I sought 
to ascertain the degree of initial independent agreement in coding with another coder. Another 
researcher with a PhD in the psychology of reading and familiarity with the study independently 
reviewed a repeated reading set from two randomly selected participants for one randomly 
selected book. This process occurred twice, resulting in inter-rater review of Bert’s and Chris’ 
readings of Are You My Mother? and Erin and Gabby’s readings of The Very Lonely Firefly. The 
data reviewed through this process sampled four out of seven (57%) participants, two out of four 
(50%) books, three out of twelve (25%) reading sessions for each participant, and twelve out of 
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eighty-three (15%) total individual sessions comprising the study. The reviewed data also 
accounted for thirty-six out of the 219 metacognitive instances in the study. Complete 
independent agreement existed for 31 of the 36 instances and for at least one example of each of 
the seven categories of metacognition. Consistent with the overall confidence ratings of the 
codings in the study, most of the reviewed coded instances were high confidence codings; two 
were medium confidence and one was lower confidence. Thus, coverage was sufficient and 
representative of the different transactional elements under study. Agreements for each data set 
ranged from a low of 75% for Chris to a high of 100% for Bert and Gabby, resulting in an 
average inter-rater initial independent agreement of 89.5%.  
 Reasons for coding discrepancies were reviewed. Even though Chris was hard to 
understand, the 25% discrepancy in the coding of his data revolved around the meaning of the 
codes. However, Chris’ communicative style did distract from what he meant. Inter-coder 
agreement for Erin’s verbalizations was near the mean at 83%. Discrepancies for her sampled 
data seemed to be attributable to the difficulty of conveying non-verbal data such as facial 
expressions and body language in the typed transcripts. 
Writing. Writing was both a process and a product of my data collection and analysis. I 
used writing as a form of inquiry, communication, and validation (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Describing cognitive and metacognitive behaviors in joint reading 
through writing was a goal of this study. I thus intended to write a thick description of these 
phenomena. Geertz’s (1973) concept of “thick description” (as explained in Atkinson & 
Delamont, 2008, p. 299) is a classic principle of qualitative research. Thick descriptions are 
dense and multiple (Atkinson & Delamont, 2008). Therefore, writing enabled me to be reflexive 
and transparent by articulating my chain of reasoning. Therefore, I wrote research memos to 
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describe each reading session, each category, changes in my coding scheme, and emerging 
relationships between categories. These ideas were eventually presented as results through 
narrative case impressions, with the goal of describing (Eisenhart, 2006) how participants 
engaged in joint reading and manifested comprehension and metacognition. Writing enabled a 
record of my chain of reasoning and helped me to maintain transparency as I proceeded through 
an exploratory research process. 
I intended for the coordination of these qualitative practices to support rigor, reflexivity, 
and trustworthiness. Any procedural choice can be characterized as having its own affordances 
and limitations relative to the design of the study. I considered the relative affordances of my 
approaches, given my purpose. In Figure 5, I depict the qualitative data collection and analysis 




Figure 5. Data collection and analysis procedures based on the research question. 
 
After reviewing the logic of my research design relative to my question, I also carefully 
considered potential rival explanations for my findings. Due to characteristics of my design 
decisions, as well as the setting of my study and the developmental characteristics of my 
population, rival explanations could potentially account for what I considered to be evidence of 
comprehension or metacognition during joint storybook reading. In Table 9, I recount the steps I 














Atextual assessment of relevant 
background knowledge 
How can 4-year-old pre-
readers manifest 
metacognition during 









Steps Taken to Increase  
Trustworthiness 
Participants mimicking researcher/other children 
 








Participants displaying Hawthorne effects 
 
 
Participants becoming fatigued 
Sessions spaced apart 
 
Transactional analysis;  
repeated readings of same story 
 
 
No coaching or targeted praising; spontaneous 
verbalizations allowed; participants allowed to 
influence conversation 
 
Researcher established rapport as classroom 
volunteer; sessions presented as free choice center 
 
< 15-minute sessions 
 
 Joint reading in a classroom is a social reading dynamic in a social setting. It is therefore 
always a potential space for the informal, social learning that is a natural part of childhood. My 
choice to use this dynamic entailed recognizing the possibility of social learning influencing 
performance. My concern was for avoiding meaningless acts of copying or mimicking the 
researcher or a previous participant, not to prevent social learning.   
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
 
Over the course of their pre-kindergarten year, I engaged seven 4-year-old preschoolers 
in repeated joint readings of four narrative picture books. I sought to investigate how 
metacognition could manifest during the joint reading task and for what benefits, such as 
repairing or enhancing comprehension or enabling learning. The chosen stories provided 
participants with meaningful and structured information to be understood, and the iterative and 
interactive nature of repeated joint readings provided a context for comprehension and 
metacognition within and across readings.  
I intended for my approach to provide more varied and contextualized verbal data than 
what has been collected from error-detection methodologies (i.e., focusing on whether children 
can detect contrived errors; Garner, 1987; Hacker, 1998; Kucan & Beck, 1997; Skarakis-Doyle 
& Dempsey, 2008) or non-interactive observation of classroom behaviors (Neuman & Roskos, 
1997; Whitebread et al., 2009). Preschoolers will likely spend many hours interacting with an 
adult reader over a picture book. I sought to uncover the relevance of metacognition to this 
dynamic.  
In the next section, I report on the thematic coding processes that I undertook to analyze 
my joint reading data. I also overview observed comprehension processes in order to lay the 
groundwork for my coordinated discussion of comprehension and metacognition in the rest of 
the chapter. Then, I report results for each participant through narrative case impressions. 
Finally, I report additional analyses of my results across readers, readings, and texts. My 
approach applied Flavell’s model of metacognition by considering metacognitive behaviors in 
conjunction with each participant’s emergent literacy knowledge and actions.   
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Refinement of Metacognitive Coding Categories 
With a transactional lens in place, my primary focus was analyzing participants’ 
metacognitive data through a constant comparative approach. Based on conceptualizations of 
metacognition relevant during conventional and emergent literacy, I established seven categories 
of emergent metacognition relevant to the joint reading of narrative picture books: 1) Task 
Planning, 2) Verbal Self-Revising, 3) Expanding Storytelling, 4) Justifying Verbalizations, 5) 
Judging Difficulty, 6) Reflecting on Reading, and 7) Feeling of Knowing Story Content. 
Through the iterative nature of the coding process, I ultimately excluded two categories—
Metamemory for Text and Judgment of Learning from the Story.  
I expected that established roles for metacognition would be evident in my data set. 
Therefore, I began the constant comparative process with operational definitions of constructs 
considered to be manifestations of metacognition. However, consistent with the exploratory 
nature of my study, I also completed inductive coding processes, to adapt established definitions 
in a novel way to the task of joint picture book reading and to establish Expanding Storytelling as 
a new category. I worked through four rounds of coding schemes. Each round resulted in finer 
differentiation. For example, my initial coding scheme combined Self-Revising and Expanding 
Storytelling before I established their mutual exclusivity. Also, I spliced the initial category of 
Judging into Judgment of Difficulty and Judgment of Learning. Though children occasionally 
learned new words during the readings, none were able to report on doing so in a way that I 
could code with an acceptable confidence level. In sum, I distinguished Metamemory for Text 
and Judgment of Learning as unique categories, but eventually excluded them, resulting in seven 
metacognitive categories for final analysis. 
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Metamemory for Text. Brown (1978) defined metamemory as “knowledge concerning 
one’s own memory abilities and strategies” (p. 81). Larkin (2009) referred to metamemory as the 
awareness of one’s memory and the ability to use the vocabulary of remembering. Larkin (2009) 
explained that metamemory emerges during typical social interactions in the preschool years. 
According to Lai (2011), children begin to use memory verbs around the age of four, and 
procedural metamemory expands in concert with language and thinking from ages six to eleven. 
In this study, I originally interpreted a specific manifestation of metamemory—reporting on or 
making claims about the use of memory relative to reading a study text or reading in general. For 
example, a comment that referenced an awareness of memory as a capacity and process, as when 
a participant stated that repeated readings help her remember better, would have been counted as 
metamemory. I considered being able to converse about the cognitive benefits of prior 
experience with a text to be an active and second-level capacity that could shape a participant’s 
performance. Since metamemory is related to memory, one limitation of this category is that 
forms of memory related to joint reading could not be assessed or verified. Brown (1978) also 
explained that relative to typical adults, preschoolers’ long-term memories contain less 
information, lack efficient organization, and might not be as helpful during a task.  
In this study, I did not consider any participant to have manifested Brown’s definition of 
metamemory. I posed 20 metamemory prompts, resulting in four scenarios that I eventually 
decided did not meet evidentiary standards. I also found both short and long term memory to be 
more limited than I expected. Many participants did not recall reading study texts with me in 
prior sessions, even when directly asked to do so. However, Bert, one of the more self-aware 
participants, once spontaneously inquired why we were reading a certain text “again.” Being 
aware of how and why one remembers might have limited impact on joint storybook reading, as 
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young children do not read to study or learn on purpose. Judgment of Learning scenarios were 
also excluded. A lack of first level memorial capacity may have resulted in participants’ inability 
to report on new learning that took place within reading sessions.  
Reflecting on Reading referred to making implicit or explicit claims about the self as a 
reader, reading as a mental task, or a book as something to be read through mental effort. Self-
awareness is a fundamental form of metacognition; it is at the root of metacognitive knowledge 
of self and task (Flavell, et al., 1993). Awareness of one’s thinking begins in the preschool years 
(Flavell et al., 1993), thus enabling reflection. Bransford et al. (2000) considered reflecting (as 
well as sense-making, predicting performance, monitoring learning relative to a goal, monitoring 
understanding, and engaging in self-assessment) to be a major form of metacognition for 
conventional readers. Both Neuman and Roskos (1997) and Rowe (1989) concluded that 
preschoolers have a working self-awareness as literacy task doers, although Rowe (1989) noted 
that this phenomenon may be easier to observe in the creation of a written product versus 
reading, since reading doesn’t involve the production of a physical artifact as writing does. 
Strommen and Mates noted this “philosophical” activity in preschoolers as young as three (1997, 
p. 99). Further, Sulzby and Otto (1982) documented kindergarten pre-readers’ “meta-linguistic 
knowledge” of text as part of their emergent literacy experiences (p. 181). This knowledge 
indicated an awareness of text as a “separable, memorable, and manipulable entity” (Sulzby & 
Otto, 1982, p. 182). Emerging knowledge of the self as a reader is intertwined with knowledge of 
reading as an activity and the text as a defined entity to be read. Thus, the Reflecting category 
coordinated this literature and data from the present study in accordance with RAND’s (Snow, 
2002), Rosenblatt’s (1978), and Dooley and Matthews’ (2009) views of reading as a transaction 
between the reader, the text, and the task (or purposeful context).  
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In the present study, five out of seven participants engaged in Reflection. One Reflection 
prompt was ignored, and two spontaneous statements that could have manifested Reflection were 
excluded in a subsequent round of coding. I interpreted three main themes from participants’ 
Reflecting data: 1) Reading is an advanced skill that they are on the precipice of doing; 2) 
Reading is hard work but something to be proud of; and 3) Though reading has something to do 
with print, it is ultimately about understanding the meaning represented in the book. Dylan took 
the third idea one step further by understanding that he could enjoy maximum meaning with 
minimal effort by having the adult read or tell the story. Reflecting could have been prompted or 
spontaneous.   
Feeling of Knowing Story Content referred to verbalizations or behaviors that 
communicated that key story information was known or not known. Though I could not know if 
participants reacted to every instance of not knowing, I was able to document the self-reporting 
of familiarity or lack of familiarity with content represented in the texts. The data suggested that 
this type of meta-statement reported on an internal state that was relative to one’s goal for 
understanding the study text. Since the books featured pictures of unfamiliar objects and print 
that participants could not yet read, there were many opportunities for this form of metacognition 
to occur spontaneously. Additionally, when participants seemed confused, I asked whether they 
knew something or not, resulting in prompted Feeling of Knowing data.  
Feeling of Knowing is typically researched in conventional readers under the umbrella of 
metamemory (Karably & Zabrucky, 2009). This relationship makes sense for a conventional 
reader who is reading and studying a defined body of knowledge in the formal institution of 
schooling. I adapted a definition for use with a pre-reader who has been asked to respond to a 
picture book through the open-ended joint reading format. The essence of this category is 
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knowing that you know or not; this state of mind was presumed to result in expressions of surety 
or requests for information needed to read or converse about the text. Feeling of Knowing 
behaviors were active and responsible actions that supported comprehension; they were 
constructively-responsive ways to participate in the joint reading task. Consistent with the 
findings of Whitebread et al. (2009), 4-year-olds in this study made the extra effort to find out 
what they needed to know to tell a meaningful story or engage in meaningful dialogue about the 
book. All seven participants evinced Feelings of Knowing.  
Judgment of Difficulty. At the conclusion of a session, I asked participants if the book 
was easy, medium, or hard. I then asked participants to elaborate on their categorical choice. I 
created the Judgment of Difficulty category from a reinterpretation and adaptation of Veenman’s 
(2014) treatments of the constructs of Judgment of Learning and Feeling of Knowing— two 
important and related phenomena that preschoolers may be capable of (Whitebread et al., 2009). 
According to Veenman (2014, p. 5), Judgment of Learning and Feeling of Knowing “are the 
result of monitoring item difficulty and evaluating memory content.” Brown (1978) also 
addressed estimation of task difficulty as a meta-level mental activity. I wanted to distinguish 
evaluation of difficulty as an expression of awareness of mental work involved. Since 
preschoolers do not read or re-read to study written materials and learn a formal body of 
knowledge, this distinction was appropriate versus allowing this construct to be subsumed under 
the large umbrella of metamemory. I thus intended for the Judgment prompt to invite participants 
to evaluate difficulty in a way that was immediately relevant in time to the reading experience 
yet challenging due to its abstract and representational nature. Evaluation of difficulty is an 
introspective, meta-level Judgment. One limitation of the Judgment prompt as executed in this 
study was that participants could report on the difficulty of the text itself, the questions I posed, 
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or some unarticulated combination of text, task, and contextual factors in that session. 
Nonetheless, the totality of data suggested that participants understood the essence of the 
Judgment prompt, with one exception when Erin interpreted the prompt concretely (versus 
representationally) and thus reported on the size of the physical book. It should be noted that 
Erin interpreted all other Judgment prompts representationally, though I did not coach her or 
provide a model. Due to perceived fatigue at the end of sessions, I collected less Judgment data 
than anticipated. Across 82 reading sessions, I only posed 27 Judgment prompts. These resulted 
in 20 replies that could be coded with at least minimum confidence.  
Task-Related Planning referred to verbalization of an intention to engage in the joint 
reading task in a certain way. Planning is a well-researched form of metacognition that is more 
easily observed in mature, conventional readers, such as students who are reading and studying 
to learn (Brown, 1978). Planning is a manifestation of intentional decision-making about how to 
engage in an understood task. One can plan how to expend mental resources based on estimation 
of task demands, as well as affective factors such as interest, and task conditions such as time 
available (Flavell, 1979; Veenman et al., 2006). A review of the literature suggests that planning 
is a least represented form of metacognition in preschoolers (Whitebread et al., 2009), perhaps 
due to lack of formal experiences with planning a literacy task or text interaction.  
Fang and Cox (1999) counted preschoolers’ planning behaviors when dictating an 
original story as a form of metacognitive “self-management” (p. 175). In their study, planning 
was an active form of participation in the tasks of story construction and communicating with an 
adult scribe. Similar to Jacobs and Paris’ (1987) Index of Reading Awareness for conventional 
readers, Fang and Cox (1999) thought that planning worked in concert with monitoring and 
regulating the adult scribe relative to a presumed intention for constructing meaning. Similarly, 
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Vygotsky (1986) presented children with challenging laboratory tasks and observed whether they 
could cope with the challenge by planning (as well as regulating efforts through using available 
tools). Under these conditions, preschoolers were not skilled planners. Fang and Cox (1999, p. 
179) counted children’s conversational verbalizations such as “Now what do I do?” and “Let me 
think” as verbal evidence of planning (see also Cox & Sulzby, 1982). In the familiar context of 
joint reading, preschoolers planned spontaneously and in response to a prompt. They seemed to 
plan to control how they participated in a task. Sometimes they planned to honor a preference, 
such as getting done quickly so they could read another book or play at a center. All Planning 
prompts were answered.  
Verbal Self-Revising referred to a scenario wherein a verbalization was offered and then 
replaced with an updated version, within the same reading session, and sometimes within the 
same speech turn. This category is essentially self-correction. I assumed that children were 
correcting themselves for misspeaking relative to some intended communication. Fang and Cox 
(1999) counted children’s oral edits as they dictated a story about a personal memory for a 
hypothetical audience as self-correction based on misspeaking relative to an intended mental 
model. Monitoring one’s performance enables the correction of errors – whether from casual 
misspeaking or a mistaken belief.  
Verbal Self-Revising was perhaps the most straightforward, demonstrable category in the 
study (Fang & Cox, 1999; Rowe, 1989; Vygotsky, 1978). The limiter “verbal” had two 
meanings. The object of the child’s monitoring could have been his or her own speech. Or, even 
if the object of monitoring was not known, the manifested evidence of monitoring was 
communicated verbally. I intended for this category to capture casual and conversational 
evidence of self-monitoring. Participants could have had many more internal experiences of self-
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monitoring that were not captured by my method. Verbal Self-Revising differed from Expanding 
Storytelling in that the second statement didn’t just alter the first one – it cancelled and replaced 
it.  
Expanding Storytelling referred to updating the telling of the story within each reading 
session or across the three reading sessions for each book. Expanding was based upon my 
reading of Fang and Cox (1999), who counted children’s elaborations (and not just self-
corrections) as literacy-related metacognition. In this study, Expanding refers to a child 
articulating more information or better integrating information such that their rendering is more 
like what the author intended. Since I did not coach children in how to tell a story, I assumed that 
expanded renderings were enabled by realizations or decisions to more fully engage in the task. 
Expanding was based on the idea that literacy is a metacognitive capacity. Expanding indicated 
that participants could change performances—presumably due to some internal ability and 
proclivity to do so. Feuerstein et al. (2010) emphasized the capacity to grow and change as the 
essence of being metacognitive. Expansion captured this idea. Only three participants, Helen, 
Chris, and Dylan, did not manifest Expanding. The four who did Expand did so spontaneously as 
part of their storytelling. I prompted Bert to Expand once when I thought it was appropriate, but 
he did not do so. Due to the limited time available for each session and concern about fatigue, I 
did not attempt to prompt any more participants to Expand their storytelling.  
Justifying one’s verbalizations and text interaction behaviors is considered 
metacognitive based on the work of Paris and Paris (2003), wherein pre-reading children as 
young as kindergarten were asked to explain why they answered narrative comprehension 
questions in the way that they did, and Whitebread et al. (2009), who noted the same capacity in 
4-year-old preschoolers. Pieschl, Stallmann, and Bromme (2014), in their study of high 
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schoolers’ interpretations of tasks, explained that justification of knowledge is epistemic in 
nature; it involves reviewing knowledge as an object, and it is related to the idea that knowledge 
can change. Justification was overwhelmingly prompted. This area is a rich source of debate 
over the cognitive or metacognitive nature of justifications. Stahl (2014) suggested that 
preschool teachers pose the Justification type of follow up question in order to develop 
thoughtful engagement but did not necessarily consider that question to be metacognitive. In the 
instances coded as Justification, participants could have reported on their true mental processes 
in order to justify their answers or they could have indicated something concrete that was 
somehow related to the question. Therefore, the true metacognitive nature of justifications is a 
debated issue. To circumvent this issue, I only accepted as Justification responses to the prompts 
“How did you know that?” or “Why do you think that?” I issued these prompts when I thought it 
was situationally appropriate to do so, as follow up to a child’s storytelling or answer to a 
comprehension question.  
A summary of the refinement process that I undertook to arrive at the final seven 
categories is displayed in Figure 6. I made decisions to replicate, establish, keep, or remove a 
category based on a constant comparison of collected data to evidentiary standards set by the 
literature and how participants were expressing metacognition in joint reading.  
Judgment of Learning. Reliable judgments of learning are not expected before five 
years of age (Tang, Bartsch, & Nunez, 2007). However, this area of research is limited in the 
preschool population, and I anticipated that the mediation of the joint reading procedure and the 
physical availability of the book might have supported an earlier performance. That was not the 
case. Future studies may find sufficient evidence through extended time for data collection or 
different data collection techniques. Some evidence suggested that these metacognitive 
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capacities may be within the reach of 4-year-olds, though these two categories were not directly 
relevant. Figure 6 recounts the coding schemes that I worked through before arriving at my final 
seven categories.  
 





             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             







































































Table 10 presents the final categories grouped as Metacognitive Knowledge, 
Metacognitive Experience, and Metacognitive Regulation. This grouping is based Whitebread et 
al.’s (2009) groupings of data and the essence of participants’ metacognitive behaviors. 
Table 10 
Forms of Metacognition Categorized as Knowledge, Experience, and Regulation  
Category         Description                            Example 
 
Knowledge   
Reflecting on Reading 
Demonstration of 
knowledge of self as reader, 
text as something to be read, 
and/or reading as a task  
   “I don’t know the words, so 
            what about if we just look at  













whether or not key 
knowledge in the text is 
known 
 
Rating difficulty of text or 
task at conclusion of reading 
session  
 
Explaining why a prior 
statement was made or why 




             “Is this the lonely firefly?”  
 (points to firefly in group) 
 
R: Was that story easy,        
medium,         
or hard to understand? 
Bert: Easy. R: Why was it  
easy? 
Bert:‘Cause the pictures. 
 
             R: How do we know that’s the        
             momma? Bert: She looks like      









Verbalizing intent to engage 
in task in a certain way  
Contradicting or correcting a 
prior statement 
 
Adding more information to 
a prior statement 
      “How ‘bout we go to the end,          
        so it can be quick?” 
 
      “Roost-, a chicken.” 
      2nd: “[T]hen she got something             
      from the man.” vs. 3rd: “Then she  
      got syrup from the man who sells              
      syrup.” 
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Fit with theoretical model. The final seven categories are manifestations of early 
metacognition that were situationally relevant to the joint reading task. This finding is consistent 
with Flavell’s (1985, 1991) model, in which metacognition is a situational resource for readers in 
reading situations (Rosenblatt, 1978; Snow, 2002). For example, the lowest frequency of 
spontaneous metacognition was associated with a boy, while the second lowest frequency was 
associated with a girl. Metacognition could have been manifested for a wide range of reasons – 
to further enhance understanding that was already sufficient – or to modify an opinion about a 
matter open to interpretation. Therefore, consistent with Flavell’s model, I did not interpret the 
amount of metacognition as evidence of a child’s metacognitive status. Rather, the totality of my 
findings suggest that the most promising analysis of emergent metacognition is through the 
person-task-action approach. This commitment to an integrated, transactional analysis is 
consistent with the work of Flavell (1981), Vygotsky (1978), Rosenblatt (1978), and Kintsch 
(1991). However, it differs from the approach taken in some of the preschool studies reviewed 
herein, in which pre-defined metacognitive utterances were examined out of context of the 
activity data (Fang & Cox, 1999; Skarakis-Doyle & Dempsey, 2008). Research may ultimately 
demonstrate that outward manifestations of metacognition (e.g., my seven categories) may be 
enabled by multiple underlying dimensions (Fang & Cox, 1999). This finding would fit with 
Flavell’s model. 
Theory of Mind and Use of Metacognitive Language  
In addition to my seven metacognitive categories, I also documented evidence of reliance 
on Theory of Mind and Use of Metacognitive Language. Flavell (2004) and Williams and Atkins 
(2009) encouraged co-consideration of theory of mind and metacognition. Therefore, I defined 
these two distinct categories, separate from the seven metacognitive categories, in order to 
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maintain a robust distinction between these capacities and emergent metacognition while noting 
inter-relationships. Theory of mind concepts and use of metacognitive language are closely 
related, adjunct capacities for both narrative comprehension processes and reading-relevant 
metacognition.  
Typical 4-year-olds use basic Metacognitive Language such as think, know, and 
remember in their expressive and receptive language; however, we do not know their 
approximate understandings of the mental states that are labeled by these everyday terms (Flavell 
et al., 1985; Flavell et al., 1993; Peskin & Astington, 2004). Therefore, use of these terms alone 
could not count as metacognition per se. However, these terms were often used to express 
metacognition. In sum, in addition to being related to metacognition, these two constructs are 
related to each other, as one would use metacognitive terms to discuss one’s thoughts or the 
inferred thoughts of a character.  
Theory of Mind was implicated in all study texts when ascribing thoughts, emotions, 
and/or motivations to story characters (Flavell, et al., 1993). In Pancakes for Breakfast, a special 
text feature, thought bubbles, appeared twice. On page 3, the thought bubble illustrates the little 
old lady’s desire for pancakes. Across pages 20-21, a series of thought bubbles shows the little 
old lady’s anticipated next steps in making pancakes. As investigated by Flavell et al. (1993), 
this text feature created an ecologically relevant opportunity to assess whether the child knew 
that the little old lady was taking actions or thinking about them in the context of comprehension 
of a story.  As shown in Table 11, six out of seven participants spontaneously mentioned the 
presence of the intention thought bubbles and also recognized their representational role. Four 
out of seven seemed to understand that the second set of bubbles represented thoughts versus 
real-time actions. A comparison of responses to the two thought bubbles in Pancakes was done 
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due to the connection to the investigation by Flavell et al. (1993). In addition to thought bubbles, 
the narrative content of each story offered differing opportunities to work with theory of mind.  
Table 11 
Responses to Two Types of Thought Bubbles in Pancakes for Breakfast 
  Depiction of Relatable Goal (p. 3) Depiction of Planned Actions (p. 20-21) 
 
Bert “She wanted something for breakfast.” 2nd reading: “Um, um, doing it.” 
3rd reading: “Making – um, thinking about it.” 
 
Chris Not mentioned, not questioned Tapping bubbles: “We need to do all these.”  
 
Dylan “She wanted to make pancakes.” “She was dreaming about doing pancakes.” 
 
Erin “She was thinking about pancakes!” Confirming insistence that bubbles were real 
time actions: “Actually, it’s happening, and 
then she ate.” 
 
Fiona “She wanted pancakes.” Tapping bubbles: “And she’s making and 
making … and suddenly it was all ready.” 
 
Gabby “They want food.” Tapping bubbles: “She’s getting the pancakes 
ready.”  
 
Helen “That’s what she was thinking about for 
breakfast.” 
“Then she’s thinking.” 
 
 Each participant used Metacognitive Language, though the youngest ones tended to do so 
only in response to question stems that contained metacognitive terms. The range of 
metacognitive terms used included think, know, remember, dream, and learn. All participants 
seemed to understand what these terms meant and could use them in reply to the researcher. 
However, only one participant spontaneously used the term learn. Even Helen, the most 
advanced participant, could not use the term learn in relation to learning something from the 
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text. When asked what she learned from reading the text, she reported that she already knew 
everything there was to learn at preschool—counting and the alphabet. Bert and Erin provide 
contrasting cases in use of metacognitive language. Though their comprehension was 
comparable, Bert often offered “Mmm-hmm,” “Umm..” or shrugged, whereas Erin 
spontaneously said that the little old lady “decided” to make pancakes based on a picture and that 
the little old lady was “dreaming.” To discuss her own mental processes, Erin spontaneously 
said, “I think” and “I mixed up.” In reply to conversational prompts, she explained the she 
“forgot” and said, “I mean” to preface a self-correction. However, Erin did not report learning 
anything, either spontaneously or in response to a prompt. One instance emerged in which Erin 
could have reported that she learned something new, but she still did not. Erin wanted to know 
what the plaque on the wall in the last scene of Pancakes said. Immediately after I read the 
saying (“If at First You Don’t Succeed - Try, Try Again”), I asked her if she learned anything 
new while reading with me. She replied “no.”  I did not ask Erin whether she changed her mind 
about anything.  Peskin and Astington (2004) said that stories provide preschoolers with ample 
opportunities to use metacognitive and mental state language. An examination of when and how 
participants in the present study used metacognitive language confirmed this finding, though 
individual differences clearly existed.    
Coding Processes and Results 
 Through a constant comparative process, I began transcribing and coding early in the 
process of data collection. After typing transcripts of reading sessions, I checked their accuracy 
and inserted field notes. Coding was iterative; I completed four full rounds of thematic coding. 
Using a combination of open and closed codes, I coded until saturation was reached (i.e., 100% 
of the data received at least one code) and no new codes were needed to categorize, describe, or 
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explain child data. Each participant demonstrated some form of metacognition with each book. 
This iterative process helped me distinguish what type of metacognition I had observed.  
Frequencies. As shown in Table 12, I recorded 219 instances of metacognition, the 
majority of which were prompted through my situationally-posed questions. Most metacognition 
in the study could be characterized as metacognitive experiences. This finding is consistent with 
developmentally-appropriate expectations for emergently-literate participants. Flavell (1981) 
explained that experiences drive the development and coordination of metacognitive knowledges 
and regulatory activities, as one gains experience with and training in formal tasks and 
intellectual domains. Contextualized examples are discussed in the next sections. 
 
Table 12 
Total Instances of Spontaneous (S) and Prompted (P) Metacognition by Category 
 Regulation Experience Knowledge 
 Planning Revising Expanding Justifying Difficulty Knowing Reflecting Totals 
 S P S P S P S P S P S P S P S P Total 
Bert   1 2 1   10  5 1 5 2 1 5 23 28 
Chris 1 1 1    1 1  2  1 3 2 6 7 13 
Dylan 8 4 9     3  5 1 1 11 3 29 16 45 
Erin 6 1 9  2  1 7  2 2 1 5 1 25 12 37 
Fiona 1  2 2 1   6  2 1 21   5 31 36 
Gabby   1  1   3  4 3 7   5 14 19 
Helen 2  4     9  6 7 8 4 1 17 24 41 
Totals 18 6 27 4 5  2 39  26 15 44 25 8 92 127 219 
24 31 5 41 26 59 33 





Coding examples. I categorized each coding as done with highest, medium, or relatively 
lower confidence in inferences made during coding. The majority of codings were made with 
high confidence in the inferences I made from the data. In other words, the participant’s coded 
utterance was metacognitive on the verbal surface and also matched what I observed in the 
moment through an additional verbal or non-verbal data point. Medium confidence decisions 
concerned the ongoing debate about the trustworthiness of counting utterances that sound 
metacognitive as metacognition; robust analysis casted a small degree of doubt about whether 
the child’s words truly expressed a second-level, inner cognitive state. A little more information 
than what could be collected through the short and noisy sessions in the preschool classroom 
could have placed medium confidence data into the highest confidence category. Lower 
confidence categorizations reflected the reality that one more data point, in addition to the issue 
of word/mental state match, called into question the metacognitive nature of a verbalization. I 
attributed the small number of these ratings to communication limitations such as articulation 
issues or non-standard syntax.  
Due to the threat of fatigue, I could not always seek clarification of unclear verbalizations 
within a reading session. For example, Dylan had a disproportionate share of lower confidence 
codings since he did not always articulate clearly and sometimes showed abrupt changes in tone 
and activity. These characteristics posed challenges to coding his verbalizations and joint reading 
behaviors with higher confidence. Table 13 reports the relative proportions of codings in each of 





Proportions of Inference/Confidence Levels in Codings of Metacognitive Data from 
Preschoolers 






Bert  77% 23% 0% 
Chris 85% 14% 1% 
Dylan 75% 1% 24% 
Erin 98% 0% 2% 
Fiona 86% 10% 4% 
Gabby 80% 20% 0% 
Helen 96% 4% 0% 
 
 The initial toy playing sessions and sixty-four reading sessions took place in fall 2015, 
and the remaining sessions occurred in spring 2016. I was present as a classroom volunteer 
before, during, and after data collection and was therefore able to build rapport with participants 
and classroom teachers. Ostensibly, seven more months of development and exposure to dialogic 
reading tasks could have resulted in more metacognitive behaviors later in the study. By the 
spring, some participants were more articulate and more aware of print. However, no obvious 
differences in metacognition were noted in the spring sessions. Indeed, there was not a clear 
pattern of an increase in metacognition from the first to second to third reading, regardless of the 
time that passed between these events. Likewise, though all participants were technically four 
years of age at the start of the study in September 2015, some were closer to five. Therefore, I 
compared results by age at start of study. Younger fours were 4 years 0 months to 4 years 5 
months old and older fours were 4 years 6 months old to 5 years 0 months old at the start of the 
study in September 2015. Coincidentally, all female participants were in the younger group and 
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all male participants were in the older group. As seen in Table 14, though the female participants 
were younger, less inference was required to code their data.  
Table 14 









91%  7% 2% 
4.6-5.0 years 
*all male 
78% 12% 10% 
In the next series of tables, I present excerpts from coded data for each participant. These 
excerpts represent a range of codes and include an example of data from each participant that 
may have been compelling but was not metacognitive in nature. I discuss these excerpts and the 
inferences made in coding them.  
As shown in Table 15, Bert’s high confidence example communicated his knowledge that 
the thought bubble in Pancakes represented the little old lady’s thoughts. The metacognition in 
this scenario was his ability to report that as a reason for a prior claim. Thus, this example 
illustrated a connection among metacognition (e.g., Justifying), metacognitive language (e.g., 
think, want), and theory of mind (e.g., character is thinking about an absent object). This 
example and the others illustrate the roles that metacognition can play during naturalistic picture 





Bert’s Examples of Coding Confidence Levels and Excluded (Not Metacognition) Data 
Higher Confidence  
(Justification) 
Medium Confidence  
(Justification) 
Lower Confidence  
(Justification) 
 Not Metacognition 
(Critical thinking) 




R: What does she 
want? 
Bert: Pancakes. 
R: How do you know 
that? 
 
Bert: Because it’s up 
here (points to 
thought bubble). 
R: One morning, a 
Mother bird sat on 
her egg. How do we 
know that’s the 
momma? 
 
Bert: She looks like 
that. (Bert points to 
the picture of the 
Mother bird.)  
 
R: How’d you know 
that was a lantern?  
 
Bert: ‘Cause it looks 
like one.  
 
R: Do you have one 
at your house? 
 




R: Was it a happy 
book or a sad book? 
 
Bert: Um, both. 
 
R: Really? Why do 
you say that? 
 
Bert: Because they 




In the medium confidence example, Bert did not provide enough detailed information 
about how he knew the pictured bird was the Mother bird. Therefore, I did not have any way of 
knowing if he was simply pointing to a likely picture of the Mother directly in front of him or 
reporting on his internal mental state. His answer may not have been truly metacognitive, though 
it was on the surface. The medium confidence example was less specific. Though Bert pointed to 
the picture, his answer had a rhetorical tone about standard representations of a mother.  
In the lower confidence example, Bert provided a general answer that may or may not 
have reported on his mental state, and he was not able to discuss the matter further. He replied 
that he did not have a lantern at his house, yet he did not mention where he had seen a lantern 
before or other information that would confirm that he knows what a lantern is. Therefore, in this 
example, two points of data called into question the metacognitive nature of his statement. The 
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lower confidence example was even less specific than the medium confidence example; it did not 
indicate that Bert knew what a lantern was or that he considered why he answered that way. 
I coded the example of excluded data as critical thinking as opposed to metacognition. In 
this example, Bert shared a relevant insight about the story beyond what was requested by the 
researcher or suggested by the book. This excerpt showed notable constructive thinking; Bert 
appeared to apply his background knowledge to make holistic sense of the story. I provided this 
excerpt to show that I did not code all constructive thinking as metacognition. 
In Table 16, Chris’ higher confidence excerpt was a straightforward example of self-
correcting a statement mid-stream, due to monitoring of what one intended to say versus what 
one actually said. Though this example did not involve a dramatic change in beliefs about the 
story, it showed second-level processing in cooperation with his stream of verbal storytelling. 
Chris’ medium example could have been a communication of a sensation that the story was long 
based on his meta-awareness of how much time and effort it took to complete that story versus 
others. However, without additional information, such as commentary on why it felt long, this 
statement may or may not have indicated a profound Reflection on Reading. Chris’ lower 
confidence example in Table 16 can be interpreted as an act of Task Planning - an exertion of 
intentional control of his engagement in the task based on his knowledge of how books are laid 
out - but it is not known if he wanted to end the session on the last page of the book or if he was 
just announcing that he had reached the last page. Chris’ example of excluded data was coded as 
a macro-level statement and an indication of an understanding of the firefly’s false belief that 
lights could be other fireflies. This false belief drove the plot—the firefly made many misguided 
attempts before reaching its goal. This data also exemplified that theory of mind and 




Chris’s Examples of Coding Confidence Levels and Excluded Data 
Higher Confidence  
(Self-Revision) 
Medium Confidence  
(Reflection on 
Reading) 
Lower Confidence  
(Task Planning) 
Not Metacognition 
(Theory of Mind) 
R: Then he came to a 








Chris: That was a 
long story. 
 
Chris noticed the 
fireflies on the last 
page and immediately 
stopped storytelling 
to go that page. 
 
Chris: And, that’s the 
end. 
 
R: Wait, not yet. Is 
this really the end? 
 
Chris: [Looking at 
fireflies on last page] 
The end! 
Chris: It was. a car. 
light.  
 
[Chris used emphatic 
pauses to 
communicate the 
macro level idea that 
contrary to the 
firefly’s false belief, 
the light we see is 
actually a car’s 
headlight.] 
 
[Reference to false 
belief structure] 
  
As shown in Table 17, Dylan’s lower confidence rating of an Expansion was impacted by 
his low speech output. Dylan did not enjoy putting forth the effort of speaking or leading the 
conversation, except for instances of high personal interest. Therefore, it was often difficult to 
feel certain of his meaning. The medium example showed Dylan’s persistent preference to 
participate in a way that was more passive than the other participants. The lower confidence 
example concerned whether he was truly Expanding Storytelling or just speaking more. Dylan’s 
excluded example exemplified his expressive and receptive proficiency with metacognitive 
language used to discuss a theory of mind concept— the thought bubble. However, it did not 






Dylan’s Examples of Coding Confidence Levels and Excluded Data 
Higher Confidence  
(Judgment of 
Difficulty) 
Medium Confidence  
(Task Planning) 




(Theory of Mind) 
R: Was that story an 
easy story, a medium 
story, or a hard story? 
 
Dylan: A medium 
story. 
 
R: What made it 
medium? 
 
Dylan: The pages. 
 
R: What about them? 
 
Dylan: Because they 
were all big.  
Dylan: I’m not gonna 
read the words.  
 
R: We can tell the 
story from the 
pictures.  





Dylan: She heard 
wiggling. My baby 
must ... want food. 
(3rd) 
R: Show me where 
she’s dreaming about 
pancakes.  
 
Dylan points to the 
thought bubble. 
 
Dylan: In her brain.  
 
[Dylan explains 
theory of mind 
concepts]  
 
In Table 18, Erin’s high confidence example exemplified her active participation in joint 
storytelling. She often took initiative. Only one of Erin’s instances necessitated a lower 
confidence rating. Erin’s example was the only less-than-high confidence rating for Judgment of 
Difficulty. I assigned that rating because she estimated the physical length of the book’s cover 
when asked to rate the difficulty of its content. Since her answer did not include selection of a 
difficulty category, it was difficult to know if she really thought that the measurement of the 




Erin’s Examples of Coding Confidence Levels and Excluded Data 
Higher Confidence  
(Task Planning) 
Medium Confidence  
 






Erin: I’m gonna make 
up my words now. 
 
R: You’re gonna 
make up your words 
now? 
 
Erin: Yeah, because 
there’s no words.  
n/a R: Was it an easy 
story, a medium 
story, or a really hard 
story to understand? 
 
Erin: (mumbling 
numbers as she leans 
across the closed 
book) It’s 12 inches.   
Erin: She maked and 
maked and maked 
and maked until she 




Table 19 shows that Fiona’s medium confidence example of Expanding Storytelling was 
downgraded from high confidence because of her use of the word “girl” in a story with only 
animal characters. Like the other participants, she recognized the mother duck, yet used the term 
“girl” for an unknown reason. Despite that, the second sample showed Expansion of important 
details versus her first accounting of the same page. Fiona’s excluded example demonstrated her 
frequent application of her personal experiences and priorities to the text. Though she used 
metacognitive language, she was not metacognitive in that moment. Furthermore, her personal 
reference did not seem to be constructive as she did not connect her experience with the story.                                  
Table 19 




Medium Confidence  
(Expanding 
Storytelling) 





R: Was that easy, 




R: What’s happening 
here? There’s no 
words.. 
Fiona: She’s 
swimming. And the 
turtle.   
n/a R: What were you 
thinking? 
 
Fiona: I was thinking 







Medium Confidence  
(Expanding 
Storytelling) 





R: Why was it so 
hard? 
 
Fiona: [No response.] 
 
R: Was it too hard for 
little kids? 
 
Fiona: Because I 






Fiona: There’s the 
baby chick back to 
the mom. The turtle’s 
bringing it to the girl. 
 
R: That when you’re 
born you’re with your 
family and not alone.  
 
Fiona: No. I’m 




 Table 20 provides examples of Gabby’s five medium-rated codings in the Justification 
and Feeling of Knowing categories. I attributed these outcomes to Gabby’s lack of familiarity 
with the representational nature of the questions that I posed. Gabby spoke as much as she could 
during the sessions, but she may have been so unfamiliar with abstract questions or thinking that 
she interpreted and answered the questions in a concrete manner. Gabby’s example of excluded 
data did not meet evidentiary standards (due to a Yes/No response without elaboration) for 
Metamemory for Text, before that entire category was excluded. The tendency to receive Yes/No 
responses without elaboration was a primary reason that Metamemory for Text was cancelled as a 
category of metacognition in this study. Overall, participants were not able to name, report on, or 
otherwise discuss their metamemorial capacities or experiences in a self-referential manner, and 




Gabby’s Examples of Coding Confidence Levels and Excluded Data 
Higher Confidence  
(Judgment of 
Difficulty) 
Medium Confidence  
(Justification) 




R: Is that easy, 




R: Why’s it medium? 
 
Gabby: Because it’s a 
short book.  
R: What’s the baby 
bird thinking right 
now? 
 
Gabby: His mother! 
 
R: How do you know 
he’s thinking about 
his mother? 
 
Gabby: ‘Cause, he’s 
gonna lay down in 
the nest soon. The 
nest. 
 
R: He’s gonna land in 
the nest soon? 
 
Gabby: Yeah. 
n/a Gabby: He look up. 
And down.  
 
R: You remember 
that? 
 






In Table 21, Helen’s higher confidence example exemplified why she came the closest to 
being able to engage in a Judgment of Learning, though that category was eventually excluded. It 
is reasonable to think that remembering content frees up mental energy for processing it.  
Helen’s medium confidence example demonstrated that though she was capable of extensive 
verbal dialogue, she sometimes fixated on her unique interpretations, leading to disappointing 
replies. Helen’s excluded data exemplified that not all answers with metacognitive language 
were counted as metacognition. Metacognitive terms such as because, ‘cause, I know, and I don’t 




Helen’s Examples of Coding Confidence Levels and Excluded Data 
Higher Confidence  
(Judgment of 
Difficulty) 
Medium Confidence  
(Judgment of 
Difficulty) 
Lower Confidence  Not Metacognition 
(Metacognitive 
Language) 
R: Is it an easy, 





R: What makes it 
easy? 
 
Helen: All the things 
that I remember in it.  
R: Was that easy, 




R: What made this 
one medium? 
 
Helen: Because she 
slept without it (the 
missing duckling).  
n/a R: They’re talking 
about that duckling’s 
running away? How 




guffaws] I know that.  
 
 
 Prompted versus Spontaneous. During dialogic reading, it is normal for the adult to ask 
questions and prompt reading behaviors. In the present study, a child could have provided data 
spontaneously or in response to a question. Questions and prompts focused the child’s attention 
and encouraged cognitive and metacognitive processing. I categorized data as prompted if the 
child’s talk or actions responded to my question or prompt within the same speech turn or within 
one additional speech turn. All other data was considered spontaneous. Table 22 provides a 
breakdown of spontaneous versus prompted data by coding category. 
Table 22 
Proportion of Prompted versus Spontaneous Metacognitive Instances 
Category Prompted Spontaneous 
Task Planning 25% 75%  
Verbal Self-Revising 13% 87%  
Expanding Storytelling 0% 100% 
Reflecting on Reading 24%  76%  
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Category Prompted Spontaneous 
Justifying Verbalizations 95% 5% 
Feeling of Knowing Story 
Content 
75% 25% 
Judgment of Difficulty 100% 0% 
 Four out of the seven categories of metacognition in the present study (Planning, 
Revising, Expanding, and Reflecting) were more likely to be spontaneously communicated, 
meaning that I did not directly prompt that type of statement or behavior in the present or a prior 
speech turn. This degree of spontaneity lends credence to the conclusion that such young 
children were not mimicking. On the contrary, their verbalizations were very much in their own 
words. For example, Dylan said “I mean” or “I said [that] by accident” when he spontaneously 
revised himself. Erin’s unique self-correction language included “I mixed up.”  
Three of seven categories (Justifying, Feeling of Knowing, and Judging Difficulty) were 
much more likely to have been prompted—evinced in response to a question from the researcher. 
Prompted metacognition was not necessarily less metacognitive. Due to the lack of a social 
model for and practice with expressing thoughts about the difficulty of a book, I was not 
surprised that Judgments of Difficulty had to be prompted. However, I was somewhat surprised 
that Feelings of Knowing and Justifying were mostly prompted, as these actions have analogues 
in the social world of the preschooler. In the final analysis, these three categories were the most 
tangential to the act of reading itself, and that may explain the need for prompting. Since the 
proportion of spontaneous to prompted metacognition occurred in the context of an exploratory 
study without standardized procedures, more research must be conducted to determine if some 
metacognition is consistently more likely to be evinced spontaneously. 
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All metacognitive prompts resulted in an intelligible verbal response. Most metacognitive 
prompts resulted in a metacognitive response. Other outcomes included codable utterances that 
were not metacognitive or no response. Though data collection was interrupted by activity in the 
classroom, environmental interruptions only affected Fiona. I attributed this outcome to 
coincidence. As shown in Table 23, participants had varying response rates to prompts, from 
60% to 91% of metacognitive prompts returning metacognitive utterances. Failed prompts 
represented all categories except Planning, Expanding Storytelling, and Feeling of Knowing. I 
also posed at least one Metamemory prompt to each participant. This coverage increased 
confidence that the exclusion of this category was due to failure to meet evidentiary standards 
and not limited data. 
Table 23 
















Bert 28 23 5    
Chris 9 7 *2    
Dylan 22 16 4 2   
Erin 20 12 *7 1   
Fiona 42 31 6 3 2  
Gabby 20 14 *6    
Helen 24 22 2    
Note. * indicates that participant had one response of “I don’t know” that was considered a 
deflection as opposed to an introspective self-report. 
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Case Impressions of Participants’ Metacognition During Joint Storybook Reading 
Returning to Flavell’s model, I composed narrative impressions for three categories of 
results for each participant: an impression of emergent literacy status based on book handling 
and pretend and dialogic reading behaviors (Clay, 1991; Sulzby, 1985), an impression of 
emergent comprehension of the structured information presented in the storybooks (Kintsch, 
1998; Stahl, 2014), and an impression of the child’s emergent metacognition based on my coding 
scheme (Whitebread et al., 2009). These divisions allow me to discuss not only metacognition, 
but also each participant’s emergent literacy knowledge and repertoire of actions applied to the 
study’s task.  
Bert: 4 Years, 8 Months at Start of Study 
 Bert was a serious participant and focused on the task at hand. I did not have to repeat 
any questions or prompts or redirect any off-task behavior. Bert seemed comfortable in the 
preschool classroom setting, and he willingly participated in reading sessions during free-choice 
center time. Though Bert was not loquacious, when he did speak, he mostly used conventional 
syntax and only occasionally confused verb tenses. All of his speech was intelligible, though he 
sometimes spoke very quietly, as he did in general in the classroom.  
Bert’s emergent literacy behaviors. Bert handled books with ease, waiting politely for 
an introduction based on the cover and then turning page by page from front to back. He evinced 
his knowledge that print carries meaning when he asked, “What does that say?” with interest and 
energy while pointing to a picture of a cookbook in Pancakes for Breakfast.  
Bert thought of a book as a “meaning container” and thought of himself as a “meaning 
maker” (Dooley & Matthews, 2009, p. 29). In addition to his own informative storytelling and 
dialogue, he noted that the little old lady “read” a cookbook to achieve her goal of making 
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pancakes. Bert provided pretend readings for all books, but he typically did not volunteer more 
information than what was requested through questions or prompts. Bert did spontaneously 
report that he could read and that he had read from his children’s prayer book. However, Bert did 
not conventionally read text during this study. Contrary to Sulzby’s (1985) concerns about print 
awareness resulting in refusal to pretend read from the pictures, Bert’s awareness of print and 
understanding of the role that print plays in reading did not hinder his rendering of stories from 
the pictures.  
 Bert’s emergent comprehension. Bert showed some sophistication with story 
comprehension. However, his quiet nature resulted in less data available to analyze the true depth 
of his understanding. In Pancakes for Breakfast, Bert confidently pointed to thought bubbles as a 
display of the little old lady’s thoughts, and he also communicated his insight that not many 
books have thought bubbles. Bert expressed two misconceptions (that the little old lady did not 
know how to make pancakes and that the animals did) while working with Pancakes. These 
isolated misconceptions did not undermine his comprehension of the gists, and he corrected one 
of them.   
 Bert was better able to form renderings of scenes across repeated readings without direct 
instruction or cues from the researcher. The sample of joint reading data below compares Bert’s 
rendering of page 18 of the wordless Pancakes from his 2nd and his 3rd reading. I coded this 
exchange as an example of Bert engaging in Expanding Storytelling, one of the seven final 
categories of metacognition in this study: 
2nd Reading 
Bert: And then she got something from the man. 
R: What’d she get? 
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Bert: I don’t know.  
R: What does it look like she got? 




Bert: Then she got syrup from the man who sells syrup. 
 Bert’s third reading demonstrated a better integration of important information in this 
scene. Between the second and third reading, without redirection or training, Bert Expanded his 
storytelling to account for the fact that the sought object was syrup and the pictured man was a 
syrup salesman. Though Bert did not report on his change in storytelling (and probably could not 
- though I did not try to find out), I concluded that some internal drive to reconsider the text 
spurred his change in storytelling.  
Bert’s emergent metacognition. Bert was not necessarily loquacious or ambitious in his 
storytelling, but he was still metacognitive. Bert did not make many spontaneous comments of 
any type, and two-thirds of his metacognition was prompted. Though Bert did not provide 
extensive verbal data, he could be metacognitive on his own or when prompted. Bert’s case 
impression thus supports the use of methods that distinguish a young child’s quantity and quality 
of talk from the relevance of metacognition to whatever task the child is working on. Bert’s 
quieter nature, however, did necessitate more questions and prompts from me. Overall, Bert 
evinced every type of metacognition except Planning.  
Reflecting on Reading. Bert engaged in both spontaneous and prompted Reflection. One 
of his spontaneous examples was social in nature. While I was working with Helen, Bert joined 
the conversation and announced that he could read and that he reads his prayers at night. Bert 
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saw Helen “reading” and wanted to let us know that he could do it, too. Bert and Helen were able 
to discuss being in a community of readers.  
Feeling of Knowing. The esoteric pictured objects in Pancakes offered plentiful 
opportunities to be stumped or to learn about new words or ideas. For example, on page 4 of 
Pancakes, the little old lady puts on an apron before she begins cooking. During his initial 
session with Pancakes, Bert interrupted his story construction to try to obtain a name for this 
unknown object that the protagonist was taking an action with:  
Bert: What’s that? (points to little old lady’s white apron) 
R: That’s an apron. 
[Bert doesn’t seem satisfied and continues to look at the apron versus continuing with his 
rendering of the story.] 
 
Though the majority of Bert’s Feelings of Knowing were prompted, this one spontaneous 
example indicated that he was actively monitoring whether he knew what he needed to know to 
tell the story, and that he was willing to change his text interaction behavior mid-stream to do 
something about not knowing.  
Judgment of Difficulty. The five times that I could pose a Judgment prompt with Bert (the 
others were skipped due to low stamina at the end of sessions), Bert always ruled that the books 
were “easy.” However, his varying explanations for why a book was easy referenced different 
aspects of readings: “the words,” “the pictures,” and specific content such as “the fireflies.” His 
explanations referenced different, real sources of difficulty and suggested active meta-processing 
of his experience of reading the text. 
For example, during the first reading of Pancakes, Bert indicated that the pictures made it 
easy to understand the storyline. Since pictures are a main source of information for a pre-reader, 
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and since Bert spent time looking at and discussing the pictures in this wordless picture book, I 
assumed that he was reporting on his ease of making sense out of this story: 
R: Was that story easy, medium, or hard to understand? 
Bert: Easy. 
R: Why was it easy? 
Bert: ‘Cause the pictures. 
 
Task-Related Planning. Bert did not evince any Planning. His lack of Planning may have 
resulted from a tendency to accept tasks as an adult presents them and not necessarily from a 
lack of ability to actively plan his interactions with a book.  
Verbal Self-Revising. Many instances of verbal monitoring were straightforward 
corrections of verbalizations mid-stream. These instances were interpreted as indicative of 
monitoring of a mental model of the story and one’s intended communication about the story. 
Children sometimes misspeak, and they do not always express their ideas with verbal fluidity.  
Though the substance of verbal self-corrections were not necessarily profound, Self-Revising still 
indicated monitoring of performance or communication relative to an intention. For example, 
when asked to retell Duckling after the third reading, Bert started to say that the baby ducks were 
looking for the errant ducking, but then he self-corrected his verbalization mid-stream to indicate 
that the mother duck was doing the searching:  
R: Can you tell me in your own words what it was about? 
Bert: They was tryin’ to find, um, [pause], um, the mama duck was trying to find the 
baby duck, so she found all of them. 
 
Expanding Storytelling. Bert engaged in one spontaneous Expansion of Storytelling as a 
metacognitive act. During his second reading of Mother, on page 35, Bert spontaneously added 
that he thought the baby bird was thinking, following our discussion about the baby bird being 
177 
 
sad. I interpreted this vignette as resulting from Bert’s desire to communicate the details that he 
felt were important. Adding that the baby bird was pensive in the middle of the story provided a 
fuller accounting of this character’s inner state as he strived to resolve his conflict: 
 
R: Look at his eyes, yeah. Let’s see what happens next. 
 
Bert: And, he’s thinking. 
 Bert had other instances of providing more details that were not necessarily 
metacognitive. For example, he progressed from picture shyness and refusal on the first reading 
of Firefly to commenting during the third reading that he wanted to add to my read aloud that 
other fireflies are coming. He was able to provide more information or elaborate when prompted 
to do so. For example, from his second to third reading of Pancakes, Bert accounted for more 
information when asked what the book was about while looking at the front cover: 
2nd reading 
R: You said we read this before. What’s it called? 
Bert: Um, pancakes. 
 
3rd reading 
Do you remember what it’s about? 
Bert: Making pancakes. 
R: Who does that? 
Bert: The lady and, and all the animals.  
 
Justifying Verbalizations. During the second reading of Mother, Bert explained that he 
knew which bird the Mother was based on her scarf. Later, during the third reading, Bert 
supplied a second way to know which bird was the Mother bird—because she was the larger of 
the two birds. These varying answers showed that Bert was reasonably responding to different 
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sources of information to make sense of the story. In response to the Justifying prompts, he was 
able to report this information. 
During his third reading of Duckling, Bert paraphrased the text’s refrain (“Have you seen 
my duckling?”) as a source of meaning in this picture book with few words: 
Bert: It says, “Have you saw my duckling?” 
R: Yeah, [the Mother duck] says, “Have you seen my duckling?” How’d you know she 
keeps saying that? 
Bert: Because the words. 
Bert’s varying replies served to triangulate the conclusion that Bert understood my 
request for justification and engaged in second level processing of his first level claims. 
Theory of Mind and Metacognitive Language. Stories that present the perspectives of 
multiple characters can naturally invoke a child’s theory of mind. Across texts, Bert was able to 
see things from the perspective of the main characters. He communicated the false belief leading 
the firefly to approach glowing objects. He knew that thought bubbles are representational. In 
another example, during the third reading of Are You My Mother?, Bert spontaneously 
articulated not only the baby bird’s uniquely limited perspective, but the reason for it: 
R: Does he know that he has a Mother? 
Bert: No, because he was in the egg. And the Mother was not. 
Bert understood the metacognitive language that I used, and he used the metacognitive 
terms know and think spontaneously in his dialogue with me. In his third reading of Pancakes, 
Bert demonstrated how hard it can be to ascertain the validity of a child’s use of metacognitive 
language – i.e., whether using a mental state term is truly metacognitive. At the very least, the 
second part of this exchange represented a reflective exchange about reading and learning: 
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R: How’d you know that milk makes butter? 
Bert: Because – you have to stir it up – like that (pointing to butter churning page). 
R: OK, did you learn that from the book or did your mommy tell you? 
Bert: Umm, I think I learned it in the book. 
Chris: 4 Years, 6 Months at Start of Study 
 Chris was an energetic and willing study participant, though somewhat unaware of the 
format of dialogic reading. He frequently requested to read a book other than the one presented. 
Once, when I asked him what the Snort in Mother was really called, he excused himself from the 
table to ask his classroom teacher. He enjoyed reading with me and spontaneously contributed 
many comments, some of which were relevant. However, Chris exhibited some communicative 
immaturity. For example, after I told him my name was “Mrs. Faust” he called me “Mr. Fow.” 
His syntax was still developing, resulting in verbalizations such as “the mama comed” to the 
baby ducks. Chris’ volume and rate of speech seemed appropriate, yet a portion of his verbal 
data had to be coded as “unintelligible” due to pronunciations influenced by his immature 
articulation.  
Chris’s emergent literacy behaviors. Chris slid books across tabletops as if they were 
toy trucks. After I taped down the end pages of Mother, Chris forced the pages apart again, 
resulting in ripping that was a little louder than my attempts to redirect him. Despite Chris’ 
rambunctious book handling, however, he did not have any page turning difficulties, and he 
adroitly rotated Duckling to correspond to the underwater scene and rotated the book back on the 
next page without interrupting the flow of his storytelling.  
Although Chris was not yet reading conventionally, he noticed print and responded by 
asking “What that say?” Chris also showed concept of word. For example, on the first page of 
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Duckling, he pointed to each word in the phrase “Early one morning” while saying “Have you 
seen my duckling?” Sometimes, Chris divided his attention between naming the letters he knew 
and pretend reading from the pictures. Chris’ budding print awareness also resulted in searching 
for text that wasn’t present, though not a refusal to engage in pretend reading when he didn’t find 
it: 
Chris: [Peruses the wordless pages 2-3 with a quizzical expression but does not speak.] 
 Chris: You say it. 
R: There’s no words anywhere. You gotta tell me what’s happening. 
Chris: The momma’s coming. 
 
Overall, Chris shifted between attending to print, pointing to words, and providing 
pretend readings based on the pictures. These behaviors were part of his emergent literacy 
repertoire and worked together, not against each other.  
 Chris’s emergent comprehension. On multiple occasions, Chris showed a sort of behind-
the-curtains meta-awareness of the story as a produced work. For example, he took on a Darth 
Vader voice to make his storytelling more interesting and feigned shock at the picture of the 
airplane with eyes in Mother. However, Chris’ understanding was hard to assess through 
traditional question and answer procedures, due to his variant response patterns. In addition to 
providing unintelligible responses, Chris would often simply ignore comprehension questions 
that I posed. Occasionally, however, he would provide an unexpected outpouring of verbal data 
that provided glimpses into his macro-level comprehension: 
R:  The baby bird could not what though?  
Chris: [No response.] 
R: What could he not do? 
Chris: I think…. 
R: Yeah, what ….? 
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Chris: I think… he looking for mama. I think a lot of “aminal” you can miss seeing but 
my mama know I am.  
 
 Chris’s emergent metacognition. Chris had a correspondingly rambunctious metacognitive 
profile characterized by instances of metacognition that indicated conscious control of the task 
and some self-monitoring. However, these moments did not necessarily enhance comprehension 
or meaningful dialogic participation. 
Reflecting on Reading. When Chris was initially presented with the wordless Pancakes, 
he studied the first few pages before responding that he was not sure if he was familiar with this 
story. The fact that he said that he was not sure showed that he was reflectively aware; 
sometimes a reader has to hear more before recalling familiarity. For example, adults can realize 
several pages into a book or several minutes into a movie that they recall a previous encounter. 
Feeling of Knowing. Chris had seven instances of Feeling of Knowing across two books 
(Firefly and Mother). Three of these were spontaneous. For example, twice during Mother, he 
stopped his storytelling mid-stream to ask what the hen and the bulldozer were. These 
spontaneous statements indicated that he wanted to know key information in accordance with his 
desire to understand what was represented in the book. The hen and bulldozer play important 
roles in the story; it was responsible to ask what these things were. His prompted Feelings of 
Knowing revealed more about his orientation to the task. Chris replied during the introduction of 
the first reading of Firefly that he was not sure if he had read the book before.   
Judgment of Difficulty. It was unclear if Chris was familiar with study texts, which might 
affect difficulty. Based on his perceived lack of stamina at the end of each session, I was only 
able to pose the Judgment prompt twice. In response to one prompt, he claimed that his second 
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reading of Firefly was hard “because of all the pages.” Additionally, as we neared the conclusion 
of the first reading, he spontaneously indicated that Pancakes was a “long” story: 
R: So, what was that whole story about? You went so fast… 
Chris: It was because it’s pancakes. (Unintelligible.) That was a long story. 
Task-Related Planning. Chris, a young participant in terms of literary and communicative 
proficiency, exhibited Planning in each study text. I concluded that his Planning was a form of 
conscious and active control over the task. From this perspective, Chris’ instances of physical 
roughness with books that were associated with both announcing and taking control could have 
been a form of active engagement, not simply unwelcome immaturity. For example, during his 
first reading of Firefly, Chris wanted to focus on the glowing fireflies on the last page of the 
book instead of finishing the last few pages. He claimed that the story was over so he could be 
released from the task and look at the glowing firefly page on his own terms: 
Chris: And, that’s the end. 
R: Wait, not yet. Is this really the end? 
Chris: Hey, you glow. [Chris is fascinated by the fireflies on the last page with the 
glowing tails. Instead of acknowledging my question, he enjoys looking at them for a few 
moments.] 
Chris: The end. 
 
Verbal Self-Revising. Chris consistently intended to refer to the hen in Mother as a 
chicken. I was unable to convince him to say hen over the course of three readings. Since 
“chicken” was his intended label, he corrected both the researcher and himself for saying 
anything different. For example, in the second reading of Mother, this exchange took place:  
R: Well, then he came to a hen. And what did he say to the hen?  
Chris: That’s not a hen. That’s a chicken. 
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 Then, during his third reading of Mother, Chris almost said rooster but caught himself 
and said “chicken”: 
R: Then he came to a … (invited Chris to complete my sentence) 
Chris: Roost-, a chicken. 
 Expanding Storytelling. Chris added comments, yet he did not engage in metacognitive 
Expansion of Storytelling. His lack of Expansion seemed to conflict with his inventive and high 
energy interpretations of stories. However, his energetic participatory style did not equate with 
this type of metacognition. The energy that Chris expended on off-task comments and behaviors 
may have lessened his ability to more deeply understand the stories through each reading.  
Justifying Verbalizations. Chris was able to justify his verbalizations, even though I 
found it was hard to pose a Justification prompt due to his distractibility. Chris engaged in two 
Justifications. However, this count could have been affected by study procedures or 
environmental conditions and might therefore belie his ability to justify his thoughts. For 
example, during his second reading of Duckling, Chris spontaneously explained why he claimed 
that the story was over: 
Chris: There is my duckling.  
Chris: The end. 
R: Oh, so, how did it end? 
Chris: I said ‘the end’ because he found his ducky because I didn’t see because he got 
back. He was just right … Look… 
Another exchange, from Chris’ third reading of Mother, provided additional evidence of 
his ability to justify his answers: 
R: How do you know he has a Mother? He doesn’t think he has a Mother.  
Chris: He know … I know it because she’s getting him a worm and her comes to the nest. 
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Chris understood that I wanted him to report on his thought process. He provided a reasonable 
explanation as to how he knew something. He referenced his internally-held, macro-level 
knowledge of the story to provide details yet to come, in order to make sense of his claim about 
the present scene. In other words, he said he knew something because he knew how the story 
ended. Chris’ internal mental model of the story functioned as a mental resource that he could 
access and report on.     
Theory of Mind and Metacognitive Language. In his initial reading of Firefly, Chris 
acknowledged the unique perspective of the humans in the story who keep hearing a noise 
outside they can’t explain (the firefly). This example shows that Chris also used metacognitive 
language as a natural part of his fluent storytelling from the pictures when reading Firefly: 
Chris: Why you guys are talking? 
R: Why you guys are talking? 
Chris: No, why you guys are thinking something’s in here? 
 In his third reading of Duckling, Chris acknowledged the limited knowledge of the 
mother duck versus his omniscience as a reader: 
Chris: So, have you seen my duckling? And the turtle said “no.” 
Chris: (Leans in and whispers as if he’s telling a secret) But there’s a duckling behind 
that turtle… 
This recognition of the false belief at the heart of the story enabled him to convey the 
gist. However, in other exchanges, Chris either did not respond to my question, or his response 
was at least partially unintelligible, precluding my ability to assess his understanding of theory of 
mind issues important to the plot: 
R: Why’d [the firefly] go up to the lightbulb? 






Chris: He’s thinking it was a lightbulb. 
R: But did he know that at first? 
Chris: No response.  
 
Dylan: 4 Years, 9 Months at Start of Study 
 Dylan chose to participate in his sessions, yet he didn’t seem to take much joy in the 
experience. He followed directions and focused on the texts, though sometimes there were 
awkward moments of silence when he didn’t respond to a question or continue a pretend reading 
already in progress. Sometimes Dylan would state that he didn’t want to “read.” In these 
exchanges, he asked the researcher to “read,” and then he would listen attentively and even 
engage in dialogue. Dylan asked the researcher to not only read the books with words but also 
the first reading of the wordless Pancakes. He bounced back in the second reading however, 
reaching for the book and stating, “I want to read it.” By the third reading, he simply commenced 
telling the story from the pictures without any requests to do so. Dylan’s request that I tell the 
story in the first reading of Pancakes could have been due to lack of familiarity with a wordless 
book and/or the dialogic scenario of study sessions. Based on variant performances such as his 
sessions for Pancakes, I attributed Dylan’s refusals to construct the story throughout the study to 
a lack of engagement, not an internal tension between seeking meaning from print versus 
pictures. Furthermore, though Dylan’s syntax was typical for his age, his verbalizations had a 
dispirited quality, making them difficult to understand among the din of classroom noise.   
Dylan’s emergent literacy behaviors. Dylan knew that the cover announced the title 
and that pages are turned from front to back. However, Dylan naively claimed that “everything 
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turned yellow” upon seeing the blank yellow end pages of Duckling. Dylan did not yet read 
conventionally. However, he demonstrated concept of word even when he was prompted to look 
at the pictures in the low-word-count text Duckling [R: There’s no words. Can you tell me this 
story from the pictures? Dylan: “There is words!” (pointing to “Early one morning” on page 1)].  
As he read Duckling, Dylan pointed to the sentence and requested to be told what the text said. 
Upon being told, he repeated the interrogative refrain “Have you seen my duckling?” or a 
paraphrase of it as part of his storytelling - when that phrase appeared. He also intuited that this 
text was a refrain; he did not ask what the text on each page said but instead proceeded as if he 
had the information he needed. In sum, his awareness that meaning comes from print was in 
workable harmony with his ability to tell the story from the pictures. His picture reading was 
mostly in short sentences that conveyed the main action of the scene (e.g., “She woke up”) but 
also frequently included concern for the internal states of the characters that drove the plots (e.g., 
“She wanted to make pancakes.”)  
 Dylan’s emergent comprehension. Across repeated readings, Dylan’s renderings 
remained the same or increased in sophistication. However, Dylan’s low tolerance for playing 
the role of reader in the sessions precluded the posing of many questions during and after 
reading. Dylan was the only participant who recognized the characteristic work of children’s 
author and illustrator Eric Carle, and he relied on this early author schema to relate Firefly to The 
Very Hungry Caterpillar, another popular picture book by Eric Carle. Dylan spontaneously used 
storybook language such as “One day there’s a little house” to start his storytelling for Pancakes 
and “the end” to conclude it. He also used the phrase “and then” to connect actions across pages.   
 Dylan knew that the errant duckling was hiding on each page, that the firefly was looking 
for other fireflies, that the bird made it home to the nest safely, and that the little old lady finally 
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got to eat pancakes. Dylan grasped the gist even when singular propositions escaped him. For 
example, he originally thought that all the characters in Duckling were asking “Have you seen 
my duckling?” In the same reading where he expressed this idea, however, he also accounted for 
the fact that the duckling was indeed purposefully hiding. Incomprehension of a proposition did 
not prevent him from grasping the gist. When he wanted to listen to me read to him without any 
dialogue, I was less able to assess his understanding of specific plot points and devices.   
 Dylan’s emergent metacognition. Dylan had a complicated metacognitive profile. 
Though he had metacognitive data in all categories except Expanding Storytelling, and the 
highest percent of spontaneous metacognition, he was not the most metacognitive about making 
meaning from study texts. Dylan’s emergent metacognitive profile exemplified how verbal data 
is an imperfect medium for the reporting of mental processes, especially for novice readers and 
communicators. Dylan’s high percentage of spontaneity co-occurred with a lack of 
verbalizations; neither finding can be assumed to indicate a lack of thought. A comparison 
illustrates this point; Bert’s low percentage of spontaneous metacognition was most likely due to 
his quiet personality and not a lack of metacognitive capacities. Dylan’s spontaneity cannot be 
inferred to represent above-average metacognition, as he expended much of his metacognitive 
efforts on abdicating his role as an active participant in joint reading and transferring the 
responsibility for storytelling back to the researcher. 
Reflecting on Reading. Dylan had 14 instances of Reflecting, in all books except the 
wordless Pancakes. Eleven of these came from his interest in the large, simple refrain of 
Duckling. Overall, Dylan knew that reading is about making meaning, and that meaning can 
come from the printed text, illustrations, and/or thoughts from within. Dylan used the term 
“reading” to refer to the variable mental work of meaning-making: telling the story from the 
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pictures, reading printed text, and even answering questions about the book. Whereas Dylan’s 
preferences for who reads were coded as Planning, his multiple requests to be told what the text 
said were coded as Reflecting on Reading. Reflecting concerned what he thought reading was, 
what a reader should do, and how that text should be read as distinct from controlling who did 
this work. Dylan’s 11 Reflections during Duckling varied. In the first and third readings, he 
constantly asked what the text said, though the text says the same thing on each page once past 
the introductory “Early one morning…” In his second reading however, Dylan actually did 
something with his Reflections. He requested to know what the titular refrain said, internalized it 
upon being told, and repeated it verbatim or in a paraphrased form in subsequent storytelling. 
Dylan also expressed a different dimension of Reflecting in his third reading of Firefly, wherein 
he spontaneously articulated his emerging author schema for Eric Carle. The following exchange 
exemplifies this form of active, self-reference to his inner world while reading: 
R: Did you like that book?  
Dylan: [Nods yes.] 
R: Why? 
Dylan: I saw the little caterpillar on Netflix.  
R: It’s the same author; his name is Eric Carle. He wrote The Very Lonely Firefly and 
The Very Hungry Caterpillar.  
R: What happened in The Very Hungry Caterpillar? 
Dylan: He ate food, and he turned into a butterfly. 
R: Is he (pointing to firefly) going to turn into a butterfly?  
Dylan: No.  
 
Dylan did not confuse the two books; rather, he recognized a common format from the 
same author. This spontaneous connection from his long-term memory also indicated that Dylan 
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was actively listening and tacitly participating, even when being read to because he didn’t “want 
to read.” 
Feeling of Knowing. Dylan had two instances of Feeling of Knowing. Both occurred 
while reading Firefly and one was prompted and one spontaneous. Though the text and 
illustrations in all study texts likely posed some moments of not knowing, participants could 
choose a variety of mental processes to cope with that challenge. In Duckling, Dylan called a 
pictured boat dock a “bridge” and a “house” —presumably because he didn’t know what a dock 
was. His lack of hesitation or delay in using these terms as part of his storytelling suggested that 
he was not aware that he did not know what was pictured or did not know the term “dock.” 
Either way, he did not stop to ask. Dylan’s two Feelings of Knowing concerned not knowing 
which firefly was the titular lonely firefly and a plot point from The Very Hungry Caterpillar. 
Dylan’s spontaneous Feeling of Knowing concerned the stylistic visuals of Eric Carle:  
Dylan: (pointing to a firefly in a group of identical fireflies on pages 25-26) Is this the 
 lonely firefly? 
 
Dylan’s prompted Feeling of Knowing concerned his own memory of related content: 
 R: What happened in The Very Hungry Caterpillar? 
 Dylan: He ate food and he turned into a butterfly.  
 …. 
 R: Why did [he] turn into a butterfly? 
 Dylan: I don’t remember.  
In the first example, Dylan made the rare extra effort of asking what something was 
because he didn’t know and wanted to know relative to his own desired level of understanding. It 
was not clear how these metacognitive behaviors affected his comprehension, though these 
instances provided evidence that Dylan did have some form of active working concept of 
knowing and understanding as relevant to reading a book.  
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Judgment of Difficulty. Dylan often lost patience for the reading sessions, regardless of 
the book. Dylan was typically ready to change activities quickly when the book was over or 
announced that he was done as soon as we finished the last page of the book. To not keep him 
longer than he wanted to be there, I chose not to pose the Judgment of Difficulty prompt in seven 
out of 12 opportunities. However, Dylan did provide a categorical response each of the five 
times that I did pose the Judgment prompt, three of which he explained further. Two of his 
explanations referenced specific story content, and one referenced the size of the pages. In this 
example from his third reading of Mother, Dylan provided a plot point that was not accurate as 
spoken but may simply indicate pronoun confusion. However, since I perceived that he was not 
interested in conversing further, I did not seek clarification: 
R: So, was that easy, medium, or hard? 
Dylan: Hard. 
R: Why was it hard? 
Dylan: ‘Cause she was trying to find him.  
 
Being able to pose the Judgment prompt at the end of each reading allowed for 
comparison across readings. For his first reading of Firefly, Dylan claimed that the book was of 
“medium” difficulty because “the pages were all big.” At the end of his second reading, 
however, Dylan claimed that the book was “medium” because “the firefly was there.” 
Various factors such as interest, familiarity, layout, and content can affect the difficulty 
of a text and/or task for conventional readers, and it appears that Dylan’s sense of difficulty was 
affected by at least three types of factors—story content, physical layout, and his memory of 
relevant information. 
Task-Related Planning. On 12 occasions, eight of which were spontaneous, Dylan made 
a conscious choice about how he wanted to interact with the storybook. Though these exchanges 
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were not necessarily profound, they were conscious and articulated decisions about whether and 
how to start, stop, or proceed through a task backed up by behaviors. Thus, they were a form of 
meta-control of cognitive effort which matched his mood and energy level. For example, he 
asked me to “read” if he didn’t feel like saying anything. He would variably insist that he be 
allowed to “read” when he felt like it. His Planning suggested a form of assertive self-
management concerning how he wanted to interact with the study texts. These instances also 
suggest that he felt comfortable with doing more than just responding to what was in front of 
him; he expressed preferences for how to participate in a book reading experience, even variable 
preferences within one reading session.  
Verbal Self-Revising. Dylan had nine instances of Self-Revision, which represented 
nascent self-monitoring. All were spontaneous but were limited to Mother and Pancakes. In the 
below example from the third reading of Mother, Dylan’s simple verbal self-correction 
suggested that he had a representational mental intention as to what to communicate; if he 
misspoke, he wanted to correct himself: 
Dylan: He said to a kitten “Where is my ... are you my Mother?” 
 In his third reading of Pancakes, Dylan insisted on correcting his storytelling and backed 
up his verbalizations with a reexamination of the text: 
R: How do you know she needed syrup? It’s not like she told you. 
Dylan: I mean it’s cat, I mean she needed milk. 
[Dylan flipped back one page to where he had claimed she needed syrup to say the 
correct line for that page (in terms of what he thought it was) even though he already 
mentioned his mistake.]  
Dylan: She needed milk, so she milked the cow. 
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In his second reading of Pancakes, Dylan yet again corrected himself, this time using the 
word “accident” to label his behavior: 
Dylan: She needed syrup. I said butter by accident. 
Expanding Storytelling. Although Dylan’s nine instances of revising showed that he was 
willing and able to revisit his stream of verbalizations, Expanding storytelling across distinct 
sessions may have posed a different type of challenge. Dylan may have provided more correct 
information on subsequent readings, as shown in the example below, but he did not have clear 
instances of metacognitive Expansion of Storytelling. In his first reading of Duckling, Dylan 
erroneously claimed that all the characters were asking where the missing duckling was. 
However, in his second reading, his response to my question showed corrected - but not 
necessarily expanded - understanding: 
Dylan: Have you seen my duckling? 
R: Yeah, who said that? 
Dylan: The mudder duck.  
It is not known if Dylan had any conscious connection whatsoever between his first claim 
concerning this matter and his second; therefore, it cannot be coded as Expansion. The 
metacognitive nature of Expansion does rest upon the reader’s capacity for growth. However, not 
all growth is known to occur for metacognitive reasons. Dylan learned or realized; he was wrong 
one time and right the next. He changed his reading, even if he could not discuss doing so.  
Justifying Verbalizations. Dylan was not always willing or able to provide a justification 
in response to a prompt to do so. Dylan had three Justifications—two from Mother and one from 
Pancakes. For example, in his first reading of Mother, Dylan justified his answer without 
hesitation by referring to specific facts from earlier in the story: 
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R: So, all these animals are not his Mother. How do you know he has a Mother? 
Dylan: ‘Cause he hatched from her egg. 
In his second reading of Pancakes, Dylan rooted his justification in self-reference: 
R: (starts the session with the book on page 1) What happens at the beginning of the 
story? 
Dylan: She was gonna make pancakes. 
R: Really? How do you know that? 
Dylan: I read (present tense) the book before.  
 
 The examples above represent high confidence coding, wherein Dylan’s data appears to 
match what he was really thinking. However, one of his three Justifications (on page 4 of his 
first reading of Mother) had to be coded with lower confidence due to a lack of specificity: 
R: How do you know that’s the mommy? 
Dylan: In the picture.  
 In addition to ignoring five prompts for Justification throughout the study or not 
providing expected specificity, some of Dylan’s responses to this prompt did not even meet the 
threshold for a low-confidence coding and were therefore excluded. For example, during his 
third reading of Pancakes, Dylan’s use of the metacognitive term know had to be excluded from 
consideration as an instance of Justification because of the generality of his verbalization: 
R: How did you know she needed butter? 
Dylan: ‘Cause I know. 
Theory of mind and metacognitive language. Dylan used varied metacognitive language, 
such as “dream” and “know,” across reading sessions. For example, in his third reading of 
Pancakes, Dylan spontaneously said that dreaming occurs in the brain and is represented by the 
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text feature of thought bubbles. Dylan seemed to use these words knowingly, in a manner that 
showed he understood a character’s thinking and feeling as distinct from his own.  
Dylan: And she was sleeping. Then she woke up. Then she was dreaming about 
pancakes.  
R: You said she was up then you said she was dreaming about pancakes.  
Dylan: Yes. 
R: Show me where she’s dreaming about pancakes.  
Dylan: (Points to thought bubbles.)  
 While reading Mother, Dylan replied that the kitten was thinking “That’s a baby bird” 
and that he was thinking about the baby bird’s “mama.” Dylan provided both of these answers in 
the midst of turning the page, indicating that they seemed to come from his internal stream of 
thoughts. Dylan accounted for the perspective of various characters. For example, he easily 
switched between speaking as the mother bird at the beginning of Mother and then speaking as 
the baby bird once the mother left the nest. Dylan showed proficiency with false belief by 
recognizing that the duckling was hiding from his family even though the character of the mother 
duck did not know that.  
Erin: 4 Years, 1 Month at Start of Study 
 Erin was an eager reader who enjoyed putting words to pages. She enjoyed storytelling 
for its own sake but was quick to express her desire to return to free choice centers when the 
story was over. Erin mixed colloquial expressions such as “lil” for little with more impressive 
expressive vocabulary for her age such as “supposed to” and “eighth”. She did not read 
conventionally, but she did identify letters, words, and sentences. For example, she correctly 
named the letter F on the labeled bag of “Flour” in Pancakes for Breakfast. Erin attended to print 
and often used a finger to trace sentences with a left to right sweep, but not with one-to-one 
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correspondence. When she spontaneously requested to “read,” she would perform finger sweeps 
of text versus telling the story from the pictures. She was equally adept at constructing the story 
from the pictures, though she did not refer to this behavior as reading. She was a prolific pretend 
reader and often embellished her re-enactments by acting out imagined dialogue representing the 
perspectives of multiple characters in a scene and inserting stress and tone to communicate 
meaning. It was easy to understand Erin, even though her age showed through with expressions 
such as “bittle” for little and “wibbled” for wiggled. She typically spoke in full sentences, 
corresponding to her rendering of full scenes, and often used speech connectors such as “so” and 
“then.” She also used storybook language such as “the end.” 
 Erin’s emergent literacy behaviors. Erin had no problems handling a book. On her first 
reading of Pancakes, she even took the initiative to confirm that she did not have to account for 
the content on the copyright pages [Erin: (pointing at print on the copyright page facing page 1) 
This one’s not for you to read? When told no, Erin moved on to page 1.] Erin understood that she 
could exert control over the joint reading task, and she frequently made spontaneous requests to 
only read certain parts versus the whole book. Erin was distracted by the camera, but when she 
was engrossed, she provided compelling verbal data. Erin knew that her words were interesting 
to the researcher, and she treated the reading sessions as a favor and a duty that she sometimes 
enjoyed doing.  
 Erin’s emergent comprehension. Erin recognized the gist of each story and focused on 
main ideas.  For example, very early in her first reading of Duckling, Erin spontaneously stated a 
main idea that drives the plot: “Mommy duck came and saw one duck was missing.” The only 
text she had heard at that point was the title, Have You Seen My Duckling?, and “Early one 
morning.” She denied prior familiarity with the text. Later in her first reading of Duckling, Erin 
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independently offered another macro level idea that drives the plot: “They swim by and they saw 
the other baby duck, but the mommy couldn’t see her.” Since the plot of Duckling rests upon the 
Mother duck’s limited knowledge about the location of her duckling hiding nearby, Erin also 
communicated her proficiency with the false belief aspect of theory of mind required to truly 
understand the plot.  
Erin applied her world knowledge and vocabulary to accurately name the objects in the 
stories or to provide reasonable mistaken names. For example, Erin fluently used the animal 
names that she knew to name the pond animals in Duckling (e.g., toucan and catfish). Though a 
toucan belongs in a different ecosystem, Erin’s use of this specific word can be taken as evidence 
of active application of world knowledge. Constructing the story in the wordless Pancakes gave 
Erin an opportunity to say that a character was “disappointed” and that unknown people were the 
little old lady’s “neighbors.” In Mother, she spontaneously used terms such as “wiggled,” “zero,” 
and “towards.”  
However, even though Erin grasped the main ideas and often checked to be sure of her 
claims, she still had some uncorrected misconceptions. For example, in Duckling, she did not 
recognize that the errant duckling returned on pages 20-21. Despite this mishandling of one 
critical proposition, she still articulated that the story ended with a predictable family reunion. 
This finding suggested that story grammar may have been a scaffold for Erin, though in this case 
it seemed to lead to a rhetorical statement versus evidence of comprehension of each proposition 
that led to the story’s outcome. Additionally, in the second reading of Duckling, Erin 
contradicted herself by saying that the runaway duckling never made it home (2nd reading) and 
then that he made it home by sneaking back with the group (3rd reading). I did not cue Erin to 
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change her mind; the prompt that led Erin to provide the correct information in the final reading 
was “Speak up so I can hear you.” 
Erin made reasonable inferences that enhanced her story construction and 
comprehension. For example, she assigned reasonable emotional states to characters, including 
“worried,” “scared,” and “sad.” Erin used inferences to fill in gaps and thus create a holistic 
story. When asked to explain the problem at the conclusion of Pancakes, Erin replied that the 
little old lady scrambled the eggs for too long. The problem was actually that the little old lady’s 
pets ruined her assembly of ingredients to make pancakes. Erin’s reply was incorrect yet 
coherent. 
 Erin’s emergent metacognition. Though one of the youngest participants, Erin was 
quite metacognitive. Her ease with talking and with switching modes from joint book reading to 
joint book discussion may have enabled her to not only be more metacognitive but also 
communicate her metacognition. Though Erin was both communicative and metacognitive, she 
was not necessarily verbally sophisticated. Through the joint reading methodology, she evinced 
metacognition through her everyday discourse.  
Reflecting on Reading. Erin had five spontaneous and one prompted instances of 
Reflection. For example, during her third reading of Pancakes, Erin indicated that she forgot the 
word “cookbook,” and asked for the word. She was reflectively aware that she forgot a word she 
knew (Erin: I mean... ughh...what’s that called again?). She knew that she knew the word but 
couldn’t produce it at that moment. This example is akin to an adult reporting having a tip of the 
tongue moment, one of Flavell’s (1979) classic examples of everyday metacognition.  
198 
 
Feeling of Knowing. Erin was actively concerned with whether she knew important 
information or aspects of the task. She had both spontaneous and prompted Feelings of Knowing. 
She did not hesitate to ask what a pictured object was or what the text said. In her second reading 
of Pancakes, she asked about whether she should attend to the copyright page, also the start of 
the pictures that tell the story. While reading Duckling, she said that the ducks swam “toward the 
thingy – whatever you call it …” (a boat dock).  
Judgment of Difficulty. A Judgment prompt was planned for the end of each reading. 
However, due to the child’s perceived stamina for that session, the prompt was not always given. 
Erin was prompted to make a Judgment of Difficulty for each text except Mother. Out of four 
prompts, Erin replied twice, both times indicating that the Firefly and Duck books were “easy.” 
After her second reading of Firefly, Erin explained that it was easy “because I know the way it 
goes.” This reasonable reply contrasted with how she responded to the Judgment of Difficulty 
prompt in the first reading—by estimating the length of the book cover in inches.  
Task-Related Planning. During the first reading of Mother, the longest book in this study, 
I requested that Erin tell the story from the beginning. Erin countered with “It’s going to take too 
long. I like this part” and turned to pages 20-21 (the scene where the baby bird unknowingly 
walks past his Mother). Erin, who generally relished reading with the researcher, was cajoled 
into some dialogic reading from the beginning. However, aware that she did not have the 
patience on this day to cover the remainder of the book page by page, she spontaneously 
requested: “How ‘bout we go to the end, so it can be quick?” This incident also indicated task 
awareness and an awareness of a story as comprised of a beginning, middle, and end – both 
physically and in terms of content. 
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Verbal Self-Revising. During the third reading of Are You My Mother, Erin announced for 
pages 42-43 “Are you my air…I was about to say, ‘Are you my airplane?’” Erin chuckled at her 
mistake and restarted her storytelling with “Are you my mommy?” Through repeated readings of 
Are You My Mother? (pages 20-21), Erin exhibited a more nuanced form of self-correction that 
can occur over time as the child has more opportunity to approximate what the author intended. 
In her second reading, she nodded affirmatively in response to my question to indicate that the 
baby bird knew what his mom looked like. In contrast, her response to this question during the 
third reading showed an expanded and more nuanced interpretation of the story:
2nd Reading 
R: Even if he could see her, does he know what she looked like? 
Erin: [Nods yes.] 
R: He does? 
Erin: [No response.] 
 
3rd Reading 
Erin: …he couldn’t see him – her– because he was behind this plug rock (taps rock) 
R: Does he know what she looks like? 
Erin: No. 
R: Why not? 
 
Erin: Because he haven’t seen him [her]. 
 
Expanding Storytelling. Fewer than half of participants engaged in true metacognitive 
Expansion; Erin was one of them. Erin’s Expansions involved spontaneously adding more details 
to her story constructions. The details she added were meaningful and accurate but not 
necessarily profound. For example, in a subsequent reading of Mother, she added that the car 
was “broken.” The fact that the car appeared broken helped to explain why it was stationary in a 
field. Also, though the setting of the book was modern enough to feature a jet plane, the car was 
antique. Since I did not cue the participants to tell me more, I interpreted Erin’s two spontaneous 
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Expansions as evidence that she became increasingly engrossed in the story across readings due 
to some internal drive to know, understand, integrate, and explain more.                                                                                                         
 Justifying Verbalizations. In her second reading of Mother, Erin volunteered information 
in the second sentence to explain the first: “Yeah, and he’s scared of the boom. Because he’s a 
baby.” This unique spontaneous justification provided the same content that would have been 
sought by the Justification prompt “Why do you think that?” The rest of Erin’s Justifications 
were in response to my prompts. For example, in her second reading of Duckling, when asked, 
Erin articulated why she counted the ducklings in the pictures: 
Erin: Mommy ducking came … and she … counted 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and the eighth is gone. 
R: The eighth one is gone? 
Erin: Uh-huh. [Erin counts again to confirm.]  
Erin: Yes. 
R: How’d you know how to count to figure out who was gone? 
Erin: Because - if I say the number, I try to count, so I can know if it’s right. 
In her third reading of Pancakes, Erin explained, in response to my inquiry, that she 
makes up the words in her brain. In the two prior readings, I had simply asked her to tell me the 
story. In the initial reading, she focused on the lack of words. In the second reading, she accepted 
the task of making up the words. In the third and final reading, she gave the following 
metacognitive explanation of how she knows what to say to tell a story without words:  
Erin: I’m gonna make up my words now. 
R: You’re gonna make up your words now? 
Erin: Yeah, because there’s no words.  
R: Now how do you know what words to say, though? 




Theory of Mind and Metacognitive Language. Erin masterfully communicated the false 
beliefs essential to story plots. In Duckling, Erin correctly answered that the other ducklings did 
not know the whereabouts of the missing duckling and that the Mother just wasn’t looking where 
he was hiding.  In Firefly, Erin spontaneously communicated the essential false belief through 
these scene-level page renderings from her first reading: “Is that a firefly? No, that’s just a light.” 
And “Is that a firefly? A very lonely firefly? No, that’s just a candle.” These readings, not from 
rote memory of the printed text, were triangulated with her macro-level response during this 
exchange from page 3 of the second reading:  
R: Anything you want to add? 
Erin: He thinks some of these lights, um, are the um, fireflies, but they’re just some 
others, but then he found the firefly.        
This exchange also exemplified her use of metacognitive language – “think” – to convey a 
theory of mind concept.  
In her third reading of Mother, Erin explained the limited perspective of the baby bird: 
Erin: He looked right past his Mother.  
R: Why? 
Erin: Because, he couldn’t see him – her- because he was behind this plug rock 
(demonstratively taps picture of rock). 
R: Does he know what she looks like? 
Erin: No. 
R: Why not? 
Erin: Because he haven’t seen him. 
Revisiting this vignette illustrated Erin’s reliance on her developing theory of mind and 
false belief capabilities to attain comprehension of this narrative. Erin had to integrate 
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information that was spread across multiple pages and then rely on this insight to arrive at her 
answer. Holding this information in mind should help any reader of this story better understand 
the obstacles to goal attainment that the baby bird faced. In sum, this relatively small answer 
indicated a larger amount of comprehension processing than what is expressed on the verbal 
surface.  This vignette illustrated that young children may be thinking much more than is 
expressed in any one answer. 
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Erin correctly interpreted the first thought bubble in Pancakes but not the second. Again, 
she used the term think in conjunction with her expression of theory of mind through the first 
thought bubble: 
Erin: She was thinking about pancakes! 
R: How’d you know she was thinking about pancakes? 
Erin: [Taps thought bubble.] 
Erin used the most and the greatest range of metacognitive language in the wordless 
Pancakes, to both tell the story and to report on her storytelling processes. For example, she 
spontaneously stated that the little old lady “decided” that she would make pancakes. She also 
explained that she “mixed up” when she made a mistaken verbalization, said “I mean” when 
correcting herself, and explained that she “forgot” what the cookbook was called. These 
instances of metacognitive language were associated with the cognitive function of storytelling 
and the metacognitive functions of Reflecting on Reading, Self-Revising, and Feeling of 
Knowing.  
Erin responded to one open-ended thinking prompt by confirming her thorough and 
nuanced understanding of the plot of Firefly. Her response, which is an accurate and integrated 
relaying of the plot line in her own words, suggested that open-ended thinking prompts 
facilitated comprehension processing just as well as comprehension questions: 
R: I’m thinking in my head “He’s flying around by himself!” What are you thinking? 
Erin: I’m thinking the sun’s going down and he comes out at night and he doesn’t see 
 nothing and there’s no fireflies for him to play with. 
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Fiona: 4 Years, 1 Month at Start of Study 
 Friendly and agreeable, Fiona politely agreed to attend all reading sessions to which she 
was invited. However, she often invited her close friend Gabby to accompany her. Though Fiona 
willingly participated in the reading sessions, it seemed that her inexperience with the dialogic 
format may have limited her output. Her syntax was often immature and non-standard, yet her 
verbalizations were still logical and interpretable. For example, “And then she maked pancakes” 
was easily understood to mean “and then she made pancakes.” Her verbal output also hinted at 
connections between syntax and comprehension; she used the conjunction “and” to connect 
discrete ideas in her storytelling versus integrating ideas into a more complex sentence that 
would relay a scene (e.g., Fiona: There’s the pancakes and she’s wanting to eating them).  
 Fiona’s emergent literacy behaviors. Fiona handled books properly but not necessarily 
efficiently. She turned the pages front to back at a leisurely pace. Fiona was not yet reading 
conventionally, and she displayed inconsistency in her concepts about print and words. Pancakes 
features a cookbook with an actual pancake recipe and several labeled objects, such as a bowl 
labeled “eggs” and a sack labeled “flour.” Fiona recognized that the cookbook was a book, but 
she did not show any concern for the abundant labels or letters. However, when introduced to 
Mother, Fiona showed concept of print by pointing to the title on the cover and announcing, “It 
says ‘Are You My Mother?’” She did not hesitate to tell a story from the pictures, though her 
verbal data did not always provide detailed information, such as seen in her first reading of 
Pancakes when she said, “And she’s making it and making it and making it.” 
 Fiona’s emergent comprehension. Fiona’s storytelling varied within and across 
readings. She frequently labeled discrete elements or actions in the illustrations (without any 
sense of a uniting story structure) and then suddenly articulated the gist or otherwise engaged in 
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talk that was semantically connected across discrete scenes or pages. Fiona represented dialogue 
between characters and used the connecting phrase “and then…” to connect her rendering across 
pages. Fiona struggled with misconceptions and lack of available background knowledge to 
make complete sense of study texts. For example, she initially claimed that the nocturnal firefly 
goes to sleep at night and that the old car in Mother was a “tractor.” She never figured out that 
the little old lady was making butter in the churn or more globally that she never successfully 
made pancakes. Had she been tasked with multiple choice comprehension questions about these 
matters, she might have performed very poorly. Her difficulty with details could have functioned 
as impetuses for Expansion or Verbal Self-Revision, but they typically did not. Instead, they 
remained discrete points of incomprehension that did not prevent her from grasping the gists and 
formulaic endings—that the little old lady did eat pancakes (even if she did not make them) and 
that the unknown vehicle was one more thing that was not the baby bird’s mother (whether it 
was a car or truck). Since comprehension of the gists did not rest on mastery of each detail, 
Fiona’s story renderings were not deterred by her areas of weaknesses. However, Fiona’s 
difficulties with details appeared to create missed opportunities for metacognition to enhance her 
story renderings and comprehension.  
 Fiona often coped with the content of texts and tasks by referring to her personal schema. 
For example, to start the initial reading of Firefly, I told her that “This is a story about a lonely 
firefly. I wonder why he’s lonely and what he will do about it.” Fiona immediately provided the 
autobiographical explanation that the firefly was lonely because “his mom and sisters are going 
to work and they’re going to school.”  She also showed a nuanced appreciation of a hard-
working mother’s perspective, claiming that the mother bird falls asleep at the end of the long 
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ordeal in Mother. This approach also allowed her to add value through the following inference 
made about the internal state of the mother bird in her third reading of Mother: 
 Fiona (spontaneously launching into pretend reading immediately upon sitting down): 
 Here’s the egg and she’s waiting for a crack. 
 R: How long has she been waiting? 
 Fiona: A long time.  
 Fiona: She’s sad and she’s really mad and it’s not cracking.  
 Fiona’s active reliance on her personal life experiences, what might be called text-to-self 
connections for conventional readers (Randi, Grigorenko, & Sternberg, 2005) showed active and 
constructive responsiveness. She did not passively observe text; she actively applied what she 
could to make sense of the story. Fiona’s response to an open-ended thinking prompt posed after 
the opening exposition of The Very Lonely Firefly corroborated this interpretation: 
R: I’m thinking in my head that …he [the lonely firefly] can’t live all by himself. What 
were you thinking about? 
 Fiona: I was thinking about my family.  
 Fiona’s story renderings while interacting with the wordless book Pancakes for Breakfast 
provided more examples of her active and constructive creation of a mental model of the text. 
Pancakes is a wordless book; no refrains restate macro-level information. The main character 
never says, “I’m so frustrated because I can't make the pancakes that I want for breakfast.” A 
lack of words lessens the likelihood that participants could pretend read from their memory of an 
adult reading the text. This reality lends credence to the idea that statements of macro-level 
information would have to arise from a mental model of the text based on some understanding of 
the gist. During her third reading of Pancakes, Fiona exemplified this idea when she stated that 
the little old lady “wants to eat breakfast with pancakes after bedtime” while viewing the 
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opening scene of a cabin in the woods. Memory of prior joint readings could not explain this 
result, as the three ideas embedded in Fiona’s statement were spread across pages and were never 
presented as a unit. Fiona processed them into a unit as she built her mental model of the text.  
 Though Fiona showed evidence that she was actively seeking to understand the stories, 
her capacity for expressing inferential understanding was inconsistent. Her responses to 
comprehension questions indicated straightforward, concrete understandings of textual content. 
Fiona’s orientation towards the concrete was illustrated in this example of her explanation of 
what Pancakes for Breakfast is all about: 
R: Do you remember Pancakes for Breakfast? 
Fiona: Yes. 
R: What’s it about? 
Fiona: Pancakes. 
R: What about pancakes? 
Fiona: You eat them. For breakfast. 
 However, when asked how the little old lady obtained pancakes, Fiona offered the 
reasonable inference that “Gramma” and “Papa” provided them. Additionally, Fiona sometimes 
inferred incorrect information to convey a holistic scene (e.g., She’s shaking it and putting 
frosting in there.”) Through this particular study design, there was no way to know if Fiona was 
not making inferences when she should have or if she did not think that inferential information 
was what was expected in response to certain comprehension questions.  
 In conclusion, evidence of story comprehension was not consistently related to the verbal 
sophistication of the story rendering. Similar to her age-peer Gabby, when Fiona failed to 
understand, it was not due to her inability to recognize whole scenes, verbalize connections 
across pages, or engage in monologic storytelling. Comprehension failures appeared to be a 
function of the various reasons at the root of conventional readers’ comprehension problems: 
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missing or poorly activated schema, a failure to focus on what is most important, or an inability 
to simultaneously weigh multiple pieces of information (see Baker & Brown, 1984).  
Fiona’s emergent metacognition. Fiona was a novice preschooler with pre-conventional 
grammar. She never articulated the false belief structure at the root of the plots of Firefly, 
Duckling, or Mother. She was, however, metacognitive in multiple ways and at multiple 
moments. I identified 28 instances of metacognition across Fiona’s reading data, 17 of which 
were spontaneous. Though 28 is a meaningful number, it is important to also note that Fiona had 
more than 28 opportunities to be metacognitive. Fiona often responded to metacognitive 
questions with “I don’t know.” I interpreted these responses as a deflection of prompted 
introspection and not mindful statements of Feeling of Knowing. Multiple limitations may have 
constrained Fiona’s ability to comfortably report on her understanding and her understanding of 
her understanding. These included lack of familiarity with the type of dialogue in the reading 
sessions and perhaps lack of experience with extended verbal expression of her ideas. Despite 
these, Fiona had 28 compelling moments of metacognition, mostly due to her Expansions of 
Storytelling in second and third readings. These not only added more details, but also conveyed 
increasingly macro-level integration of information.    
Reflecting on Reading. Fiona did not seem inclined towards reflection on herself as a 
reader or reading as an experience. For example, when asked “Does this little old lady make you 
think about anybody?” Fiona simply replied “No.” When I asked her what she thought about the 
little old lady who wanted pancakes, Fiona replied that “She wants to eat them for breakfast.” 
Requests for reflection, like comprehension questions, returned concrete responses that did not 
transcend the text or the content of prior discussion.  
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 Feeling of Knowing. Fiona had one spontaneous and two prompted Feelings of Knowing. 
Based on her emergent literacy profile, I suspected that Fiona might not know some content 
featured in the stories. As discussed earlier concerning her difficulty with accurately naming 
pictured details (e.g., car vs. truck), she fulfilled this presupposition. Concerning Feelings of 
Knowing, Fiona did not spontaneously express her internal condition of not knowing what she 
needed to know. In other words, in contrast to Erin, she did not make meta-level statements 
about her struggle with details. She did not articulate that she did not know certain details and 
that this reality was affecting her reading experience. It is possible that the novelty of both task 
and text consumed all of Fiona’s mental resources, which meant that she might not have been 
aware that she did not know or that she was unable to discuss this experience. During her 2nd 
reading of Pancakes, Fiona gave a response to a Feeling of Knowing prompt that exemplified her 
tendency to deflect additional processing by stating that she didn’t know, as opposed to 
articulating the fact that she didn’t know or spontaneously offering a reasonable guess: 
 R: So, what came out of the big wooden thing? [a butter churn] 
 Fiona: I don’t know. 
 R: What’s that stuff? (indicating yellow butter) 
 Fiona: Oil.    
 Oil is a reasonable guess for butter; it is yellow and is often used in the process of making 
pancakes. However, Fiona required an additional prompt to share that she was thinking that it 
could be oil. This example might indicate that Fiona was not comfortable with devoting internal 
attention to or discussing Feelings of Knowing.  
 Judgment of Difficulty. Fiona rated Pancakes as “hard” because, in her words, she didn’t 
“know how to read.” This response is interesting for a wordless text and may indicate her 
newness to the task of joint meaning making. Due to perceived exertion, I did not prompt Fiona 
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to provide a Judgment of Difficulty at the conclusion of each reading. However, for the two 
additional times that she replied and explained her Judgment, she rated the second reading of 
Firefly as “not hard” and the third reading as “a long book.” This final original response lends 
credence to the assumption that Fiona was expressing her true opinion; it was not an arbitrary or 
mimicked response. 
 Task-Related Planning. Fiona did not exhibit planning behaviors. Since one can 
participate without planning, this finding does not necessarily indicate that she was less 
interested or less invested in the reading sessions. However, a lack of Planning is consistent with 
an inability or a preference not to engage in a meta-level of processing if it was not necessary or 
interesting at the moment.  
Verbal Self-Revising. Fiona did not demonstrate a proactive commitment to resolving 
unknowns or contradictions and rarely revised her statements. She did have two instances of 
Verbal Self-Revising throughout the study. During her third reading of pages 21-22 of Firefly, 
she prematurely claimed “He found his family!” Realizing that she spoke a few pages too soon, 
she stared and pointed at the fireworks contemplatively before offering “Not yet.” During her 
third reading of Pancakes, she also revised herself: 
Fiona: You need eggs too, because that’s what goes in eggs.  
R: OK  
Fiona: I mean pancakes.  
However minor, these two spontaneous instances of revision indicated self-monitoring 
and at least some extra capacity to recall, discuss, and revisit her prior efforts. I did not prompt 
Fiona to revise herself due to concern that she might be overwhelmed by this task or feel that her 
rendering was somehow being discounted.  
211 
 
Expanding Storytelling. In some ways, Fiona’s reading of Pancakes became more 
sophisticated over time. Once, I attributed this change to an elaborated mental model that she 
tacitly Expanded upon. Other elaborations added details but for unknown reasons. Her first 
reading of pages eight to nine of Pancakes yielded the isolated and disjointed comment “There’s 
chickens in the coop.” However, her second reading of these pages yielded the fully explanatory 
“She had to get eggs from the farm to make pancakes.” Her change was not prompted; I never 
asked participants to speak in full sentences. Her variable performance could be described as 
becoming more oriented towards macro-level information. Overall, subsequent readings matched 
or exceeded the sophistication of prior ones, by either providing more plot-dependent details or 
by expanding from discrete labeling to scene-level re-enactment.  
Justifying Verbalizations. Fiona did provide Justifications for statements she made during 
the reading sessions, although these tended to be of a lower quality. When she did justify an 
answer, her justification was limited and concrete or reliant on her constant internal stream of 
thought about family and togetherness. In the excerpt below from her second reading of Firefly, 
Fiona responded to a Justification prompt by referring to themes of family life. Though her 
statement is not inaccurate, it reflects a failure to account for the immediate internal motivation 
of a story character pursuing its goal. However, it explained why she answered the way she did; 
she reported the contents of her mind: 
R: Where’s the lantern? 
Fiona: Right here (points to lantern). 
R: How’d you know that was the lantern? 
Fiona: ‘Cause he wants his family. 
R: ‘Cause he wants his family? 
Fiona: Yes.  
R: Why’d he go up to the lantern? 
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Fiona: ‘Cause he loves his family so much. 
 
Theory of Mind and Metacognitive Language. Fiona spontaneously offered that the 
content of a thought bubble represented the little old lady’s thoughts. Fiona also used the 
metacognitive terms “think” and “decide” spontaneously in her constructed reading of the 
pictures of Pancakes. For her first reading of page 4 of Pancakes, Fiona offered “And she decide 
to put that on (the apron) and she maked and maked it.” During her second reading, when 
confronted with the little old lady’s struggle to churn butter (page 16), Fiona offered the 
following integrative explanation that alluded to the fundamental tension of the plot: “And then 
she tiny little mess. I think she couldn’t do it.” For Fiona, unsophisticated sentences co-occurred 
with use of more advanced terms such as “decide” to convey the internal motivation driving the 
little old lady’s actions and tying them together. Fiona’s use of metacognitive terms to account 
for the internal states of characters helped her to relay the narrative structure of the story. To 
triangulate my interpretation of her verbalizations as true appreciation of characters’ internal 
states, I asked Fiona what the little old lady was thinking. Fiona’s reply of “She want pancakes” 
corroborated that she used metacognitive terms to articulate internal states of the fictitious 
characters as she read about them.  Her pre-conventional sentences and picture labeling 
behaviors contrasted with her moments of metacognition, nuanced storytelling, use of 
metacognitive language, and her working theory of mind. Though Fiona showed developing 
theory of mind, she never articulated the false belief structure at the root of the plots of Firefly, 
Duckling, or Mother. In the example from Firefly discussed above, Fiona referred to personal 
schema instead of the character’s false belief that objects giving light could be the other fireflies 
he was searching for. Fiona’s results may suggest that theory of mind development is uneven, in 
that use of this skill in one part of the story may not correlate with use throughout the story. In 
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conclusion, a lack of verbal sophistication or an immature storytelling profile, per Sulzby’s 
schemata, did not result in the absence of storytelling prowess or metacognition. However, in 
Fiona’s case, less verbal sophistication did co-occur with less and less productive metacognition 
during joint reading. 
Gabby: 4 Years, 1 Month at Start of Study  
Gabby was a friendly, agreeable, and content participant. She was one of the youngest 
children in the study. She seemed to understand the study tasks in general, yet she had difficulty 
in different areas. On multiple occasions, books slid from under her hands. Gabby consistently 
started with the front cover and turned the book’s pages from front to back, just not always one 
by one. Physical page-turning difficulties had cognitive and metacognitive implications when 
they resulted in missing information or opportunities to self-revise. Additionally, Gabby’s syntax 
was still developing (e.g., “He say, ‘Are you my mudder?’”); her use of gender pronouns and 
verb tense and number were irregular. Her speech was clear, however, and she provided a 
sufficient amount of verbal and behavioral data for analysis. 
Gabby’s emergent literacy behaviors. Despite isolated page-turning difficulties, Gabby 
was very engaged in reading sessions. She focused on the pages and provided pretend readings 
without hesitation. She seemed genuinely delighted to drink in the illustrations and provide her 
commentary, which was mostly in the form of labeling—e.g., “There’s the mommy and there’s 
the egg”; “Here’s the chick…” Gabby’s budding print awareness was integrated into her overall 
text interaction repertoire. For example, at the beginning of her third reading of Firefly, Gabby 
spontaneously pointed out “Those are the words!” Gabby was excited to share her print 
knowledge but did not insist that we attend to the print. Instead, she happily accepted a listening 
role as I continued with a read aloud. Gabby did not read conventionally, name specific letters, 
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or engage in finger sweeping of printed text during pretend reading. She had no problems with 
constructing stories from pictures and did not hesitate or refuse to do so. Though she mostly 
labeled distinct objects, she occasionally gave scene level readings such as “The sun is going 
down because it’s nighttime.”  
 Gabby’s emergent comprehension. Similar to Fiona, Gabby’s responses to questions 
meant to assess or elicit comprehension typically returned straightforward, concrete statements. 
Gabby’s orientation towards the concrete was illustrated in her reading of page 15 of Pancakes: 
“There’s two clocks, and she’s making pancakes!” The clock is shown in two different mini 
scenes to show the passage of time as the little old lady churns butter – a strenuous and time- 
intensive task. Gabby would not be expected to tell the exact time from an analog clock face; 
however, she did not interpret the presence of clocks on the same page as an exasperated little 
old lady as indicating the passage of time. Gabby simply provided a descriptive report of the 
presence of two clocks with no further synthesis or inference. When Gabby did make inferences, 
they were not necessarily insightful or helpful. For example, when asked during the second 
reading of Duckling why the duck family was in a huddle, Gabby offered that they were “reading 
a story about her ducklings.” However, no books are featured in the pictures, and reading, books, 
or related terms were not mentioned in the text. This inference was reasonable and may have 
referenced personal schema and positive attitudes towards shared reading. However, it was not 
supported by textual evidence and did not facilitate comprehension.  
 Gabby may have also struggled with the subtle logic of question words. For example, 
when asked how the little old lady obtained pancakes, Gabby answered “because she was 
hungry.” Gabby may not have understood the logical structure of the question or she may not 
have had the ability to report on her understanding, much less her understanding of her 
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understanding. Skarakis-Doyle and Dempsey (2008) cautioned about this possibility when 
posing questions to preschoolers. Gabby also struggled with more complex questions. Questions 
that referenced the notion of a book as a created work seemed to cause the most trouble. When 
asked how the author of Mother tells us that the baby bird is sad, Gabby answered “’Cause he 
wants his mudder.” When asked “What are the pancakes doing there?” while she pretend read 
Pancakes, Gabby replied matter-of-factly that they were “in a picture” versus commenting on 
their role in the plot.  
 Though Gabby typically pretend read by labeling pictured objects, her performances 
varied unexpectedly. She might label discrete items in illustrations without any sense of a uniting 
story structure, and then suddenly articulate the gist. For example, Gabby’s spontaneous 
verbalization in the voice of the little old lady “I can't make pancakes! Will I ever get pancakes?” 
can be interpreted as the main idea that drives the plot. In this example, Gabby’s assumption of 
the little old lady’s voice communicated that she was expressing the main character’s thoughts. 
Furthermore, Gabby’s verbalization also communicated her comprehension of an idea relevant to 
the macrostructure of the story – that the goal, despite all of the setbacks, is to make pancakes. 
She frequently supplemented her serial labeling of each page with “and then…” as a cross-page 
connector (e.g., “and then they’re going back” for pages 20-21 of Duckling followed by “and 
then it was nighttime...” on the next page spread). In conclusion, comprehension did not appear 
to be solely a function of not being able to articulate whole scenes. Gabby’s isolated vocabulary 
errors (e. g., truck for car and helicopter for airplane) and misconceptions (e. g., the firefly is in a 
cave; the little old lady gives pancakes to the syrup salesman) did not prevent her from grasping 
the gist of each story. These vocabulary errors and misconceptions were unrealized opportunities 
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for metacognition and contrasted with the moments when she stopped her flow of pretend 
reading to ask for the name of something that she didn’t know how to name.  
 Gabby’s emergent metacognition. Gabby evinced metacognition representing four out 
of seven possible categories. As part of my analysis, I counted speech turns taken by myself and 
each participant, as we engaged in the joint reading session. Demonstrating a back-and-forth 
conversation between two participants was important to the integrity of my study design. Since 
both researcher and participant provided data in each session, focusing on the child’s speech 
turns provided perspective on the relative presence of metacognition in the child’s contributions 
to the conversation. Gabby’s instances of metacognition were present in a range from zero to 
31% of her speech turns within any one session. In other words, during her most metacognitive 
sessions, metacognitive talk did not take up more than approximately one-third of her oral 
contributions. However, the only one of her 12 readings that lacked any metacognition was her 
first reading of Pancakes. In this reading, she did not have any spontaneous metacognition, and 
she did not Justify her thoughts though prompted to do so. Across successive readings of 
Pancakes, she had a steady increase in instances of metacognition (n = 6, 8, 11), but this pattern 
did not exist across repeated readings for each text. The totality of this extra analysis suggested 
that Gabby, one of the least sophisticated participants, was metacognitive in ways that were 
situationally relevant. This finding suggested that there may not be forms of metacognition that 
are always easier or harder, but rather that metacognition is situationally accessible, relevant, and 
useful, even for the most nascent of participants.   
 Reflecting on Reading. Gabby did not exhibit reflective awareness of reading as a task. 
Though she did have print awareness, she did not reflect on the role that print plays. In other 
words, she identified letters as print and text, but she did not articulate any need to question or 
217 
 
reference the print to render a story. Likewise, she accepted the task of picture reading without 
sharing any reflections on the experience. In sum, she did not reflect on reading as a task, herself 
as a reader, or the text as something to be understood. However, in the Judgment of Difficulty 
vignette discussed below, Gabby did seem to be close to associating reading with personal 
mental labor.  
 Feeling of Knowing. Gabby had both spontaneous and prompted Feelings of Knowing. 
For example, during her second reading of Mother, Gabby seemed to be having a tip of the 
tongue moment, which she quickly corrected. These moments revealed a respectable active 
engagement that was not apparent from her difficulty with answering questions, her frequent 
reply of “I Don’t Know,” and her tendency toward storytelling through simplistic labeling.  
 Judgment of Difficulty. Due to the challenge of just getting dialogic data from Gabby, 
Judgment of Difficulty prompts were only given four times across twelve readings. Gabby 
provided explanations for her difficulty ratings three out of the four times, revealing interesting 
insights about her active internal response to study texts. For example, after her initial reading of 
Mother, Gabby provided a rating of difficulty with a reference to the hard, mental work of 
reading: 
R: Was this easy, medium, or hard? 
Gabby: Hard. 
R: Why was it hard? 
Gabby: Because I read it.  
 
 After her third reading, Gabby downgraded Mother to “medium” difficulty but did not 
provide any explanation. Finally, Gabby rated Pancakes as “medium” at the conclusion of her 
second reading because it was a “short book.” Though I did not consider Gabby to have evinced 
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Reflection, her Difficulty ratings could indicate that she might evince Reflection under different 
circumstances, such as a reading session in which only Reflection prompts were given.  
Task-Related Planning. Gabby did not exhibit any planning behaviors. 
Verbal Self-Revising. Gabby seemed comfortable with her renderings of the stories, even 
when she was incorrect, and she therefore did not correct or revise herself, with one exception. 
This result may not be due to less self-awareness or self-monitoring, but rather a lack of 
awareness or feeling the need to follow up on being mistaken. Consider Gabby’s 3rd reading of 
page 6 of Pancakes, wherein a bag labeled Flour is pictured on a kitchen table with mixing 
bowls and other cooking supplies: Gabby: Sugar again (pointing to bag marked “Flour”), then 
milk, then cream. In other interactions, Gabby indicated that she was familiar with the letter F. 
However, she did not use this information as a clue as to what was in the bag. It is possible that 
Gabby could visually recognize the letter F without knowing the sound that it made. Many 
emergent literacy skills are implicated in the joint reading of a picture book. Knowledge of letter 
names and letter sounds are relevant discrete skills for pre-readers. A letter name and letter sound 
probe could have been administered as part of the study. However, given the range of discrete 
emergent skills that could be relevant, the number of assessments needed to determine an 
exhaustive explanation of each reading problem was unrealistic.  
Expanding Storytelling. Gabby had one instance of Expanding Storytelling, which was 
spontaneous. This example was an important form of metacognition for Gabby, who struggled 
with handling books and answering comprehension questions. In her first reading of Mother, 
Gabby offered the following sing-song labeling for pages 20-21: There’s his mommy and there 
she is. Three days later, without any prompting or feedback, she integrated more information in 
her rendering for this page spread: “There’s his mudder! She was getting his breakfast!” As 
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opposed to her initial reading, her subsequent reading was no longer redundant, provided more 
information, and integrated information at a macro level.  
Justifying Verbalizations. Gabby typically responded to requests for justifications through 
no response, a mumbling noise, or a reference to concretely pictured elements or personally-held 
world knowledge, as in this exchange from the first reading of Pancakes: 
Gabby: She’s making pancakes. 
R: She is making pancakes. How did you know that? 
Gabby: [Made a noise that seemed to indicate that she didn’t like the question.] 
 
However, Gabby did provide one Justification each during her second and third reading 
of Mother, and one during her third reading of Pancakes. The varying content of her 
justifications seemed to be reports of her inner thoughts behind her storytelling and 
corresponding dialogue. For example, during her second reading of Mother, Gabby’s 
justification referenced her notion of a what a mother would do in the situation depicted: 
R: A mother bird sat on her egg. Did I leave anything out? 
Gabby: It’s a baby bird in there! 
R: I know! How do you know that’s the mommy? 
Gabby: She sat on her big white bottom waiting on her baby to come out.  
 
During her third reading of Mother, Gabby’s Justification referenced her knowledge of 
what comes next in the plot: 
R: What’s the baby bird thinking right now? 
Gabby: His mother! 
R: How do you know he’s thinking about his mother? 
Gabby: ‘Cause, he’s gonna lay down in the nest soon.  
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During her third reading of Pancakes, Gabby’s justification referenced her understanding 
of the protagonist’s internal motivation: 
Gabby:  ..she’s doing a lot of work to make pancakes. 
R: Yeah, how’d you know she’s doing a lot of work? 
Gabby: ‘Cause she wants to eat pancakes for breakfast.  
 Gabby’s varying references in the content of her Justifications seemed to indicate that she 
was able to rely on different types of processing relevant to narrative comprehension—e.g., 
integrating information into a coherent plot and understanding the character’s internal 
motivations to act. These examples also demonstrated the interconnectedness of narrative 
comprehension and metacognition, in that the content of Justifications were constructive acts of 
narrative comprehension. 
Theory of Mind and Metacognitive Language. In Pancakes, Gabby didn’t seem to 
associate metacognitive language with thought bubbles, and she didn’t question their presence. 
Gabby tended to provide concrete interpretations of characters that indicated either a less 
developed theory of mind or lack of experience with discussing her empathy for and 
understanding of the characters’ unique perspectives and limitations. Like Fiona, Gabby 
expressed emotional sympathy for the characters, but she did not always fully articulate their 
internal knowledge bases and states that were relative to the plot. For example, when asked what 
the mother bird was thinking, the mother bird’s purported thoughts did not transcend a concrete 
plot point—Gabby reported that the mother bird thought that the egg would hatch. For Gabby, 
the baby bird’s thoughts did not waver from the generic state of wanting his “mudder.” In 
addition to wanting to reunite with his mother as his overarching goal, the baby bird had several 
specific moments of false belief as he approached animals and things that he believed to be his 
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mother. Gabby did not articulate any element of false belief when rendering the story for or 
answering questions about Mother. However, in her second reading of pages 5-6 of Firefly, she 
spontaneously articulated the false belief structure at the heart of the plot: “There’s the firefly 
and there’s the light, but it’s not a firefly!”  
Finally, when prompted to share her personal thoughts, Gabby did not go beyond what 
she knew would happen next. Gabby typically responded by restating my model sentence, stating 
what was pictured on the page, or referencing the topic of the book. However, Gabby started to 
add spontaneous statements such as “I think the owl” on the page preceding the appearance of 
the owl in Firefly. Multiple exposures to open-ended thinking prompts may have sensitized 
Gabby to her internal thoughts over the course of the study. This finding is consistent with the 
proleptic nature of joint reading. This type of discourse also increased her spontaneous use of 
metacognitive language (e.g., think) within the joint reading conversation.  
Helen: 4 Years, 5 Months at Start of Study 
 Helen was a mature participant in many ways. She seemed to enjoy reading in a one-to-
one setting, where she could express her ideas and show off her skills. She typically had high 
interest in and endurance for the reading sessions. Speaking with Helen was often like speaking 
with an adult; she was easily understood and verbally sophisticated. She chatted about any topic 
or book with ease and understood both the substance and the nuances of the stories and my 
questions about them. She understood study tasks and used verbal and non-verbal emphasis to 
communicate what she meant. For example, when I asked if she had read Firefly (to confirm her 
earlier denial of familiarity with the book from her personal life but exposure to it during the 
study), she replied, with a corresponding head nod, “not at home”. 
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 Helen’s emergent literacy behaviors. Helen had no difficulties handling books. 
However, she wasn’t as comfortable constructing a story from the pictures as less sophisticated 
participants were. For example, in response to my first request to tell the story from the pictures 
for the wordless Pancakes, Helen exclaimed “I don’t know how to tell the story from the 
pictures.” However, one act of modeling on page one launched her into engaged picture reading 
for the rest of the story.  On her third reading of Duckling, Helen demonstrated not just print 
awareness but also awareness that meaning comes from print: R: What happened, early one 
morning? Helen: Is that what that says? (pointing to the text “Early one morning”). Helen 
accepted my confirmation of what the text said and continued with the task of constructing a 
story from the pictures. Helen had to balance her knowledge about print and reading with the fact 
that she could not yet read the printed word. Helen’s detailed awareness of print and her global 
awareness that meaning comes from the printed word sometimes divided her attention while she 
was trying to construct a story from the pictures. Characteristically, Helen developed a solution 
that worked for her unique situation. While I was setting up the camera for her third reading of 
the low-word count Duckling, Helen announced that she would tell the story from the pictures 
since she might not know the words. She then proceeded to finger point and read the print that 
she felt she could read (the short refrain in Duckling) yet did not waste energy on print she had 
no hope of deciphering (the extensive text of Firefly and Mother.) Helen also used storybook 
language such as “one day” and cross-page connectors such as “then,” and she typically spoke in 
full sentences that conveyed whole scenes. These characteristics resulted in storytelling 
constructions such as “One day the little lady lived in a house. Then she was sleeping in her bed 
and she decided she wanted to make pancakes.” Her storytelling also accounted for the internal 
motivations of the protagonists (e.g., R: What does [the little old lady] want? Helen: Pancakes, 
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‘cause that’s what she was thinking about for breakfast”.) Helen appreciated that a picture book 
is a created work and suggested that the illustrator of Pancakes could have made the kitchen wall 
black such that specks of white flour could be easier to recognize.  
 Helen’s emergent comprehension. Helen was an advanced participant who understood 
the texts and tasks. She may have understood them too well and become bored on subsequent 
readings. Helen added the most inferences to her story constructions, such as “She (the mother 
duck) was up late trying to look for her duckling”). Her rich inferences provided nuanced and 
holistic interpretations of the plots and indicated that she was likely able to process more 
sophisticated and complicated plot structures than what was offered in the study. In addition to 
articulating her inferred frustration of the mother duck, Helen also proposed that the mother duck 
was not looking hard enough, that the errant duckling might not have wanted to come home due 
to being angry at the mother duck, and that the errant duckling might have wanted to return home 
on his own terms. These inferences were offered in addition to her articulation of the basic plot 
points that the errant duckling swam away because of his interest in the butterfly, that he is 
hiding from his family on each page, and that the turtle escorts him home at the end. Helen also 
communicated an element of danger for the protagonists that was not represented or suggested 
by the printed text or illustrations. While reading Duckling, she expressed that the woodpecker 
might try to attack the duckling. While reading Firefly, she stated her concern that the cat might 
eat the young firefly. Like many other participants, Helen was confused by the meaning of the 
picture of the winged eggs flying away on pages 22-23 of Pancakes, yet she was able to grasp 
the meaning below the surface: “It means that she can’t get her pancakes!”  
 Operating under the assumption that Helen was not being sufficiently challenged by the 
texts or tasks, I requested that Helen tell me what the stories were about at the conclusion of 
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certain sessions. Helen’s responses were neither adequate retellings nor summaries, as 
exemplified in this exchange from the end of her third reading of Mother:  
 R: What’s this story about? 
 Helen: It’s about a bird. 
 R: What happens to the bird? 
 Helen: He lost his mom. 
 R: But is that how it ends? 
 Helen: No. 
 R: How does it end? 
 Helen: (bored) A happy ending.  
 In contrast, at the conclusion of her first reading, Helen had given the specific summary 
statement “It ended up with his mother coming back.” The generic reply detailed above could 
have been attributed to boredom or a sense that she had already provided the requested 
information.  
 Helen’s application of her world knowledge was not as robust as her propensity to engage 
in inferencing. She did rely on her knowledge to make internally consistent sense of texts. For 
example, she stated in her second reading of Duckling that the woodpecker wanted to eat the 
duckling because “It’s ‘cause this is a woodpecker and woodpeckers like to peck and eat stuff.” 
This original story construction corresponded with the four-word refrain that she invented for the 
low word count book Duckling: “Don’t. Hurt. My. Babies.” Later, I told her that those five 
words of text actually said, “Have you seen my duckling?” 
 Helen’s emergent metacognition. Helen evinced metacognition in six of seven possible 
categories in this study. As the most verbally sophisticated participant, metacognition was still 
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present in only 6% to 23% of her turns in joint reading dialogue. As opposed to Gabby however, 
Helen’s metacognition referenced more profound text processing. In many ways, Helen was less 
metacognitive than might be expected for a precocious talker and critical consumer of children’s 
literature. Helen’s familiarity with study texts and the limitations on dialogue posed by simplistic 
plots may have artificially curtailed demonstration of her metacognition, as the way the books 
were presented may not have been challenging or novel enough for her. This finding suggests 
that similar to conventional readers, metacognition is most relevant when the task poses some 
degree of cognitive challenge.  
 Reflecting on Reading. Helen’s advanced print awareness could not necessarily be 
interpreted as an advanced awareness of herself as a reader or reading as a task. Due to her 
relative maturity, blanket claims that she could not read could have resulted from overthinking 
the task or being concerned about the parameters for task success, as she also claimed that she 
did not know how to tell a story from the pictures— until a quick modeling of how to do so 
launched prolific picture reading. Helen appeared to learn more about study expectations while 
simultaneously growing her emergent literacy skill set. These two sources of influence seemed to 
lead to a range of types of responses to the task. When initially presented with Firefly early in the 
study, Helen claimed “I just don’t know how to read.” Later in the study, when I introduced 
Mother to her, Helen offered the more specific statement “I don’t know the words, so what about 
if we just look at it?” During her third reading of Mother near the end of the study, Helen 
exhibited a third type of response: 
 R: Do you remember what it’s called? 
Helen: Are. You. My. Mother? (points with one-to-one correspondence; makes two taps 
for moth-er) 
 R: How’d you know that? 
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 Helen: (emphatically) Because. I. Can. Read.  
  
 These vignettes support the idea that Helen was becoming more print oriented over the 
course of the study and that she was aware of this change. In addition, Bert overheard Helen’s 
comment while he was playing nearby and commented that he could read too, and that he had 
read his prayers the previous night. An increased awareness of the ability to visually recognize 
printed words or decode them as what reading is was always present in the classroom. By the end 
of the pre-kindergarten year, some participants could accurately report whether or not they could 
read basic or familiar print. This capacity changed the contours of Reflecting on Reading as a 
Task for those participants. It also expanded the range of what Reflection behaviors could look 
like during emergent literacy.  
 
 One of Helen’s Reflections suggested the possibility that she might be able to state that or 
when learning new content had taken place. At the conclusion of her second reading of Mother, a 
book that she claimed familiarity with, Helen was not able to explain that she didn’t learn 
anything new because she already knew the story front to back: 
R: So, did you learn anything knew when we read it today?  
Helen: I already know everything. Like my ABC’s and how to count.   
 
 Helen understood the question and used the metacognitive term know in her response. 
However, her response indicated that she might not be able to consistently rely on or discuss 
familiarity with the plot. In contrast to her response to the Reflection prompt above, Helen did 
articulate recognizing stories or smaller units of information, such as sentences. These examples 
are discussed under Feeling of Knowing and Judgment of Difficulty. Different responses may 
indicate that prompts or questions will not always induce the target behavior. For this age group, 
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situational demands may contextualize prompts and result in a more robust reply than prompts to 
self-report that are perceived as separate from the story.  
 
 Feeling of Knowing. Since Helen was comfortable with study texts and tasks (e.g., “I 
already know that sentence), I pressed her to explain whether she knew key content and how she 
knew it. Helen had multiple spontaneous and prompted Feelings of Knowing. The following 
excerpt from her third reading of Firefly illustrated that Helen understood this line of 
questioning, yet she still did not offer extensive commentary about connections between story 
content and her world knowledge: 
 Helen: (spontaneously pretend reading) And he went by a light. And it wasn’t a firefly. It 
 was a light.  
R: Did you know that was called a lightbulb or did the story tell you? 
Helen: Because I knowed that.  
R: Yeah, ‘cause it’s at your house? 
Helen: Yeah. 
 
 Judgment of Difficulty. Helen provided six Judgments of Difficulty after readings, all of 
which were “Easy” or “Medium.” Her lack of “Hard” as a difficulty rating was consistent with 
my conclusion that she was not sufficiently challenged by study texts and tasks. For example, at 
the conclusion of her second reading of Mother, Helen indicated that she found the story easy to 
understand due to her familiarity with it: 
R: When you read this book, do you ever feel like it’s easy, medium, or hard? 
Helen: Easy. 
R: Why is it easy? 
Helen: Because I have it at my house.  
 Task-Related Planning. Helen’s Planning behaviors suggested that she was a willing and 
actively engaged participant; she was vested in the joint reading dynamic, even if she was 
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underwhelmed by the simple texts. For example, as I was setting up for her third reading of 
Duckling, Helen requested that we complete the session in a certain way. As I was turning on the 
camera, Helen announced that she would tell the story from the pictures, because she might not 
know the words. She announced her preference before she saw the book, based on an 
understanding of the task and how she wanted to proceed.  
Verbal Self-Revising. In her initial reading of Mother, Helen corrected herself during her 
rendering of pages 36-37, when the baby bird made a declaration of determination to find his 
mother. She started to say, “I do have enough,” stopped abruptly, and resumed with “I do have a 
mother.” Helen had four spontaneous Revisions. Because her storytelling was accurate, it was not 
appropriate for me to prompt her to revise. I did not consider Helen’s alternative interpretations 
(e.g., when she mentioned that the baby characters were in danger alone in the world) as 
inaccurate; these were valid alternative interpretations. 
Expanding Storytelling. Helen did not provide the story Expansions that might be 
expected from a sophisticated participant. This result may be due to being bored and 
underwhelmed with the study texts. Across readings, it can be concluded that tasks that are too 
hard or too easy may not produce the required cognition or metacognition. Helen’s third reading 
of Mother exemplified this idea: 
Helen: It’s about a bird. 
R: Uh-huh and what happens to the bird? 
Helen: He lost his mom. 
R: He lost his mom. But is that how it ends? 
Helen: No. 
R: How does it end? 
 Helen: (bored) A happy ending. 
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 Justifying Verbalizations. Helen had nine instances of Justification, the same number as 
Erin, and the second highest frequency for this category in the study. However, not all of her 
Justifications were coded with the highest confidence. In the example below from Helen’s 
second reading of Duckling, Helen provided less sophisticated Justification data than might be 
expected: 
Helen: They’re talking about like that duckling is trying to run away. 
R: …How do you know that? 
Helen: ‘Cause! [Squeals and guffaws] I know that. 
 
During her third reading of Pancakes, Helen’s tone when replying to my “Why?” 
elaboration prompt (closely related to Justification) suggested that had Helen not been 
underwhelmed by texts and tasks, she might have provided more robust data in response to 
Justification prompts: 
Helen: And then she got a bowl, to fill it up for her cats and dogs. 
R: OK. 
Helen: She went out, to find eggs. 
R: Why? 
Helen: So, she could make her pancakes, remember? (tone indicates boredom 
with the obvious) 
R: Oh OK, I forgot. 
 Theory of Mind and Metacognitive Language. Helen demonstrated a proficient theory of 
mind and understood the false belief structures within the plots of the four study texts. For 
example, in her third reading of Duckling, Helen indicated her understanding of her omniscient 
perspective versus that of the Mother duck looking for a runaway duckling hidden on each page.  
R: But why can’t the mommy see [her missing duckling]? If we can see it, why can’t the 
mommy see it? 
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Helen: Because, it’s not looking very well. 
 
 Helen used the metacognitive terms learn, know, and remember in her dialogue to discuss 
her reading-related cognition. Helen had varied responses to open-ended thinking prompts. Near 
the end of her third reading of Firefly, Helen responded to my question “What are you thinking 
right now?” with “Ah, that he thinks all the lights are fireflies.” This original statement conveyed 
the fundamental false belief structure of the plot in her own words. Furthermore, during her third 
reading of Pancakes, Helen let me know that as the manager of her own mind, she did not have 
to share everything that she was thinking: 
 R: When you saw this page (22-23), did it make you think of anything? 
 Helen: Nothing! Only except some weird stuff. 
 R: Like what? 
 Helen: A secret. 
 R: Like what? 
 Helen: A secret, secrets are secret, so it’s a secret. 
  
Summary of Case Narratives 
 I reported the frequencies of occurrence of each of the seven types of metacognition in 
Table 12. I discussed participants’ metacognition, comprehension, and emergent literacy 
behaviors through case impressions. I intended for these displays of data to highlight the range of 
constructive and metacognitive processing that 4-year-olds engaged in across four texts. 
All of this data was collected in the context of joint reading, which is a dialogic and 
informal procedure. Some metacognition was spontaneously manifested, and some was 
documented in response to questions that I posed to encourage metacognitive processing. I posed 
these questions when metacognition seemed relevant and would fit in the conversation. For 
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example, I always posed Judgment of Difficulty prompts at the conclusion of reading, as this 
prompt required a holistic review of the task just completed. I issued prompts for other 
categories, such as Justifying or Feeling of Knowing, when I deemed them to be most relevant in 
the moment. Therefore, each reading session had a unique profile. Given that characteristic of 
the study, I reviewed the data again to search for the “antecedents and outcomes” of instances of 
metacognition (Flavell, 1981, p. 51).  
Antecedents and Outcomes 
Flavell (1981) pointed out that outcomes of metacognition may be immediate or may 
occur over a longer term. Since many forms of learning take place over time, metacognition may 
not immediately produce comprehension or any other insight or benefit. It is possible that many 
experiences with a defined task, goal, or action will have to take place before a learner has a 
metacognitive breakthrough or is able to coordinate her or his metacognitive abilities with 
cognitive ones. Metacognition reveals incremental insights to the learner that should facilitate 
comprehension over time. There are benefits to noticing and verbalizing this information, 
whether in internal monologue or out loud for the benefit of an observer.  
In sum, expecting a range of causal or temporal antecedents and outcomes is consistent 
with Flavell’s conceptualization. Not always being able to identify a clear antecedent or outcome 
is also consistent with Flavell’s conceptualization. Since mental processing may not be 
thoroughly understood or exhaustively reported by the young child, discrete data collection 
events, however interactive, may not manifest visible antecedents and outcomes as well as the 
metacognition itself. Flavell (1981) thought that recognizing metacognitive experiences alone 
had value, especially for the young learner.  
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Table 24 thus displays the temporal antecedents and outcomes for Bert’s metacognitive 
vignettes across his three readings of Are You My Mother? I chose this data set for this type of 
analysis based on its 100% inter-rater agreement on the coding of metacognitive categories. This 
table provides additional information by reporting antecedents and outcomes for spontaneous 
and prompted metacognition. As shown in the final column, an inter-relationship often existed 
between metacognition and various processes that incrementally facilitated comprehension.  
Table 24 





















R: Well, just then, the baby bird saw a big 




R: A bulldozer or something?  Bert: [Nods 
yes.] 
 
R: Do you remember what the book calls 
it? 
 





he did not 














R:  But the big thing just said, “Snort.” 
“Oh, you are not my mother,” said the 
baby bird. “You are a Snort. I have to get 
out of here!” 
 
R: What’s the baby bird thinking now? 
 
Bert: Um, he thinks he’s scared.  
R: How do you know that? 
Bert: ‘Cause, there’s loud noises.  
__________________ 
R: Is there anything about what the baby 
bird looks like that tells you he’s scared? 
Bert: Mmm-hmm. ‘Cause his beak and his 
eyes are different. And sweat is dripping 




































R: Sad, yeah, how do you know? 
 
Bert: ‘Cause, look at his eyes.  
 knowledge of 
character’s 
internal state  









R: Look at his eyes, yeah. Let’s see what 
happens next. [R. begins to turn page.] 
 



















R: Well, just then, the baby bird saw a big 
thing.  This must be his mother! “There 
she is!” he said.  “There is my mother!” 
 
R: What’s that big thing really called? 
 


















R: But the baby bird could not get away. 
The Snort brought him up and up and up. 
Brought him way up.  
 
R: Then what happened?  
 




















R: A mother bird sat on her egg.  
 
R: How do you know she’s the mama? 
 



















R: Just then, the Snort came to a stop. 
What’s the Snort going to do? 
 
Bert: Um, drop him into his home.  
 
R: So, is the Snort good or bad? 
 
Bert: Um, good.  R: He’s good? Why? 
 






his ability to 
reference his 
mental model 




Additional Evidence of Constructive Comprehension Processes 
 As discussed in the case impressions, participants exemplified constructive, flexible, and 
sometimes whimsical thoughts and behaviors during the process of interacting with four 
narrative picture books. All participants grasped the gist of each main character’s struggle, even 
when misconceptions marred comprehension of certain details or parts of the plot. Empathizing 
with a main character and understanding goal-driven behavior is at the heart of narrative 
comprehension. Additionally, I identified two major categories of constructive comprehension 
processes in their text interactions: constructing alternative interpretations and applying factual 
knowledge. Participants independently brought these efforts to the joint reading task. 
Constructing internally-consistent, alternative interpretations. Multiple participants 
provided alternative interpretations of parts of the stories. These were more whimsical or 
inventive renderings than a standard reading of the story. These versions often explained missing 
information that would be valuable to any reader striving to achieve holistic understanding. For 
example, when reading Mother, both Dylan and Erin claimed that the mother bird was inside of 
the bulldozer, presumably to use this piece of equipment to find and return her baby to the nest. 
The actual text did not explain or picture the driver of the bulldozer. Since the story did not 
suggest that the baby bird began to fly in the process of searching for his mother, this alternative 
interpretation is a valid inference concerning the method by which the baby bird could return to 
its nest high in the tree. This inference was consistent with both world knowledge and the text, 
and it therefore represented constructive meaning-making.  
The three study texts with words featured a baby protagonist who was alone in the world. 
Across these texts, multiple participants articulated an element of danger above and beyond what 
was suggested by text or pictures. For example, the darkness of Eric Carle’s night in Firefly was 
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interpreted as an ocean or a cave, and the firefly was said to be in danger of being injured by the 
cat and dog. The runaway duckling (in Duckling) was in danger of being pecked by a 
woodpecker, and the baby bird (in Mother) could have been eaten by the various animals it 
approached or injured by the prongs on the bucket of the bulldozer. These interpretations 
indicated a profound personal response to literature that could have been missed since it did not 
occur in the form of sophisticated verbal data. This information likely represented empathy for 
the main character and application of a 4-year-old’s schema for going out into the world. These 
two actions – feeling empathy and applying personal experience- are related and often implicated 
when reading stories. In other words, these responses to the text represent the type of response 
one would expect from a reader of any age to a character in an epic situation (Mar & Oatley, 
2008).  
Applying background knowledge. The picture books used in this study depicted various 
types of information: facts (and assumed facts) about the natural world (e.g., that fireflies come 
out at night), routines of daily living and corresponding discourses (e.g., how to make pancakes 
from scratch), and esoteric references (e.g., a butter churn and iron stove). Different types of 
information make varying demands on comprehension processes, such as schema compatibility, 
relevant conceptual vocabulary, and the opportunity to learn new information (Baker & Brown, 
1984; Kintsch, 1998). These processes can be spaces for metacognition (Baker & Brown, 1984). 
Participants were not expected to know all possible facts depicted in the stories, though toy-
playing sessions showed that they had sufficient familiarity with major ideas. The more 
important analysis concerned how a participant utilized his or her recognition of familiar 
information or how a participant coped with the presentation of the unknown. Both processes are 
at the heart of comprehension monitoring as an enterprise and disposition (Markman, 1977). 
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Furthermore, according to Kuhn (2000), awareness that one has learned is a fundamental role for 
metacognition. Thus, though participants were not able to discuss learning from the texts, the 
nexus of reader and information still occurred and might produce different results in a different 
research design. 
Are You My Mother? included factual information about the developmental stages of 
baby birds: hatchling, nestling, and fledgling (Massachusetts Audubon Society, 2017). Only  
fully-feathered fledglings (two weeks or older) can safely leave the nest, though they must hop or 
walk until they can fly (Massachusetts Audubon Society, 2017). The baby bird in Mother must 
be a fledgling since he cannot yet fly. Indeed, as many participants implied, he should not have 
been away from the nest without parental supervision. Participants’ story renderings took this 
fact into account. No lesson was given on the stages of bird development, yet no one questioned 
why the baby bird couldn’t just fly home.  
Have You Seen My Duckling? accurately depicted animals found in a pond ecosystem. 
Two duck species are accurately illustrated: a typical Mallard duck and a plumed Merganser 
duck (The Cornell Lab of Ornithology, 2015 a, b). Illustrations also accurately depict a 
salamander, fish, beaver, and turtle. This package of information created an opportunity to assess 
the child’s use of a consistent schema for a pond – and the inclusion of reasonable animal 
residents versus a “toucan” (as stated by Erin) and a “shark” (as stated by Helen). Helen’s and 
Erin’s animal names may be out of place, but they still indicate active application of world 
knowledge from a nearby schema. Thus, the realistic presentation of animals in their natural eco-
system offered opportunities to choose how to cope with factual information in a book—by 
expressing a Feeling of Knowing, calling up and applying a vocabulary word within the real time 
of reading, by using non-specific language (e. g., that one), or by simply not accounting for the 
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unknown in storytelling. In the present study, it was not possible to document internal decisions 
to just not mention unknown objects. In future studies, a researcher could ask the participant why 
an object was not mentioned.  
Through Eric Carle’s collage style of illustration (The Official Eric Carle Website, n.d.), 
The Very Lonely Firefly depicts both information and assumptions about fireflies. Fireflies are 
bioluminescent and prefer warm, dark locations (Boston Museum of Science, 2017). Therefore, 
it would not be surprising to see glowing fireflies on the night of a fourth of July fireworks 
festival, as suggested by the book. Fireflies can glow from their larval stage, so a very young 
firefly could glow (Boston Museum of Science, 2017). However, the idea that fireflies are 
attracted to common sources of light is more myth than fact. Since artificial light interferes with 
the interpretation of flashing patterns, fireflies tend to gravitate towards dark backgrounds 
(Boston Museum of Science, 2017). It is not known if children were aware of any cognitive 
dissonance between their experience of fireflies and the storyline. However, the opportunity 
presented itself.  
Pancakes for Breakfast was the only study text with a human as the main character. It 
also features information that is esoteric relative to modern culture such as cooking with an old-
fashioned iron stove, churning butter in a wooden churn, and sifting flour in a hand sifter. 
Though typical food preparation is separated from the steps from farm to table, eggs come from 
chickens, milk comes from a cow, and maple syrup comes from trees, as pictured in this book. 
Furthermore, cookbooks provide printed recipes to be read in the kitchen and aprons are placed 
over clothing so one won’t get soiled while cooking. The representation of these unfamiliar 
objects and activities created opportunities to learn, be aware of learning, and report learning.    
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The information profile of each story underscores the importance of analyzing texts as 
created works instead of artificially implanting errors for detection. The texts “as is” offered 
many opportunities to recognize familiar information or scenarios, learn something new, or just 
be confused and choose how to proceed. Text “as is” can also be subtly inaccurate, thus creating 
an opportunity for cognitive dissonance and an opportunity to choose how to cope. Texts have to 
be analyzed as a party to the transaction, and the information profile of a narrative is one feature 
to be taken into consideration.   
Analysis of Metacognition across Repeated Reading Sessions 
McGee and Schickedanz (2007) suggested repeated interactive readings for preschool 
literacy instruction, to improve comprehension, allow for more exposure to textual claims, and 
provide more processing time. In the present study, comparisons across repeated readings could 
not be standardized since each session may have featured different scripting, tasks, prompts, and 
environmental interruptions. However, comparing metacognition across readings opened a 
conversation about the role of metacognition in repeated reading, as improvements across 
readings have been thought to be a function of comprehension alone.  
As Table 24 shows, most metacognition occurred in the third reading condition. In joint 
reading, the frequency of metacognition is only on dimension of the phenomenon of interest. 
Frequency alone does not explain whether a participant’s metacognition was beneficial. 
Depending on the type of metacognition, more could have occurred due to more prompts to think 
deeply and reflexively versus correcting errors or expanding retellings as more information is 
gathered from each successive exposure to the text. A more insightful number is the ratio of 




Proportion of Metacognitive Instances by Book and Reading 
 First Reading Second Reading Third Reading 
Mother  30% 40% 30% 
Duckling 12% 29% 59% 
Pancakes  32% 25% 43% 
Firefly  23% 23% 54% 
 
Tables 24 and 25 show that both the distributional proportion and the type of 
metacognition that was most frequent in each reading of each book varied without a clear 
pattern. This result is due in part to the researcher’s original intention of obtaining a picture walk 
reading on the first reading and to ask increasingly abstract questions as the child became more 
familiar with each text. The overall pattern was not true for each participant. For example, Bert 
had the most spontaneous metacognitive statements while reading Duckling, and he had the 
greatest range of categories of metacognition and the most metacognition overall while reading 
the wordless Pancakes. In sum, these findings support the conclusion that metacognition was 
relevant in ways that were transactional and situational for each combination of child, text, and 
transaction characteristics. The number of occurrences of a certain type of metacognition was 
ultimately a function of multiple sources of influence on the joint reading dialogue, including my 
questions.  
The frequency of occurrence of each category during each reading, as shown in Table 26, 




Modes of Metacognition by Book and Repeated Reading 
 First Reading Second Reading Third Reading 






























Justifying  Judging 
 
 
Borrowing from Dooley and Matthews’ (2009) application of RAND’s transactional 
model of reading to emergent literacy experiences, my analysis included consideration of 
characteristics of the child as participant, the four stories as texts, and contextual influences. This 
approach afforded comparison of the subtle differences in similar moments across readers and 
texts. For example, Gabby (4 years 0 months at start of study) was a naïve participant in many 
ways. She demonstrated page-turning difficulties, and her primary mode of pretend reading was 
pointing to and labeling the pictures. She had the least occurrences of metacognition. However, 
she could be metacognitive when it mattered. In contrast to Gabby, Helen was a more cognitively 
and socially sophisticated participant. Helen not only skillfully handled a book, but also offered 
literary criticisms of plot lines and illustrations. Like Gabby, Helen also justified her thinking, 
but she did so through a nuanced understanding of the baby bird’s perspective as the explanation 
for why she held the idea that the Snort is good. Both engaged in reasonable emergent 
metacognition; the differences between them illustrate how metacognition was differentially 
relevant for comprehension. Gabby just referred to her knowledge of the text whereas Helen 
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demonstrated that not only did she know the story, but that she was also aware of the 
knowledgeable position of the reader versus the limited knowledge of the baby bird.  
Analysis of Metacognition by Text and Text Type 
What participants did to make sense of text is best explained by reference to the content 
that was in the text to be understood (Kintsch, 1998; Kinnunen et al., 2009). In the four stories 
used in this study, printed text and illustrations variably contributed meaning. They did so by 
directly communicating or indirectly implying information and using varying text features. For 
example, in Pancakes for Breakfast, thought bubbles represented the protagonist’s thoughts and 
thus required a working theory of mind (as well as familiarity with the text feature of thought 
bubbles) to understand what was communicated. The four study texts were true narratives with 
elements of story that can be plotted on a narrative arc. Table 27 recaps these structural elements 
of story. Toy playing sessions revealed that participants were familiar with the critical content 
(e.g., essential to the main idea) of study texts. Esoteric content that was not essential to the plot, 
such as the butter churn in Pancakes, was not addressed in toy playing sessions. However, this 
type of content did provide interesting challenges for the participants and opportunities for 
metacognition to be immediately relevant. 
Table 27 
Story Elements as Macrostructures along the Narrative Arc 
 Main 
Character(s) 
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Microstructures and macrostructures. Since the four study texts were true narratives, I 
created nodes to code instances where a child articulated or referenced information that 
constituted a microstructure or macrostructure of the text or referred to the text base (i.e. whole 
story) (Kintsch, 1998). Per Kintsch and Rawson (2008), the content of structured texts (such as a 
true narrative arranged along a narrative arc) can be classified as discrete propositions, 
microstructures made from relationships among propositions, and ultimately a macrostructure, 
which is formed from overarching topics and their inter-relationships. The microstructure plus 
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the macrostructure equals the text base—what the author and/or text said. Finally, a reader forms 
a situation model—a mental model of the text based on an existential interpretation of what the 
author communicated. Across the totality of verbal data recorded from 83 reading sessions with 
seven preschoolers, I coded 149 references to macrostructure. This finding is significant because 
even children who seemed to have inchoate pretend and/or dialogic reading skills referred to 
macrostructure level information (e.g., main ideas). This type of information was not likely to 
have been reproduced from memory or spoken as a result of discrete picture reading. Rather, it 
was more likely articulated from comprehension of structured information. 
Misconceptions. Since the stories posed a variety of ideas, some simple and some 
complicated, the potential for misconceptions existed, requiring coding of when a child 
expressed a misconception. I assumed that a misconception would be a likely basis for 
metacognition in the form of self-correction. Misconceptions were not moments of “not 
knowing” or whimsical alternative interpretations. Rather, they represented problematic 
interpretations of story content that conflicted with the author’s intended meaning. Depending on 
the grain size of the misconception, it may or may not have affected the child’s grasp of main 
ideas or the gist. Misconceptions were assumed to be opportunities for metacognition, especially 
in the form of self-correction.  
World knowledge. Though study texts were narratives, they featured information about 
the natural and built worlds that ostensibly tasked application of background knowledge. 
Applying one’s knowledge to one’s processing of a story is an active and constructive 
comprehension process. The study texts featured information about the natural world and 
information about the routines of daily living. Pancakes for Breakfast featured esoteric 
information that twenty-first century 4-year-olds might not be familiar with (e. g., a butter 
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churn). Therefore, since the texts featured not only a story but also information, I considered 
whether and how a participant utilized any relevant knowledge. The information in the stories 
was not guaranteed to be familiar to participants. I expected that 4-year-olds might refer to their 
world knowledge to justify their answers to comprehension questions. 
Rival Explanations for Results  
 Potential rival explanations for results could be mimicking the researcher or other 
children or learning from repeated readings, especially of the same text. I intended for my study 
design to lessen the likelihood of each. However, the interactivity of any form of participant 
observation likely adds social aspects to the research dynamic that could affect data collection 
and analysis in subtle ways.  
 Mimicking researcher or other children. It was important to establish that children did 
not simply mimic metacognitive language that I used. The ten most frequently-spoken words in 
the totality of the transcripts were, respectively: Mother, bird, baby, firefly, little, old, duckling, 
lady, dog, and pancakes. My reading aloud the print of the three books with words constituted a 
significant proportion of the data. This breakdown of time and talk indicates that naturalistic, 
semi-structured, dialogic reading actually occurred, as opposed to the delivery of an 
experimental script. Within this context, I used metacognitive language as the more skilled 
member of the dynamic (Vygotsky, 1978), but I did not explicitly teach or rehearse it.   
Learning from repeated readings. Since I could not reasonably give a neutral response to 
participants’ verbalizations in a joint reading scenario, participants may have been influenced by 
subtle cues about what I considered to be correct, interesting, or worthwhile. However, the range 
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of responses in second and third readings and multiple instances of less sophisticated 
performances over time or in subsequent readings cast doubt on this threat. 
Repeated readings have cognitive benefits (McGee & Schickedanz, 2007), however, and 
these could be confused for metacognition. Until more is known about the relationship between 
cognition and metacognition, the nature of this threat is not clear. It is possible that 
metacognition has always been a latent factor in the cognitive benefits observed from repeated 
readings. More research is needed. In the present study, repeated readings did not always 
produce more sophisticated storytelling, calling into question the validity of inferring literary 
sophistication from pretend reading. Consider the diminishing quality of Bert’s reading of page 
one of Pancakes across three readings: 
1st Reading of page 1 
Bert: (right away with confidence) One day it was snowing, and it was cold.  
 
2nd Reading of page 1 
Bert: A snowy day for a house.   
 
3rd Reading of page 1 
Bert: A house on a cold morning.  
R: A house on a cold morning! And then what? 
It is unlikely that Bert and the other participants who provided stagnant or even lower 
quality readings over time were regressing in their emergent literacy. Rather, unfulfilling data 
from this age group may not be a valid or reliable indicator of constructs under study. It could 
just mean that preschoolers are not mature enough to always do their best in accordance with 
spoken and unspoken task demands. On the contrary, increasingly sophisticated data over 
readings or time should be recognized as trustworthy, unless it was simply mimed from another 
child or adult. 
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Prompts providing cognition or metacognition.  Brown (1980) expressed concern that 
metacognitive prompts supply the actual metacognition that is attributed to participants. I did 
pose many prompts that could be said to contain comprehension processing or metacognitive 
processing. However, participants also provided impressive verbal data from open-ended 
prompts that did no convey any information. When asked “What are you thinking about?” 
participants provided varying responses. Even within each child, the response to this prompt 
seemed to vary situationally or just coincidentally. Participants variably referenced pictured 
objects, rhetoric about the gist, alternative interpretations, inferences about the internal state of 
characters, articulation of a false belief, and rudimentary plot summaries. Though they may not 
have provided mature “think aloud” data, their responses revealed whimsical, constructive, 
and/or insightful discourse that was not likely to be obtained through other means. For example, 
Helen responded to this prompt by reporting that she keeps some thoughts to herself as secrets. 
Helen apparently made conscious choices about which thoughts she felt like sharing. In another 
example, Dylan typically ignored this open-ended prompt or replied that he was thinking about 
one thing pictured on the page in front of him. However, after his third reading of Mother, he 
responded to the “What are you thinking about” prompt by sharing an original thought about the 
safety of the baby bird: 
R: What were you thinking while you were reading this book to me? 
Dylan: (deliberately) I was thinking about him falling out of the nest. 
R: You were worried about him falling out of the nest? 





CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS, LIMITATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THEORY AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
I found that 4-year-old preschoolers with varying verbal abilities and varying levels of 
emergent literacy sophistication manifested seven forms of early metacognition during joint 
picture book reading. These forms of metacognition were highly relevant to their individual 
experiences of joint reading as a task, enabling them to correct their mistakes, manage and adjust 
their efforts, and report on their reading experiences. Even in instances wherein metacognition 
did not produce a clear and immediate advantage, the capacity to report metacognitive 
knowledge, metacognitive experiences, and metacognitive actions was a meaningful finding. 
Flavell (1981) explained that metacognitive experiences are worthwhile in and of themselves. 
That these experiences were articulable and highly relevant to the task is another important and 
exciting observation. Through instruction and experience, metacognition should become more 
beneficial over time.  
My findings suggest that research on the metacognitive capacities of preschoolers should 
continue. My findings also suggest that metacognitive theory should be open to the inclusion of 
young children, who appear to have qualitatively different early metacognitive capacities that are 
no less relevant to the literacy tasks important for their age. Joint reading was a context for 
encountering pancakes, ducklings, fireflies, and baby birds. In the words of 4-year-old Erin, it 
was also a context for “thinking in your brain.” Metacognition was as much a part of 





My findings ranked in order of importance are as follows: 
1. Most joint reading sessions with preschoolers featured at least one instance of 
meaningful metacognition. This finding encourages reconsideration of the status quo, wherein 
metacognition has not been considered central—or even possible—during joint reading or other 
emergent literacy activities and experiences. Metacognition appears to be an unconstrained skill 
that is relevant to emergent literacy. 
2. Preschool participants were metacognitive in both spontaneous and prompted 
ways. In fact, approximately 40% of their observed metacognition was spontaneous in nature. 
Furthermore, the 60% of metacognition manifested in response to a prompt was within their zone 
of proximal development. Prompting facilitated application and expression.  
3. Each 4-year-old participant had a unique personality and emergent literacy 
repertoire, and each 4-year-old participant was metacognitive. Each participant had multiple 
moments of metacognition, many of which were clearly relevant to their understanding of study 
texts. Each participant was metacognitive in at least five of seven possible ways. The least 
sophisticated participant, Gabby, manifested 19 instances of metacognition in five of seven 
categories.  
 4. Each of the four commercially-available, mass-market narrative picture books 
used in joint readings supported opportunities for metacognition. These well-structured 
narratives presented participants with implied information, new vocabulary words, motivated 
characters, and plot twists. Accordingly, six of seven participants manifested a variety of forms 
of metacognition as they encountered difficult plot points and coped with task demands (e.g., “I 
just can’t read.”). Helen, the most sophisticated participant, found it easy to understand these 
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scenarios. This match of reader and text did not preclude metacognition, but rather made 
metacognition relevant in ways that made sense for the reader. Helen’s metacognition was 
concentrated in functions such as Reflecting and Justifying as opposed to Knowing. This finding 
from analysis of the texts and the reader-text interactions further suggests the unrecognized 
relevance of metacognition to typical emergent literacy experiences with narrative picture books.  
5. Metacognition was relevant to multiple cognitive actions and various emergent 
literacy behaviors. Participants’ metacognition helped them to update their understandings, 
change their minds, and articulate valuable insights into their emerging thought processes. The 
frequency and range of metacognition in my data set strongly suggested the overall relevance 
and appropriateness of metacognition to the joint book reading experience during preschool 
emergent literacy.  
Discussion of Findings 
My results demonstrated that preschoolers were regularly metacognitive within the 
context of joint picture book reading, and that their metacognition was evidenced by and through 
different emergent behaviors and related verbalizations. Consider the two vignettes below, from 
two participants who varied strongly in their demonstration of emergent literacy skills. The 
scenarios are different, yet metacognition was just as relevant to each. 
During Dylan’s second reading of Pancakes, he provided the following spontaneous 
verbal self-revision: “She needed syrup. I said butter by accident.” I did not use the word 
accident in my contributions to the joint reading dialogue. Dylan spontaneously used this word to 
signify a self-revision. This instance of metacognition has high clarity. However, considering 
that both butter and syrup were pictured as pancake toppings, this metacognitive act corrected 
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misspeaking versus a deep-seeded structural error. This observable Revision manifested self-
monitoring and allowed him to correct a detail, thus increasing accuracy and comprehension. 
Though misspeaking may not be a profound error to be revised, the meaningfulness of this 
exchange concerned the evidence of a 4-year-old independently monitoring his storytelling—
while storytelling. My presence as a reading partner enabled a situation in which Dylan 
spontaneously articulated his introspection that he knew he made a mistake. I was also able to 
observe his correction and resumption of storytelling. Mistakes, small and large, are part of the 
reading process. Dylan’s example indicated that flexibly noticing and responding to mistakes is 
also a part of reading, even for the emergently literate.  
As opposed to misspeaking, an exchange from Erin’s third reading of Pancakes 
exemplified a structural correction. On the fourth page of Pancakes, as part of her storytelling, 
Erin offered the following:  
Erin: Then she picked out a book … I mean.. ughh..what’s that called again? 
R: I think that’s a cookbook, right?  
Erin: Yeah, I forgot. Then she pulled out her book and made her recipe of pancakes. 
I coded this exchange as manifesting Feeling of Knowing. Per Flavell’s model, I 
presumed that integrated cognitive and metacognitive processing undergirded this observable 
data. Erin likely made a decision that the cookbook was important, that she knew the name of it 
but forgot, and that she could interrupt storytelling to ask for help and then resume from the same 
point. Erin was presumably monitoring her storytelling relative to her intentions and mental 
model. Erin used original metacognitive language to report real introspection. Erin decided that 
she needed certain information and shouldn’t proceed without it. Erin engaged in all of the above 
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within 10 seconds of joint reading. Reading interactively with an adult conversational partner 
enabled documentation of her metacognition and connected, constructive literacy behaviors. 
According to Kintsch and Rawson, “the situation model for a literary text may require 
construction at more than one level of analysis; to understand a story, the reader may have to 
infer the protagonists’ motivations; to understand an argument, the exact relations between its 
components may have to be analyzed. Deep understanding always goes beyond the text in non-
trivial ways, requiring the construction of meaning and not just passive absorption of 
information” (2005, p. 221). This constructive lens on comprehension complemented Flavell’s 
person-task-action model of metacognition and prioritized the formation of meaning versus 
expectations for discourse. Through this lens, how closely a child can mimic an adult when 
“reading” a storybook is less important than how she or he engaged with and responded to 
nuanced narrative scenarios and novel information. My results showed that metacognition was a 
meaningful dimension of these experiences.  
Though different, Dylan’s and Erin’s scenarios illustrated the appropriateness of Flavell’s 
person-task-action model for the study of metacognition in joint storybook reading. They also 
illustrated that metacognition could not be solely attributed to any singular factor in any one of 
three readings, during the reading of any one of four books, or at a certain time of the year (fall 
or spring). Metacognition can play different roles in Flavell’s model, and it did in this study of 
joint reading. These vignettes also illustrated that though categories of metacognition used in this 
study were mutually exclusive, they were not necessarily equal. A Self-Revision could have been 
limited in scope while an Expansion could have indicated deep processing. Self-Revisions could 
have perfunctorily resulted from not paying attention at first. Children who had “more” 
metacognition did not necessarily have more profound or more beneficial metacognition. Rather, 
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study texts presented information to be understood, and in each reading a complicated process 
unfolded that was influenced by multiple reader, text, and task characteristics. Studying the 
reader, text, or task in isolation would have yielded limited information about metacognition and 
related comprehension and emergent literacy skills and experiences.  
The rich scenarios that occurred in joint reading may have been overlooked by a 
traditional study of independent pretend storybook reading. Sulzby (1985) conducted her seminal 
study of pretend storybook reading by having children pretend read a picture book from home 
that parents selected as familiar. Children’s ability to read the text as an adult would was judged 
to be a marker of emergent literacy sophistication. However, my results indicated that 
comprehension processing and metacognition can occur in the absence of advanced verbal 
storytelling. Kintsch’s ideas may explain why my results differ without being in conflict. I 
employed interactive prompts and questions to document the actions of preschoolers presented 
with the myriad of characters, actions, events, and other details found in study texts. I used well-
structured narratives chosen for my purpose. In sum, I took multiple steps to make 
comprehension and metacognition visible through the proleptic and dynamic task of joint picture 
book reading (Vygotsky, 1978). 
Yet, as mentioned earlier, I did not observe an obvious benefit for each instance of 
metacognition. Preschool-aged children’s thinking skills can be fragmented (Dowling, 2014), 
meaning that preschoolers may have the multiple skills they need to perform a task but not be 
able to integrate them. A lack of metacognition may be at the root of the inability to integrate 
skills, or metacognition may be a present skill that is not integrated (Garner, 1987; Veenman et 
al., 2006). Text comprehension requires an integration of many thinking skills (Tompkins et al., 
2013). For example, the distinct but related skills of inference generation, monitoring, and 
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knowledge of story structure predict later overall reading comprehension (Cain & Oakhill, 2012, 
as cited in Stahl, 2014). Therefore, I intended to investigate not only the presence of 
metacognition while interacting with texts, but also whether a 4-year-old’s metacognition 
enhanced understanding of the story. However, since I did not employ a standardized design, and 
since participants were allowed to participate in each session in non-standard ways, information 
that would allow for an analysis of complete story constructions (i.e., independent re-
enactments) was not obtained. Also, I could not analyze responses to a consistent set of questions 
that covered the major points of each text. However, I could provide a situational analysis of 
each instance of metacognition, and I could make careful inferences about whether it enhanced 
understanding. Enhancing understanding was not the only possible benefit of metacognition. 
Metacognition also aided planning such that the task was more comfortable for the learner and 
enabled reports about the self as a reader or person on the verge of reading.  
A lack of standardization was a design choice and not a limitation. It featured affordances 
and consequences as would any design choice. This exploratory study had maximum relevance 
in that it resembled the informality of participants’ typical experiences with commercially-
available picture books in their familiar preschool classroom. Sessions were of a 
developmentally-appropriate duration (ranging from three to six minutes), and results were not 
attributable to mimicking. Jointly reading with 4-year-olds in their regular preschool 
classroom—for the purpose of collecting data about abstract thinking—posed unique 
commitments and challenges. These challenges did not undercut the trustworthiness of my 
interpretations. Logic dictates that it would be more difficult for a preschooler to articulate 
cognition and metacognition under such conditions, not less. My loosely structured approach to 
joint reading made sense in a classroom environment with distractions and interruptions. Thus, 
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the moments of comprehension and metacognition documented in this study can be assumed to 
be a part of participants’ repertoires of thinking and communicative skills that are comfortable 
for use in the regular preschool classroom environment. 
I intended for this study to be the first of my studies on this topic. Open-ended methods 
were appropriate to investigate what would happen versus replicating prior research, 
manipulating an isolated variable, or implementing an error detection scenario that would not be 
repeated at home or school. Below, I summarized my main conclusions from my findings for 
further discussion.  
 Metacognitive sophistication does not depend on verbal sophistication. Participants 
produced a lower volume of verbal output than I anticipated based on prior studies of pretend 
storybook reading (e.g., Holdaway, 1979; Sulzby, 1985). I attributed this finding to the 
intersection between developmental characteristics of preschoolers and the multi-faceted nature 
of my study design. Four-year-olds have biological limits on their attention, working memory, 
and short and long term memories (Brown, 1978). These characteristics can complicate the study 
of preschoolers’ metacognitive processing during joint reading by influencing their observable 
performances in ways that are challenging to isolate and document. For example, in the middle 
of a challenging task, such as jointly reading and discussing a book, 4-year-olds might not have 
enough working memory to fully render the story and also fully engage in interaction, self-
reflection, and self-reporting. It is possible that participants would have provided more purely 
“metacognitive data” if that had been the only focus of the study or fuller “story constructions” if 
that had been the only focus of the study. However, consistent with its purpose, my study 
examined these constructs in conjunction, in a dynamic situation. Collecting less data than 
anticipated on one particular construct collected through a multi-faceted design is reasonable. 
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My results distinguished verbal sophistication from worthwhile verbal data and emergent 
literacy sophistication from comprehension and metacognitive capabilities. I intended for these 
findings to contribute to the understanding of what metacognition is and advocate for the 
inclusion of preschool participants in future studies. Less verbal data does not necessarily equate 
with less comprehension or metacognition. Even in a children’s picture book, not all information 
is essential. Since some information is expendable, omitting some content in a story construction 
may not indicate a lack of comprehension (Baker & Brown, 1984; Kintsch, 1998) or a need for 
metacognition. Therefore, omissions and limited verbalizations may or may not have indicated 
literary, cognitive, or metacognitive immaturity. In fact, for at least one participant, limited 
verbal responses may have indicated a preference for efficiency versus lesser understanding. 
Bert, an older four, was consistently concise. During his third reading of Firefly, Bert replied to 
the question “What happens now?” (on pages 7-8) with “a candle.” This terse reply may have 
been Bert’s efficient way of saying that the false belief/failed attempt pattern that defines Firefly 
repeated yet again on the page with a candle. Offering the term candle instead of a verbose 
rendering of the scene may have simply been Bert’s shorthand.  
Likewise, less articulated metacognition than expected could be explained by greater 
comprehension. In conclusion, limited verbal data will result in a lower rating on Sulzby’s scale 
of pretend storybook reading sophistication, but it does not preclude meaningful and constructive 
cognitive and metacognitive processes that need to be appreciated.  
It is also important to note that participants’ verbal data was not that different from that of 
Martin and Kragler’s (2011) kindergarteners, who gave generic responses to metacognitive 
prompts, such as “I was reading,” versus articulating more specific insights into mental 
processes. In the present study, participants were only rarely silent or replied that they didn’t 
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know how to answer a question. These results show that the challenge in working with young 
participants may not be silence in response to questions, but rather asking children with limited 
vocabulary and world knowledge to communicate exactly what they are thinking and doing 
while reading. Limitations on self-reporting are not limited to the young (Brown, 1987). 
Mokhtari and Reichard (2002) noted limitations in the 6th through 12th grade students they 
asked to report their use of reading comprehension strategies. Therefore, if self-reporting can be 
limited at any age, and if poor metacognition can be a problem at any age (Baker & Brown, 
1984; Flavell, 1979), then age and its developmental correlates should not preclude or downplay 
the use of verbal reporting to investigate metacognition.  
This study’s results demonstrated that preschoolers can provide meaningful verbal data 
and that lesser verbal data does not necessarily indicate lesser processing. A next step could be to 
explore whether they can think aloud in real time or engage in a joint think aloud. True think 
aloud prompts would be more open-ended than some of my pre-planned questions and would 
open up new possibilities for more data and a freer form of articulation (i.e., initiating a thought 
versus responding to a prompt).  
Making inferences about the “impact” of metacognition.  Determining the impact, 
value, or outcome of each instance of metacognition within the joint reading task was 
challenging. A more robust analysis of the impacts of metacognition would require additional 
interaction with participants who, by and large, exhausted their stamina in the reading sessions as 
is. Future studies could address this aspect of a transactional analysis by using shorter texts 
and/or texts with content that invites a stark reaction in a specific location, such as a plot twist or 
a chance to finally learn a new word or idea that had been important to the story. Alternatively, 
observation of independent reading could be compared with observations during joint reading to 
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determine if the metacognitive prompting of the researcher enhanced comprehension processing. 
This approach would be most productive with unfamiliar text such that constructive-integrative 
processing could be observed versus reliance on memory.  
Different terminology is appropriate for different scenarios. I intended for the results 
of this study to contribute to the literature on reading-related metacognition. However, this study 
did not necessarily use the same terminology as other studies in this area. Due to my 
presumptions and commitments, I did not rely on two terms often found in the lexicon of 
reading-related metacognition research— strategy and self-regulation. A strategy is a specific, 
consistent, and formally defined behavior that was likely taught through academic instruction 
(Palincsar & Schutz, 2011). Neuman and Roskos (1997) claimed that their preschool participants 
were strategic in that they acted intentionally in pursuit of a goal. I interpreted their use of the 
word strategy to imply that the child’s intentionality occurred within a context of cognitive and 
social agreement of what reading and writing are and how one should perform them. However, 
my study did not include observation of home or school reading experiences. In the end, I did not 
have enough information to verify whether any child’s behaviors were truly strategic per the 
definition above. Even if my participants’ metacognitive behaviors were strategic, I am not 
claiming that they were defined behaviors that could be replicated at will. I am only claiming 
that metacognitive behaviors occurred in the context of joint reading during this study. Since the 
preschool curriculum did not officially include comprehension instruction, it is likely that 
participants’ performances were influenced by a variety of reading practices experienced at 
school, at the library, and at home. Furthermore, I was open to unique and whimsical 
interpretations of the texts and the task. These commitments legitimized my study of intelligent 
actions during reading without referring to them as strategies.  
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I also did not emphasize the term self-regulation. Fox and Riconscente explained that 
“understanding metacognition and self-regulation as aspects of human behavior, learning, and 
development requires situating them within the broad context of all activities for humans of all 
ages and points of development, while self-regulated learning is, by most definitions, limited to 
students in academic contexts (e.g., Zimmerman, 2008)” (2008, p. 374). Fox and Riconscente 
(2008) connected this distinction to Vygotsky’s notion that children in any society are taught 
formal, academic, or “scientific concepts” through formal institutions such as school (1978, p. 
35). Before that, they use “natural concepts” (1978, p. 35) to navigate the world and all of its 
informal learning situations. In this study, it would have been inappropriate to look for 
implementation or self-regulation of formal strategies that conventional readers are taught to use. 
Had this study used pure observation (Neuman & Roskos, 1997), then the child data could have 
been interpreted as a form of folk strategies for accomplishing tasks. However, I intended to 
explore what happened during joint reading as a form of interactive participant observation. 
Though participants engaged in actions that could be interpreted as strategic and/or self-regulated 
attempts to make meaning from text (e.g., counting pictured objects, turning back through pages, 
and closely examining illustrations for meaning), I preferred to language their behaviors using 
terms such as constructive, cognitive, and metacognitive.  
Discussion of Limitations 
Two limitations impeded my ability to fully answer my research question through my 
study design: the influence of joint reading practices on collected data and the influence of the 
study environment on collected data. 
 Influence of joint reading practices. Younger and older participants may not 
spontaneously engage in, benefit from, and/or share metacognitive knowledge, thoughts, and 
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experiences. I therefore designed this study to collect both prompted and unprompted data (Lee 
& Schmitt, 2014) and both verbal and non-verbal data (Whitebread et al., 2009). However, this 
study’s procedures may have influenced data collection and analysis and therefore the 
conclusions drawn. Brown (1980) drew attention to an almost unanswerable question relevant to 
any study in which a researcher interacts with a young participant – if it was prompted, was it 
metacognitive at all? This question goes beyond assuming that children actually have more 
sophisticated internal thoughts that they can’t articulate and calls into question whether any 
metacognition took place at all.  
Though I did not implement a formal intervention, some aspects of my procedures could 
be considered influential. Since children can internalize both explicit and implicit scaffolding 
(Lee & Schmitt, 2014) from the adult party to joint reading, distinguishing truly independent data 
was difficult. In other words, though some data was clearly spontaneous in accordance with my 
operational definition, it was not necessarily truly independent.  
Nonetheless, my truth claims in this study concern what participants did in the context of 
a procedure that is interactive, unpredictable, and proleptic by design. By treating each reading 
session as an embedded unit of analysis and by richly describing not only what the child did, but 
also what I did, and what the text offered, I accounted for the influences of my prompts and other 
verbal input within my narrative impressions. It is possible that my questions and prompts helped 
set a base for future metacognitive growth for the participants. The questions and prompts were 
scaffolds to make the invisible visible. The totality of data and the results of my search for rival 
explanations suggested that the abilities to understand and respond to these scaffolds belonged to 
the preschoolers. Thus, salient questions and prompts appeared to create a space that may help to 
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document and describe the beginnings of metacognition in joint readings and perhaps throughout 
emergent literacy. I discuss this idea further in my suggestions for future research.  
Implementing a challenging, novel procedure in a naturalistic setting. Implementing 
a novel procedure in a naturalistic setting posed some difficulties. Participants were given 
prompts that ostensibly challenged them to concentrate and articulate their thinking while being 
distracted by the normal activities of the classroom. Most reading sessions experienced at least 
one interruption by other children or by a teacher. These likely interrupted concentration and 
precluded collection of some verbal and nonverbal data. I also had to forego data collection 
opportunities when I perceived fatigue or boredom, by not posing preplanned questions or by 
allowing participants to skip pages. Also, many participants were distracted by my visible use of 
a small video camera to record sessions versus use of a hidden camera. Many participants 
requested to start and stop the recording or to view the recording of their session in real time. In 
sum, conducting sessions in the regular preschool classroom posed a tension between rigor and 
ecological relevance. In future studies, I intend to not have to make this tradeoff, by selecting a 
more spacious site and working with staff members to set up a reading area that is less likely to 
be interrupted. 
Implications for Theory 
My findings suggest two main implications for continued metacognitive theory building. 
The first is that seeking to understand situational, functional relationships among meta-capacities 
that emerge during the preschool years is more important than searching for a start year or a pre-
determined developmental sequence. In this study, theory of mind, use of metacognitive 
language, and metacognition functioned as distinct yet related phenomena. It would not have 
been fruitful to think of these three areas as sequential. For example, participants who recognized 
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the representational nature of the thought bubbles did not necessarily demonstrate the most 
metacognitive engagement during joint reading. Second, my findings suggested that young 
metacognitive agents can have meaningful metacognition without being able to recall or discuss 
the experience. The task of joint storybook reading invited metacognition actions, enabled 
metacognitive experiences, and presumably built metacognitive knowledge.  
Implications for Future Research  
My findings suggested three main implications for continued research. First, future 
research on preschoolers’ interaction with stories before they can conventionally read print 
should include metacognition. The canon of emergent literacy research has addressed topics such 
as familiarity with storybook language (Dooley & Matthews, 2009; Purcell-Gates, 2001; Sulzby, 
1985), acquisition of meaning vocabulary (Blamey et al., 2012), or proficiency in various code-
based skills (NELP, 2008). Tompkins et al. (2013) and Hannon and Frias (2012) added focus on 
the capacities of pre-readers to engage in higher order comprehension processes such as 
inferencing. Studies of higher order processes have included preschoolers’ proficiency with false 
belief scenarios (Riggio & Cassidy, 2009) and their use of metacognitive language (Peskin & 
Astington, 2004). As suggested by this range of topics, the totality of emergent literacy research 
has established that both lower and higher order meaning making processes are relevant to 
emergent literacy (Clay, 1991; Dooley & Matthews, 2009; van den Broek et al., 2011). The 
present study began to examine how metacognition may work in concert with these processes 
during joint book reading.  
Second, research on reading-related metacognition should include preschoolers as 
participants. Four-year-olds shouldn’t be excluded from the study of comprehension or 
metacognition based on age or pre-conventional literacy status. However, it should be studied 
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through developmentally-appropriate and ecologically-relevant methods. In the present study, 
metacognition was not necessarily a function of emergent literacy sophistication. Neither was it 
consistently a function of interacting with a particular book, or responding to a particular prompt, 
or engaging in a repeated reading. Furthermore, the quantity of metacognition alone did not 
indicate cognitive or metacognitive proficiency. The implication is that future studies of 
preschoolers’ metacognition should respect these complexities and avoid concluding that 
absence of pre-defined metacognitive behaviors equates with an absence of metacognition. 
Another subtle implication for research design is that story construction and story comprehension 
are not necessarily the same thing. Children may retell familiar stories from memory, an issue 
Sulzby (1985) was aware of but did not control for in her seminal study. Therefore, when 
studying metacognition in relation to comprehension of structured information in a narrative text, 
care must be taken to distinguish between these two functions (Kintsch, 1998). In a similar vein, 
theory of mind, understanding of false beliefs, and expressive and receptive familiarity with 
metacognitive language are organic components of story comprehension and can be direct 
objects of or partners with metacognition (Peskin & Astington, 2004). Therefore, these 
constructs are best studied in concert, transactionally.  
Third, metacognition research with preschool participants should embrace storybook 
reading methods using actual children’s picture books and without the use of error detection. 
Joint storybook reading is a recognizable task that can be implemented with or without 
prompting. Multiple storybooks may yield more reliable information, as text characteristics can 
affect whether and how metacognition is relevant. The gists of the four texts in the present study 
were salient. Participants could fail to grasp multiple main ideas without undermining their 
ability to articulate a refrain, state an internal motivation or goal, and evaluate whether the goal 
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was reached. Future research may benefit from working with texts that are conceptually 
challenging or texts that cannot be understood without comprehension of a meaningful number 
of constituent propositions. Real texts could be understood or not for any number of reasons, 
meaning that metacognition could be relevant in any number of ways. There is no need to add 
metacognitive vocabulary (Peskin & Astington, 2004) or implant errors (Skarakis-Doyle & 
Dempsey, 2008). Stories invite understanding, and understanding invites metacognition (Baker, 
2017). As observed in the reading of The Very Lonely Firefly, when students do encounter errors 
in texts, they may not be obvious, and what to do about them even less so.  
 Expanding study of the most productive questions and prompts to use during joint 
reading would also be a fruitful area for future research. Joint reading, as a form of dialogic 
reading, is already considered a best practice in emergent literacy (NELP, 2008). However, what 
exactly adults should say and how they should interact with children is a topic of ongoing 
research. In the present study, open-ended prompts tended to produce impressive responses 
(sophisticated and/or metacognitive). Although metacognitive and thinking prompts may have 
been a novel form of discourse for the participants, they often produced higher order processing 
or critical insights. Thus, these interaction patterns can be comfortably added to the informal 
routines of shared or joint reading.  In fact, Rosemary and Roskos (2002) noted that adults can 
send implicit messages about thinking, learning, communicating, and reading through classroom 
talk about literacy functions and through the special “sustained verbal interaction” (p. 225) of 
adult-child book reading. The facilitative mechanisms of questions and prompts could be a 
fruitful space for related future study. 
 The study of questions and prompts could also gather information on the relationships 
between theory of mind concepts and metacognition. My analysis of participants’ responses to 
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the thought bubbles in Pancakes provided an example. The text feature of thought bubbles also 
seemed to play a special role by connecting emerging skills in the related areas of narrative 
comprehension, theory of mind, and metacognition. Not all participants understood that thought 
bubbles represented the character’s thoughts; some thought they were just a page cut out 
showing another action sequence. However, they all understood my question about thought 
bubbles and could earnestly answer. Thus, the mere presence of thought bubbles encouraged the 
focus of attention to the main character’s internal experiences, such as the abstract acts of 
thinking, planning, wishing, or imagining. Thought bubbles also provided a reason to use 
metacognitive language within the joint reading discourse. Finally, thought bubbles exemplified 
the idea of documenting and sharing thoughts as defined objects. The language of my questions 
about thought bubbles also provided cues about how to react to them.  
Conclusions 
 The results of this study demonstrated that particular forms of reading-related 
metacognition are comfortably within the zone of proximal emergent literacy development for 
typical 4-year-olds. In the present study, preschool participants were metacognitive in at least 
seven ways. These results concurred with Whitebread et al.’s conclusion that underappreciation 
of the metacognitive capabilities of preschoolers is becoming an “increasingly untenable” 
position (2009, p. 64). From birth, children accumulate knowledge, beliefs, and routines 
concerning language, communication, print, texts, reading, and writing (IRA & NAEYC, 1998). 
This emergence of literacy includes the formation of ideas about the act of reading (Strommen & 
Mates, 1997) and about the self as an active participant in literate communication (Clay, 1991; 
Neuman & Roskos, 1997; Rowe, 1989).  
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In the present study, metacognition was a meaningful feature of the joint reading of 
picture books; articulating internal meaning-making processes co-occurred with talk about 
pancakes and ducklings. Preschool participants were constructively responsive meaning-makers; 
they went through many of the same cognitive and metacognitive meaning-making processes 
that readers of any age do. These results should bring attention to the relevance of metacognition 
to the joint reading of picture books and inspire curiosity about the importance of metacognition 
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